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1. This project assesses the impacts that recent floods in Scotland have had on 
people, their attitudes and behaviour and establishes ‘what works’ in relation to flood 
prevention programmes and flood warning and dissemination systems.  It also 
identifies the consequences of living in a flood risk area for those with and without 
the experience of being flooded. 
 
2. The report comprises a literature review (Chapter Two) followed by an outline 
of the methods used to capture and analyse the data in selected locations across 
Scotland and an assessment of the socio-demographic profiles of flood risk areas 
when compared with Scotland as a whole (Chapter Three).  The main findings of the 
project are derived from a household survey in which flood impacts and attitudes to 
managing flood risk are assessed (Chapter Four), a series of focus groups which add a 
‘human face’ to the material on flood impacts and contrasting attitudes to managing 
flood risk (Chapter Five) and interviews with key institutional stakeholders who 
manage flood risk both nationally and locally (Chapter Six).  The report ends with a 
discussion on these findings, a summary of ‘what works’ and a series of 





3. Questionnaires were delivered by hand to 2,085 households in seven locations 
(Brechin, Edinburgh, Elgin, Forres, Glasgow-Shettleston, Hawick and Perth) and by 
post to 236 households in scattered rural and coastal communities.  The respective 
response rates for hand-delivered and postal questionnaires were 1,154 (55.3%) and 
69 (29.2%) respectively, giving an overall response rate of 52.7%.  Within the 1,223 
returned questionnaires, 633 were from households which had been flooded and 590 
from households not flooded but located within areas that had been flooded over the 
period 1993-2005.  Focus groups were conducted with respondents from the 
household survey at five locations.  Structured interviews were conducted with senior 
staff from eleven institutional stakeholders drawn from local authorities, SEPA, the 
Scottish Executive, Scottish Water and the insurance industry.  Socio-demographic 
profiling of the flood risk areas yielded a slight over-representation of single 
pensioner households and a slight under-representation of lone parents with children, 
but in other categories lower socio-economic groups were well-represented when 
compared with urban Scotland as a whole. 
 
 
The experience of being flooded 
 
4. In the surveyed locations, rivers overtopping their banks was the most 
common cause of flooding (85%) followed by surcharging sewers and overland flow 
(‘pluvial flooding’ – 10%) and coastal storms (5%).  The flood waters were nearly 
always contaminated with mud and/or sewage.  
 
5. Of the flooded households surveyed 42% received some kind of warning, one 
third of which provided more than 3 hours notice of the flood.  The most common 
form of warning to those flooded was from neighbours (32%) and just over 51% of 
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flooded households had received an official warning (official phoning or knocking on 
door, loud hailer or automatic telephone message).  Approximately a third of those 
who had been flooded and a fifth of those living in flood risk areas now use SEPA’s 
Floodline as an information source, but this leaves a significant majority of those at 
risk in the surveyed locations unaware of the service.  Nearly 80% of those using the 
service found it “helpful or very helpful”. Receiving a warning increased confidence 
in getting a sufficient warning next time, but this was lessened by the actual 
experience of being flooded.  Direct methods of dissemination were strongly 
favoured, particularly officials knocking on the door, and media messages.   
 
6. The most common immediate responses to a warning were to remove 
possessions from the ground floor, deploy sandbags or flood guards, move vehicles 
and vacate the property.  Neighbours and friends provided most of the emergency 
assistance with local authority and Fire Service staff assisting around 20% of flooded 
households.  Only 5% of those forced to leave their homes used an Evacuation Centre 
but 45% of households required temporary accommodation for 6 months or more.  
The main providers of temporary accommodation were friends and relatives (44%) 
and the public and private rental sector (52%).  
 
7. Direct economic losses for households averaged around £32,000 for damage 
to buildings and around £13,500 for damage to contents.  Around 10 days of time off 






8. Respondents to the household survey were invited to rank 20 potential flood 
impacts and the outcomes coded on a four point scale: 0 – not applicable or no 
impact, 1 – mild, 2 – serious and 3 – extreme impact.  When all 20 potential impacts 
were grouped into three classes and the scores aggregated, intangible impacts 
(relating to non-material and/or emotional losses) registered markedly higher values 
than tangible impacts (relating to material losses), and immediate impacts were 
generally higher than lasting impacts.  Intangible immediate impacts (overall score 
of 1.81) included the stress of the flood itself, the anxiety of being out of one’s home, 
the discomfort of living in temporary accommodation and the time and effort in 
dealing with insurers and builders to return home as soon as possible.   Intangible 
lasting impacts (which focus on the time and effort to return to a normal life) were 
more sustained and included fear of future flooding, strains within the family itself and 
loss of sentimental/irreplaceable items.  Collectively these scored 1.29 overall, lower 
than the intangible immediate impacts, but higher than the tangible impacts which 
scored 1.12 overall.  One immediate consequence of these findings is that the cost-
benefit analyses for flood alleviation schemes should consider including intangible 
social impacts. 
 
9. Impacts on surveyed households were also examined in terms of respondents’ 
take up of insurance, their occupational status, household income, housing tenure, 
whether a warning was received and the frequency and nature of the flood.   
Households with insurance registered higher stress levels, in part as a result of dealing 
with loss adjustors and builders whilst living in temporary accommodation.  
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Households with an annual income of less than £20,000 also reported higher levels of 
stress and anxiety and more adverse health impacts.  Tangible impacts were rated 
more highly for households with a skilled or semi-skilled highest earner compared to 
those with a professional or managerial highest earner.  Pluvial floods with little or no 
warning and floods with high levels of sewage contamination generated higher 
tangible impacts and strikingly higher lasting intangible impacts.  Greater flood 
depths markedly exacerbated the stress of the flood and disruption of living in 
temporary accommodation.  Repeated flooding added to anxieties over future 
flooding and declining property values.  Floods with the most severe impacts were 
those in Elgin (1997 and 2002) and Glasgow-Shettleston (2002).  
 
 
Managing flood risk 
 
10. In terms of living with the risk of flooding, nearly two thirds of those in the 
household survey who were flooded regard future flooding as “likely” or “very 
likely”, but this reduces to around 40% for those not flooded.  Most households 
gained their knowledge of flood risk from neighbours, friends or the local authority.  
The experience of being flooded does not improve householders’ confidence in what 
to do in a future flood. 
 
11. Contents insurance covered 91% of households living in flood risk areas, 
reducing to around 75% for social tenants.  84% of flooded households had contents 
insurance of which 37% were subsequently charged a higher excess.  Knowledge of 
‘pay-with-rent’ contents insurance is known about by 37% of council tenants and the 
take-up 13%.  However, given that around 75% of social tenants who have been 
flooded now have contents insurance (with around 10% using ‘pay with rent’ 
schemes), further promotion of such schemes should address affordability and the 
reluctance of some insurers to provide cover.  Over six in ten flooded households in 
the survey have some degree of flood proofing (removable flood guards or sand bags, 
sometimes provided by the local authority) and have moved irreplaceable items to a 
safe place.   
 
12. When invited to state preferences for flood risk management by far the most 
popular measures were structural defences closely followed by a flood warning 
service and upstream storage in reservoirs.  Payments to rural landowners to increase 
upstream storage of flood waters and demolition of the most threatened properties, 
with compensation or relocation of residents, attracted much lower levels of support.  
In terms of where protection from flooding should lie, respondents assigned the main 
responsibility to local authorities (58%) followed by the Scottish Executive (42%); 
SEPA, Scottish Water and home-owners or landlords all registering <20%.   When 
asked where this responsibility actually lay, these shifted to local authorities (45%), 
home-owners or landlords (26%) and Scottish Executive (17%) with SEPA and 
Scottish Water registering <12%.  It is striking that in neither set of answers did 
respondents register home-owners and landlords as primarily responsible for flood 
protection.  When asked if they would be willing to pay additional council tax to fund 
flood protection the majority of respondents declined, but 10% of those who had been 
flooded would be willing to contribute at least an additional £100 per year.  
Willingness to pay was lower for households renting from local authorities or housing 
associations and higher for households with an income >£20,000 per year. 
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Personal accounts of being flooded 
 
13. Findings from the household survey were further probed and elaborated by 
focus groups held in Elgin, Forres, Glasgow, Perth and Edinburgh.  A more nuanced 
set of findings emerged privileging individual stories and revealing the human face of 
flooding with greater clarity.   
 
14. In terms of tangible impacts most participants reported a downturn in the 
property market immediately after the flood and problems in recovering additional 
day-to-day expenses such as meals in hotels and restaurants.  Most loss adjusters and 
insurance companies were prompt and efficient in agreeing and settling claims, but 
the settling of relatively minor sums was occasionally contentious.  Extensive delays 
were claimed on behalf of some social tenants in being re-housed and returned to their 
original homes.  Loss of no-claims bonuses and high flooding excesses became an 
unexpected issue for some participants. 
 
15. The trauma of being flooded and its immediate aftermath was by far the most 
significant intangible impact reported in the focus groups, disproportionately felt by 
the elderly and most vulnerable.  Anxiety and stress often peaked after the flood, 
when the scale of disruption became clearer and initial coping strategies dwindled.  
Physical and mental ill-health impacts also became more apparent, exacerbating 
existing chronic conditions.  Dealing with building contractors and monitoring the 
timing and quality of repair work proved especially stressful.  The loss of family 
photos and mementoes was particularly acute for the elderly for whom these items 
were amongst their most cherished possessions.  Some participants reported how 
difficult it was to maintain family cohesion when children live in hotels or stay with 
grandparents and schooling suffers.  Relationships within the family were also 
severely tested by living in temporary accommodation and simultaneously dealing 
with tradesman in short supply and checking on the quality of their work. 
 
16. In terms of living with the continued risk of being flooded, the value of 
warnings was questioned by some participants in terms of what could be done to 
minimise personal losses, partly reflecting a lack of information.  Risk perception is 
highly variable with floods attributed to ‘acts of God’, land management upstream 
and poor maintenance of urban water courses.  Local risk assessment is variously 
based on a realistic understanding of structural defences and less robust anecdotal 
information on historic floods.  Most focus group members acknowledged a degree of 
personal responsibility in dealing with floods but this was tempered with blame 
attached to local authorities for alleged failings both during and after floods. 
 
 
Responses of senior flood risk stakeholders 
 
17. Questions to senior flood risk stakeholders on flood warning and 
dissemination, raising flood awareness, emergency planning, the role of Flood Liaison 
Advice Groups (FLAGs) and the role of insurance helped to characterise the roles of 
key institutional stakeholders. 
 
18. Key flood risk management objectives for local authorities are (i) reducing 
flood risk to a manageable level where the risk is known, (ii) using the planning 
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process to direct development away from flood risk areas, (iii) seamless co-ordination 
with the emergency services in providing temporary flood defences and evacuation of 
people at risk; and (iv) promoting flood alleviation schemes (where cost-benefit 
analysis permits) with public involvement in the procedures from the earliest stages. 
 
19. SEPA’s flood warning service covers the majority of communities at risk, but 
gaps still have to be filled, especially in Aberdeenshire and the upper Forth estuary.  
The extension of Flood Watch to cover coastal areas at risk will soon be implemented 
alongside a progressive expansion of inland warning schemes.  Dissemination of 
warnings varies markedly across Scotland.  In the Scottish Borders and Moray, local 
authority staff report Automated Voice Messaging highly effective in its contact rates 
for those registered.  The police continue to disseminate warnings in the Highland 
Council area and parts of Perth & Kinross, but have withdrawn this service in other 
parts of Scotland.  Since it is rarely possible to warn against pluvial flooding, Scottish 
Water is fitting non-return valves, sealing manhole covers and providing flood guards 
in selected high risk urban areas based on its Flooding Register.  Several of the local 
authorities interviewed have sought to engage community groups in disseminating 
flood warnings and initiating emergency response, but the level of training required 
and the need to maintain this competency between floods is viewed as a challenge.   
 
20. Raising flood awareness via information campaigns remains a priority with 
managers interviewed in both local authorities and SEPA acknowledging very limited 
public understanding of flood risk and where the statutory duties for flood defence 
actually lie.  At present raising awareness largely rests on SEPA’s locally focused 
campaigns and local authority Biennial Reports and Flood Liaison Advice Groups 
(FLAGs) which bring together landowners, local authority engineers and planners, 
Scottish Water and the insurance companies.   
 
21. National flood emergency management is based on eight regional co-
ordinating bodies whose role has been strengthened following the Civil Contingencies 
Act 2004.  Local authority flood emergency plans include liaising with SEPA, pro-
active distribution of sand bags (to both households and local authority staff), 
activating temporary defences and the deployment of council employees as local 
flood wardens.  This ‘nested’ structure works well and has been commended by 
central government. 
 
22. The Association of British Insurers’ policy on flooding is to continue to 
provide cover for properties with a risk of flooding of less than 1 in 75 years.  For a 
risk of more than 1 in 75 years, cover is available where improved flood defence is 
planned within 5 years.  For properties which have been flooded new applications 
may be refused and existing policy-holders will see increased premiums and excesses. 









1.1 The impacts of floods have long been recognised as complex and multi-
faceted.  In Scotland, flooding fatalities have been rare in recent decades, but financial 
damage to property, disruption to communications and business losses have all 
featured regularly in appraisals of flood impacts (eg Scoping study into the costs of 
Flooding, JBA, 2005).  Such appraisals are subject to considerable uncertainty, with 
economic impacts featuring more prominently than social impacts which are more 
difficult to encapsulate.  Not surprisingly, there is a growing awareness by flood risk 
managers that social impacts have been under-represented in post-flood appraisals.   
 
1.2 Following a series of damaging floods across parts of England and Wales 
(1998, 2000 and 2002) and Scotland (Perth 1993, Strathclyde, 1994, Edinburgh 2000, 
and Elgin 1997, 2002) flood risk management in the UK has undergone a series of 
radical reviews (Institution of Civil Engineers Learning to Live with Rivers, 2000; 
DEFRA Making Space for Water, 2004) and the Foresight Project Future Flooding 
(Evans et al., 2004, Werritty with Chatterton, 2004).  Collectively these reviews have 
proposed less reliance on hard engineering solutions, schemes which work ‘with’ 
rather than ‘against’ nature and more of a ‘people dimension’ in flood risk 
management.  Future Flooding also stressed the need for a paradigm shift in which 
flood risk management relies less on state intervention and more on an acceptance of 
individual responsibility.  
 
1.3 In response to substantial flood losses during the 1990s the Scottish Executive 
developed a policy of ‘Awareness, Avoidance, Alleviation and Assistance’ which also 
enhanced the ‘people dimension’ in flood risk management.  In 2003, sustainable 
flood management become a duty for responsible authorities under section 2 of the 
Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003.  This concept was 
subsequently defined by the National Technical Advisory Group on Flooding 
(Scottish Executive, 2005) as follows: 
 
“Sustainable flood management provides the maximum possible social and economic 
resilience against flooding by protecting and working with the environment, in a way 
which is fair and affordable both now and in the future”  (emphasis added). 
 
The inclusion of social resilience designed to “enhance community benefit with fair 
outcomes for everyone” is noteworthy.  Further work on implementing the Water 
Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003 is currently being undertaken 
by the Scottish Executive’s Flooding Issues Advisory Group. 
 
1.4 For the full potential benefit of these policies to be achieved, there is a need 
for a more robust evidence base surrounding flooding and flood risk.  A number of 
key questions remain to be asked.  What precisely are the social impacts of being 
flooded or living in a flood risk area?  How important are less tangible issues such as 
feeling secure in one’s own home compared to the more easily quantified economic 
costs?  Are such feelings of insecurity felt more strongly by certain groups, such as 
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the elderly and disabled, and what are the implications for their health and well-
being? 
 
1.5 Moving beyond the impacts of a flood on the individuals affected, what are the 
likely implications for community cohesion?  While a flood may initially bring 
neighbours close together in helping each other through the immediate aftermath, 
what of the longer term implications, for example if fear of future floods causes 
people to start moving away?  
 
1.6 Are the communities in flood risk areas more or less affluent than the Scottish 
average?  This is likely to have a major impact on householders’ resilience to a flood, 
for example in terms of their ability to put flood proofing measures in place, secure 
alternative accommodation (temporary or permanent), replace possessions, etc.  What 
is the take up of insurance cover and is this differentiated by social class, income and 
housing tenure? 
 
1.7 Finally, what awareness of, and attitudes toward, flooding are held in 
communities in flood risk areas and how are they differentiated by social class, age 
and housing tenure?  How might public policy respond to differential expectations 
and levels of awareness? 
 
 
Objectives of the project 
 
1.8 The project has the following objectives: 
 
1. To assess the range of impacts that experience of recent flooding in Scotland 
has had on people, their attitudes and behaviours; and 
2. To establish ‘what works’ with particular population groups and locations in 
relation to flood prevention campaigns and flood warning/dissemination 
systems. 
 
1.9 In fulfilling these objectives, it aims to answer the following questions: 
 
• What are the social impacts of living in a flood risk area, for both those who 
have been flooded and those not flooded? 
• How important are social impacts, such as disruption, upset, stress and ill-
health, for those in flood risk areas, compared to the economic impacts which 
are more easily quantified? 
• Are such feelings of insecurity more strongly felt by certain social groups, 
such as the elderly and those on low incomes, and what are the implications 
for the health and well-being of those groups?  
• What degrees of awareness of, and attitudes toward, flooding are held in 
communities and how might public policy respond to this? 
• How do the key institutional stakeholders manage flood risk, and to what 
effect? 
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2.1 The social disruption caused by floods can seriously undermine the quality of 
life of individuals and impact on the fabric of affected communities (Gordon, 2004). 
As well as the physical and health dangers of flood waters, the psychological impact 
of the emergency and aftermath causes longer term effects that may be exacerbated by 
stresses such as having to move out of the home, cleaning up, negotiating with 
insurers and getting damage repaired and goods replaced (RPA, 2005).  Even when 
the ‘recovery’ phase is over, there may be difficulties caused by living with the 
ongoing risk, obtaining and paying for insurance and the effect on house prices and 
community cohesion. 
  
2.2 The economic cost of flooding in Scotland is estimated to average £31.5 
million per year from inland flooding and £19.1 million from coastal flooding 
(Werritty with Chatterton, 2004).  These broad-brush estimates focus on direct costs 
and say little about the social impacts of flooding in Scotland (JBA, 2005).  Media 
coverage, while often dramatic, is usually short lived and limited to ‘rescue’ situations 
and anecdotes of hardship.  The people featured then disappear into the background 
and have to pick up the pieces out of the public view.   
 
2.3 Over 170,000 residential and commercial properties in Scotland, some 10-
12% of the total, are thought to be at risk of flooding at present (Werritty with 
Chatterton, 2004).  However, a much larger group will be at risk in the future with 
climate change likely to result in higher winter rainfall (especially in the west), more 
intense summer storms and rising sea levels (Baxter et al., 2001; Hulme et al., 2002; 
Milly et al., 2002; Werritty et al., 2002).  Further factors that will increase future 
flood risk include legacies of drainage systems that have inadequate capacity, poor 
building construction techniques and flood defences adapted to a former hydrological 
regime (Price and McKenna, 2003; Evans et al., 2004).  These factors combine with 
the planning ‘inertia’ of homes and businesses already located on floodplains, low-
lying coastal zones and urban areas at risk of flooding.  
 
2.4 This literature review collates information from a range of sources, mainly 
academic journal articles, government and consultants’ reports, media reports and 
industrial data sources. The objective is to summarise the current state of knowledge 
about the impacts of flooding on individuals and communities, the impacts of living 
with flood risk, and opinions on the best way to manage flood risk. 
 
 




2.5 Deaths directly attributable to the physical impact of floods are relatively rare 
in the UK, although many more are documented in Europe, where floods have been 
both deeper and faster-flowing (Rosenthal et al., 1998; Rosenthal and Bezuyen, 
2000).  The most commonly affected groups are those mobile at the time of the flood, 
who encounter floodwaters and associated storm conditions (Jonkman and Kelman, 
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2005; DEFRA, 2006).  Bye and Horner (1998) document five deaths from the 1998 
floods in England and Wales.  In Scotland, the January 2005 storm and flooding led to 
five deaths in the Outer Hebrides, and three lives were lost during the severe floods 
that occurred in northern England.1 
 
2.6 Limited information is available on indirect mortality from floods, for 
example, due to the shock of the event exacerbating pre-existing health conditions 
such as heart disease and strokes, particularly among the elderly.  But Ohl and Tapsell 
(2000) observe that such deaths are closely related to the prevailing socioeconomic 
and existing health conditions of the community.  Increases in population mortality 
rates of 50% were noted in Bristol following the 1968 floods, in a controlled study 
(Bennet, 1970), and a similar proportionate increase was noted on Canvey Island 
following the 1953 storm surge (Baxter et al., 2001). There is also evidence of an 
effect on suicide risk (see para 2.11 below). These deaths represent a substantial 
social impact from floods, but one that is very difficult to quantify owing to the lack 





2.7 Flooding impacts directly on both physical and psychological health, with a 
strong interaction between the two.  The most extensive recent study, global in scope, 
is the Tyndall Centre’s Floods health and climate change: a strategic review (Few et 
al., 2004; summarised in Ahern et al., 2005).  In this work, which includes studies in 
England, Australia and the USA, the health impacts of flooding are closely related to 
age and pre-existing health (RPA, 2005). 
 
2.8 Physical health impacts of floods include shock, gastrointestinal illnesses 
(particularly if flood waters were contaminated with sewage) and respiratory illnesses 
(Hajat et al., 2003).  Although few incidents have been reported in the UK in recent 
years, there is evidence of gastrointestinal effects after the severe flooding in the 
Midlands in 1998 (Ohl and Tapsell 2000).  Reacher et al. (2004) also noted an 
increase in self-reported gastroenteritis and respiratory complaints following the 2000 
floods in Lewes, England.  Vector and rodent-borne diseases have not been reported 
for recent floods in the UK. 
  
2.9 According to the World Health Organisation (2001), psychological health 
impacts, although well documented in the literature, have yet to be fully addressed in 
terms of disaster preparedness or service delivery.  But impacts that have been 
recorded include acute stress, clinical depression and anxiety, as well as post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  A number of reports have shown that these impacts 
are made worse by the scale of the flood, the time taken to return to normal, the 
presence of contaminants, evacuation, and ineffectiveness of other actions and help 
received (Green et al., 1985a,b; Tapsell and Tunstall, 2000, 2006; Tapsell et al., 2002; 
Adeola, 2003; Galea et al., 2005; RPA, 2005).  Victims of the 1997 floods in 
California showed evidence of acute stress, with both short and long term reactions 
(Waelde et al., 1998; 2001). Increases in stress and depression have been observed 
                                                 




following various floods in the UK (Bennet, 1970; Green et al., 1985b; Tapsell et al., 
2002; Reacher et al., 2004).  These can last for years (Tapsell and Wilson, 2003), and 
although the effect may diminish with time, recurrence can occur in response to 
triggers, such as anniversaries (Echterling, 1987).  Psychological health is strongly 
mediated by support structures and interventions have the potential to reduce the 
mental health impact if timely and comprehensive (WHO, 2003).  However, these 
structures may be poor to nonexistent where the flood is unexpected (Tapsell and 
Tunstall, 2000).  
 
2.10 Other studies focused on flooding in developed nations have investigated the 
extent of impacts on psychological health across social groups. They show that the 
impacts are differentiated, and tend to be higher among more ‘socially vulnerable’ 
individuals.  In Australia, Abrahams et al. (1976) found an increase in depression in 
both men and women following the 1974 Brisbane floods.  In a follow-up study, Price 
(1978) investigated the age-related effects of the same floods, finding that those 
between 35 and 75 years of age were most affected.  Women showed greater 
symptoms, but this gender difference disappeared at over 65 years of age.  In the 
USA, Melick (1978) and Logue et al. (1981) found no significant mental health 
effects in working class males three years after a flood resulting from tropical storm 
Agnes in Pennsylvania, 1972.  However, the apparent lack of impact may have been 
due to a long time lapse after the event.  Phifer et al. (1988), investigating 55-74 year 
olds, found an inverse relationship between health impact (depression and anxiety) 
and socioeconomic status.  Greater impacts were seen in those who had a previous 
history of depression.  
 
2.11 There is also evidence that flooding, via increased depression, leads to greater 
suicide risk.  Fifty such suicides were documented in Poland by the International 
Federation of the Red Cross/ Red Crescent Societies as ‘likely to have been caused’ 
by the widespread River Oder flooding in 1997 (IFRC, 1998).  Data on suicide links 
to flood impacts are lacking in the UK, although 13 out of 1510 respondents in the 
RPA (2005) survey (see Box 1) reported having ‘had thoughts’ of suicide.  Cognitive 
psychological impacts of floods may also occur.  Thus those who have been flooded 
in the past may believe they are at immediate risk when they are not, and 
consequently experience anxiety more often than before the flood, sometimes with 
persistent effects (Beck et al., 1985).  There may also be ripple effects and knock-on 
impacts of the disaster on friends, family and those involved in the emergency (Eyre, 
2004).  The ‘anniversary’ effect, providing unwanted reminders each year after the 
event, has also been noted (Echterling and Hoschar, 1987). 
 
2.12 Children may also be affected psychologically, although the severity is 
mediated by the degree of support from their family structure.  Green et al. (1985a) 
document psychological effects specific to this group, including symptoms of PTSD 
and behavioural difficulties several months after the flood (an effect also found in 
Scotland by Fordham and Ketteridge, 1995). 
 
 
Intangible losses and health 
 
2.13 A study by RPA (2005) in England and Wales showed that damage to and loss 
of memorabilia and irreplaceable items was ranked as a major impact by respondents. 
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Although ranked below the effort of getting a house back to normal, having to leave 
home, and anxiety about future flooding, the loss and damage of memorabilia was 
ranked above health impacts.  Financial hardship after a flood can also be devastating 
and has strong links to psychological health (Green et al., 1985b).   
 
 
Community and housing impacts 
 
2.14 Flooding impacts on communities are complex and varied.  There is some 
evidence that, in the aftermath of a flood, cohesion can increase with ‘everyone 
pulling together’ (termed ‘social fusion’ by Gordon, 2004), but much of this evidence 
is anecdotal.  Instead the flood may eventually act as a divisive influence on the 
community due to its impact on certain groups.  This arises from the perception (real 
or imagined) that particular groups are favoured by emergency and longer term 
assistance even though these groups might, in fact, have had greater need.  Such 
effects can override social fusion, creating ‘cleavage planes’ (Gordon, 2004).  This 
was noted by Fordham and Ketteridge (1995) in communities in Perth and 
Strathclyde, flooded in 1993 and 1994 respectively   One thousand out of the 1200 
flooded properties in Perth comprised local authority housing (Smith, 1993).  In the 
aftermath of the flood it was widely thought that these tenants had been favoured over 
owner-occupiers and private tenants.   
 
2.15 The longer-term flood impacts on a community are poorly documented and 
vary markedly. In some locations the flood risk may reduce longer term investment in 
a flooded area with a knock-on effect on the housing market if substantial out-
migration occurs.  Yeo (2003) provides an international review of the impacts of 
flooding on property values, reporting effects lasting from two to more than ten years, 
and a wide range of changes in value associated with flooding. They vary from 
reduced values of up to 60% (though more typically in the order of 25%) to increased 
values associated with the benefits of repairs.  Some reduced valuations were 





2.16 Although the economic damage from the 1994 Strathclyde floods and the 
1993 Perth flood were reported as exceeding £100m and £30m respectively, the 
indirect social and health effects were not costed for either event (Chatterton, 1995).  
However, some qualitative data are available on the impacts of flooding on some of 
the communities involved.  Thus Fordham and Ketteridge (1995) reported on 
problems faced by residents in Ferguslie Park, Renfrewshire with anecdotal evidence 
of inadequate emergency accommodation and many difficulties faced in the aftermath 
by those residents with inadequate insurance.  In Perth, some difficulties were noted 
in prioritising assistance, with owner occupiers having felt ‘left out’ by the emergency 
services.  Enarson and Fordham (2001) also noted that the impacts of these two 
flooding events were highly gender-specific, with women shouldering much of the 
burden of organising re-housing and/or household reconstruction, obtaining social 
security benefits and coping with family strains including support for partners and 
child care.  This led to persistent strain and self-reported evidence of stress and 
depression. 
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2.17 More recently, the Scoping study into the cost of flooding using the August 
2004 event as a case study (JBA, 2005) estimated the overall costs of the widespread 
flooding and associated damage in Scotland from the August 2004 floods at between 
£7.2 and £31 million.  This estimate includes some ‘monetised’ social costs; 
evacuation costs, loss of earnings and loss of recreation opportunities, plus costs of 
treating injuries and worry about future flooding.  Several other costs were not 
monetised, including loss of irreplaceables, damage to natural habitats and historical 
sites, loss of confidence in authorities and services, loss of services, loss of 
income/earnings, loss of community and disruption due to flood warnings or alarms. 
Those costs that were assigned a monetary value ranged from £0.6 to £3.7 million. 
However, the report noted that: 
 
“Worry about future flooding is only included for those properties that 
were flooded.  This may be an underestimate in that other households may 
also be concerned about the potential for flooding, particularly if their 
property is close to that flooded in 2004”. (JBA, 2005, p31) 
 
The report further postulated that 
 
  “Overall the non-monetised impacts are not expected to be significant when    
  compared with the money estimates.” (JBA, 2005, p34) 
 
This assertion has not yet been tested in Scotland by a social survey.  The key 
findings of the RPA (2005) survey also require appraisal in Scottish communities, 
which may, as proposed by Werritty with Chatterton (2004) have different 
characteristics to those in England and Wales. 
 
 
Living with flood risk 
 
Social drivers of vulnerability 
 
2.18 A full analysis of the effect of the floods requires us to link the physical 
hazard to the social impacts resulting from it.  These impacts are both direct, from the 
flood itself and indirect, from living with it ‘in the background’ (Green et al., 1994; 
Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, 1999).  
 
2.19 The Office of Science and Technology ‘Foresight’ study Future Flooding 
(Evans et al., 2004) is the most significant attempt to date to isolate the controls on 
flood risk in the UK and, by linking physical and societal drivers, the optimal 
responses to future risk.  Using a source-pathway-receptor flood risk model, the study 
found that for three out of four modelled socioeconomic scenarios to 2080, social 
factors were the most important determinant of the impact of future flooding events, 
but also had the highest range of uncertainty.  Prominent among the ‘key messages’ 
for researchers was to reduce the uncertainty in knowledge of these social factors and, 
from this, to make a strategic assessment of the optimal responses to flood risk for 
particular areas (see Box 2). 
 
2.20 The concepts of vulnerability, coping capacity and adaptation help define the 
potential for managing future flood risk (Hewitt, 1983; Green, 1994; Cutter, 1996; 
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Smit and Pilifosova, 2001; Brooks, 2003; Wisner et al., 2004).  Vulnerability is the set 
of conditions and processes that determine both the likelihood of exposure and 
resulting susceptibility of individuals and social systems to the hazard.  Few (2006, p. 
20), adopting Blaikie et al. (1994), defines vulnerability in the context of floods as: 
 
“a set of conditions and processes that determine the likelihood of exposure 
and the resulting susceptibility of humans or human systems to the adverse 
effects of a flood hazard.” 
 
There is a growing interest in using the social aspects of vulnerability as tools to 
develop policies that can minimise risk and maximise the ability to anticipate and 
adapt to the flood hazard.  Characterising the social aspects of vulnerability comes 
from investigating the impacts of past floods at the individual and community level, 
and living with continuing and increasing vulnerability to future floods.  
Generalisation is difficult as the relationship between the scale of the event and the 
actual or potential hardship suffered is not unique; the same event may have very 
different effects even on adjacent households (Wisner et al., 2004).  Although 
vulnerability is multi-faceted, helpful indices can be derived based on the social 
characteristics of particular areas, such as the Social Flood Vulnerability Index (SFVI) 
(Tapsell et al., 2002) which integrates social factors (presence of long term sick, 
elderly and lone parents) and financial factors (non-homeowners, non-car owners, 
presence of unemployed, and amount of crowded housing).  Flood alleviation benefits 
can then be assessed more accurately with this information to hand (Penning-Rowsell 
and Green, 2000). 
 
2.21 Coping capacity is implicit in the above definition of vulnerability.  It takes a 
positive approach, emphasising the ability of individuals and groups both to avoid 
exposure to hazard and to tolerate and recover from the adverse effects when that 
hazard becomes a disaster (Handmer, 2003; White et al., 2004; Few, 2006).  It is 
important to emphasise the action potential of individual communities and not just 
label them ‘disaster prone’ (Bankoff, 2001).  Social factors and institutional factors 
must both be studied in order to establish the best policy approach to maximise coping 
capacity and thereby reducing vulnerability (Woodward et al., 2000).  The authors of 
Future Flooding (Evans et al., 2004) drew up a suite of possible policy approaches, 
technical solutions and other interventions to manage future risk along the source-
path-receptor route (see Box 2).  
 
2.22 The best approach in enhancing coping capacity is to focus on diverse needs, 
looking at the level of social capital and degree of economic security and equality in 
each area (Cutter, 1996; Crichton, 1999; Bankhoff, 2001; Enarson and Morrow, 2001; 
Adeola, 2003; Handmer, 2003; Walker et al., 2003; Fielding and Burningham, 2005; 
Van der Veen and Logtmeijer, 2005).  Existing surveys in developed countries have 
suggested that large differences can exist in the demands faced by families with 
children, women, minorities, the sick and the elderly, both during and after the flood 
event (Buckland and Rahman 1997; Morrow, 1999; Tapsell and Turnstall 2001; 
Enarson and Fordham, 2001; Cutter et al., 2003).  Local coping capacity may, in 
some cases, also have been weakened by past floods.  Their effects may also be 
persistent and result in existing community divisions being exacerbated by another 
flood (Fordham and Ketteridge, 1995).  The weakening of coping capacity may  
continue through a decline in family cohesion, residential property values (Yeo, 
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2003), community focal points, including local businesses, and an increasing 
disconnection with government and stakeholders. The possibility of a ‘downward 
spiral’, with ever-increasing vulnerability, then becomes a threat that must be 
addressed. 
 
2.23 Adaptation to the flood hazard denotes a long-term increase in coping capacity 
which can arise from a combined change in individual behaviour, resources, 
infrastructure and functions of individuals and their community (Parker, 2000; 
Brooks, 2003; Few, 2006).  Although applied extensively in developing countries 
(Wisner et al., 2004), this concept has also proved useful in developed countries, 
particularly in the context of coping with climatic change and consequential increased 
flood risk (Baxter et al., 2001; Smit et al. 2001; Evans et al., 2004).  By studying the 
social characteristics of particular areas, we can analyse the ‘adaptation likelihood’ of 
the existing social status quo (Brooks, 2003) and focus on what appears to work best. 
Integrating these social and institutional adaptative responses to a flood hazard may 
lead to a ‘virtuous circle’ where the processes by which vulnerability is reduced also 
reinforce community links and connection with stakeholders.  As Few (2006, p 27) 
notes “response to flood risk that is rooted in public inclusion and local scale capacity 
building is a key element in long term risk reduction”.  
 
2.24 A consensus is emerging that the adaptations that are required are those that 
integrate policies and actions at the higher systems level, such as defence, warning, 
emergency management, the range of assets at the local level and the knowledge and 
skills of individuals and stakeholders (Neal and Phillips, 1995; Brown and Damery, 
2002; Few, 2006).  Attention must still be given to maximising the effectiveness of 
those methods that need high level organisation and management, such as flood 
warning and strategic emergency planning (Buckland and Rahman, 1999; Few, 2003). 
According to the IFRC (2002), full preparedness should include: 
 
• risk and vulnerability mapping 
• disaster awareness and education 
• early warning and evacuation 
• stockpiling of relief materials 
• training in response skills 
• planning at all levels to ensure co-ordination of the disaster response. 
 
In this regard it will be helpful to develop an accurate picture of the state of this 
integration in Scotland from the point of view of the public at risk of flooding, and 
stakeholders, which forms one of the objectives of this project. 
 
 
Distribution of risk and vulnerability  
 
2.25 An important part of planning for flood risk is to track where those 
communities at risk of flooding are located and their relation to those likely to suffer 











The study separated groups of householders in areas of England and Wales affected principally 
the floods of 1998 and 2000. A ‘non-flooded-at risk’ group was surveyed alongside flood-
affected groups in thirty locations. 
 
The two groups were selected and segregated by reference to the Environment Agency’s ‘at 
risk’ database, based in turn on the (then-current) indicative floodplain map. 
 
The survey focussed on the general health differences and indicators of stress between the 
groups, which were analysed by a questionnaire, administered by interview. Health effects 
were determined by standard questionnaires addressing general health and post-traumatic 
stress. Most of the flood impacts were rated on Likert scales (e.g. response classes ranging 




The results confirm that flooding causes short term physical effects, and both short and long 
term psychological effects. The degree of impact is linked to socio-demographic factors 
(mainly prior health history, age), flood characteristics (mainly assessed depth) and post-flood 
effects such as problems in settling insurance claims and in getting houses back to normal. 
 
For those actually flooded, the study focused specifically on the relative stress effects of the 
initial shock (‘worst time’) and ‘after-effects’ of flooding. Analysing the effect of floods in 
relation to socio-demographic indicators, the findings (from bivariate analysis) were that short-
and long term psychological effects (stress and depression) occurred, to a significantly greater 
extent in: 
• women  
• lower social grades  
• certain age groups, especially those in their 50s 
• the long-term sick 
• families with children  
• those in ‘vulnerable housing’  
• those in rented housing  
• the unemployed 
• those unaware of flood risk. 
 
In relation to longer term post-flood effects on health, the study found that: 
• Adverse health effects were increased by problems with insurers and builders, and 
having to leave home 
• Short-term adverse effects were reduced if outside assistance was received, but 
longer-term impacts were not 
• 15% of men and 29% of women consulted a doctor after the event 
• Worry about future flooding was much higher for the already-flooded group (65% 
somewhat or very worried) compared to the ‘not flooded but at risk’ group (42%). 
 
Analysis was carried out on willingness to pay (WTP) to mitigate these adverse health effects: 
• More than 60% of all households expressed some willingness to alleviate the health 
impacts of flooding by paying for extra ‘flood defence’ (note that the question was 
phrased in this way rather than paying for ‘flood alleviation measures’) 
• Highest WTP values were from those in their 50s, also the group that reported highest 
impacts 
• WTP values for those flooded averaged £200 for those flooded and for those at risk 
£150 per household per year. £200 was chosen as the fairest value for input to cost/ 
benefit appraisal. 
 
• The value of £200 was chosen as the fairest measure of WTP. 
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2.26 Digital terrain models coupled with inundation algorithms provide 
increasingly accurate maps of areas at risk of fluvial and coastal flooding (Hall et al., 
2005).  SEPA’s Indicative River and Coastal Flood Map based on these models 
provides a major advance in depicting flood risk across Scotland (SEPA, 2006).  But 
few data exist on awareness and attitudes to flooding and the economic and social 
profiles of those living in flood risk zones.  Awareness of both the risk and 
appropriate response enables residents to prepare in a way that can reduce the social 
impacts of a flood event when it occurs.  When coupled to effective warning systems 
and workable emergency plans, severe damage and/or its social impacts may be 
limited or even averted.  The key message is that the success of such systems and 
plans depends on individual and community awareness, attitudes and participation 
(Twigg et al., 2001; Enders, 2001).  
 
2.27 DEFRA’s project Flood risks to people aims to develop a methodology for 
vulnerability and risk mapping for floods in the UK and thus channel attention to 
areas that need most focus on flood preparedness.  The project develops concepts of 
‘hazard rating’, ‘area vulnerability’ and ‘people vulnerability’ that result from 
combining the physical characteristics of the flood with locational and social 
characteristics (DEFRA, 2006). The ‘area vulnerability’ score includes fixed features, 
such as housing type and the effectiveness of measures to manage the risk, such as the 
presence of flood warning.  ‘People vulnerability’ is related to the age and health of 
the people in this area and their likely behaviour during flooding (e.g. likelihood of 
self-evacuation once the flood has started, putting themselves at physical risk).  
 
2.28 Knowledge of the economic and social characteristics of those in flood risk 
zones has also been the focus of research. The possibility of using spatially referenced 
data to generalise the economic characteristics of those at flood risk was examined by 
Fielding and Burningham (2005).  In this study designed to detect any social 
inequalities, social class characteristics of the population at risk from flooding at 
selected sites in England were compared with the population considered not at risk.  
Much depends on the basis of aggregation; the use of broad census districts for spatial 
subdivision giving a different result to a grid model-based aggregation method.  The 
grid model was considered more accurate and indicated that lower income groups 
were disproportionately located in the flood risk zones.  A UK-wide study by Walker 
et al. (2006) also concluded that more vulnerable groups are more likely to live in 
areas at risk of coastal flooding.  However this effect, whilst significant at a regional 
level, was not replicated for the UK as a whole, again hinting at important scale 
effects.  A study in Florida designed to prioritise areas for evacuation purposes 
reported similar findings in relation to the risk of hurricane damage (Chakraborty, 
2005).  Both studies imply it is difficult to generalise on the social profiles of those 
living in hazardous locations.  At some scales there may be a clear discrepancy in 
economic and social characteristics between those at risk and those not at risk, but 
there are no consistent regional or national patterns.  No attempt has yet been made to 
extend this methodology to Scotland.   
 
 
Warnings and emergency preparedness  
 
2.29 Effective warnings maximise a community’s ability to adapt to an impending 
flood and help minimise loss and trauma.  They are deemed to be a crucial factor in 
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reducing the risk of loss of life, and are often a most cost effective measure in regions 
where defences are not physically or economically feasible.  The lack of warning 
systems has been linked to the high casualty rates and economic damage in the Czech 
Republic and Poland during the floods of 1997.  In Germany, where warning systems 
were present, both were much lower in the same event (Rosenthal et al., 1998; 
Penning–Rowsell et al., 2004; DEFRA, 2006).  
 
2.30 Most people affected by the 1998 floods in England and Wales did not receive 
a warning, which led to a revision of the Environment Agency’s procedures and the 
establishment of Floodline (subsequently extended to Scotland by SEPA).  In the 
2000 floods in England and Wales, there was no loss of life and the warning systems 
gave authorities more chance to evacuate those at risk (Kelman, 2001). The 
effectiveness of warnings, however, is highly dependent on lead times.  There is a 
stark contrast in lead times between pluvial/flash floods and fluvial floods, with the 
lead times for pluvial flooding drastically lower or non-existent (Rosenthal and 
Bezuyen, 2000).  In January 2005 several areas in northern England and Scotland had 
little or no warning, either because the flooding was coastal (e.g. Western Isles of 
Scotland) or because of very rapid combined pluvial and fluvial flooding (e.g. 
Carlisle).  The provision and lead time of warnings is an important aspect of ‘area 
vulnerability’ in DEFRA’s Flood risks to people project (para 2.27).  There are severe 
difficulties in developing warning systems for pluvial flash floods (Bruen, 1999), but 
ongoing projects are seeking to address this. 
 
2.31 Flood warning systems in the UK have generally met with favourable 
comment internationally. Thus Handmer (2002) noted the value of the media and 
web-based based warnings from the Environment Agency and SEPA, and the clarity 
of the four stage alert classification.  However, in a wide-ranging review of flood 
warning systems in North America and Europe, he also identified several areas of 
general concern that apply to the UK: the need for effective processes to ensure 
community engagement, determining and delivering appropriate advice on what 
action to take on receipt of a warning; and identifying high risk groups to ensure they 
get the advice that they need.  
 
2.32 Glantz (2003) in a wide-ranging global review of various approaches to flood 
warning points to several ‘dos and don’ts’. Prominent among the ‘do’s are: 
 
• educate and remind, especially between hazard episodes, bearing in mind 
the inherent public tendency to discount the past; 
• time warnings correctly; 
• involve stakeholders as early as possible in the development and review of 
a warning system; and 
• identify what it is that makes societies more or less vulnerable and more or 
less resilient. 
 
2.33 It is clear from these reviews that the dissemination requirements should not 
be neglected. Co-ordination between public sector bodies and local institutions across 
a variety of sectors is crucial to establish dissemination plans that ‘work’ when a flood 
strikes (IFRC, 2002). It is helpful to survey examples of interaction between 
communities and management bodies (Davis et al., 2004). Best practice places stress 
on co-operation and community participation, which also helps manage public 
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expectations of a warning system and ensures that the public are aware the system 









The project analysed the potential future losses from flooding across the UK under four different 
socioeconomic scenarios to reflect different potential national governance and sustainability 
approaches between now and the 2080s, and the effects that these approaches would have different 
effects on greenhouse gas emissions (and, consequently, modelled climatic change). 
 
World markets (Internationalist, libertarian/ market-enabling, high growth high emissions) 
National enterprise (Nationalist, individualist, statist/ market-regulating medium-low growth, 
medium-high emissions) 
Local stewardship (Localist, co-operative, interventionist, low growth, medium-low emissions) 





The report suggests that in the 2080s, the number of people in England at high risk from flooding 
would increase from 1.4 million at present to between 2.0 million and 3.3 million, depending on the 
scenario followed. The expected annual economic damages in England to residential and 
commercial properties might increase from £0.9 billion to between £1.5 and £20 billion. At 
minimum, socioeconomic influences multiply overall risk between 3 times (for governance 
scenarios that emphasised sustainability) up to 20 times (for the lower sustainability scenarios – see 
Executive Summary, p23). £10-30 million increases in spending, year on year, could be required to 
come with the increased risk. 
 
The report examined 80 responses to these risks, categorised into direct response (ie flood defence, 
forecasting), governance (institutional change, adaptation etc), and radical (e.g. soft engineering 
solutions).  
 
It noted the importance of social engagement to the success of those responses: 
 
While there is scope for improvements in science and technology to unlock large 
reductions in risk through measures concerned with forecasting and flood-fighting, it is 
issues of governance and stakeholder behaviours that will determine the extent to 
which flood management measures … can be implemented in practice. In this regard, 
the receptor-related response groups … are closely influenced by scenario-specific 
public attitudes and societal values (Vol 2 – Managing future risks --p32). 
 
Werritty with Chatterton (2004), extended the project to Scotland. They assessed that an increase 
would occur in economic damage to the 2050s, from £31.5 to £52.9 million). 
 
Social influences were considered to be even higher-ranking drivers to future flood risk in Scotland 
than in England and Wales. The highly urbanised nature of Scottish society, coupled to future 
projected increases in rainfall magnitude and frequency with often antiquated urban drainage 
systems, elevates the future risk level under all four modelled scenarios. They note, however, that 
the high degree of social cohesion in Scotland has the potential to reduce the adverse social impacts 
of flooding significantly. This assertion requires closer evaluation within Scottish communities. 
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Lichterman, 2000). Twigg et al. (2001) comment that this engagement allows people 
to express needs and priorities and reinforces local organisation. Parker (2000) points 
out the need also for a relationship of trust with authorities, which is helped by 
familiar individuals on the ground persuading the public to act on warnings.  
 
2.34 International examples exist of attempts to link flood warning to positive 
behaviour by recipients.  Australia’s ‘total flood warning’ system (Handmer, 2000) 
provides an example that emphasises prediction and dissemination, alongside 
prescribed responses by management agencies and communities, plus institutional co-
operation in the review and improvement of the scheme.  Another example of a 
successful approach is provided by Blandford, South Canterbury, New Zealand, 
where full information brochures and outreach programmes, along with site-specific 
signage and warning status signs, have been introduced (Kingsbury, 2000). The 
measures have proved successful in alerting tourists and others temporarily on the site 
to the dangers and steps to take in the event of a flood.  
 
2.35 In relation to evacuation, problems have been identied: notably, the resistance 
of a population that has not been subjected to a flood before.   Pfister (2002) observed 
that this was a significant factor in the lack of response to an evacuation order in New 
South Wales, Australia, and noted that the effect of ‘crying wolf’ might make future 
evacuation more difficult (also reported by Dow and Cutter (1998) as an effect of 
repeated hurricane warnings in the USA).  
 
2.36 A further area of concern is that of the ‘residual risk’ groups that remain even 
after implementing flood warning dissemination and evacuation plans (Handmer, 
2001).  This group is highly uncertain in size, but contains those potentially subject to 
most impact following a flood and most at risk of death.  These less visible groups 
require inclusion in flood warning plans as well.  Handmer also identifies people 
mobile at the time of the flood, those in the site temporarily, seasonal workers and 
those socially isolated as examples of less visible groups. 
 
2.37 The need to be aware of vulnerable groups has been reinforced by a survey 
into attitudes to flood warning systems by Thrush et al. (2005).  This study sought to 
identify groups in England particularly at risk through being located in areas flooded 
in 2000, but who were also less likely than others to receive, or to respond to, 
warnings.  Confirming many of the published findings noted above, socially 
vulnerable groups in risk areas were both less likely to receive warnings and less able 
to take action in the event of receiving them.  In terms of receiving warnings, those at 
risk included minority ethnic groups (especially where language was an issue); older 
people who were confused; those with mental or physical illness; and those with other 
special needs, including hearing impairment (particularly relevant for telephone 
warnings).  In terms of taking action on receiving a warning, those most at risk 
included single people (compared to households with two or more adults), those new 
to an area, and families with young and/or dependant children.  
 
2.38 In Scotland, SEPA reported low levels of awareness of Floodline among those 
living in the 42 flood risk areas covered by its Floodline warnings (SEPA, 2004, 
2005).  A large number of respondents aware that they were in a risk area were 
unaware that they were in a Floodline warning scheme area.  Awareness increased 
following various campaigns, including an ‘awareness fortnight’ in 2003 and a 
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follow-up advertising campaign in 2004, and trailer and information displays in flood 
risk areas during 2005.  The most recent information from SEPA indicates that, in a 
telephone interview sample of 200 adults in 11 ‘at-risk’ zones in October 2005 and 
prior to a flood awareness campaign, 95% did not think their property was at risk of 
flooding.  Although a majority had heard of Floodline, only around 24% said they 
knew a little or a lot about its operation. Of those responding to feedback 
questionnaires following a visit to a mobile exhibition, 67% of households had been 
flooded in the past, but only 30% had made any preparation for flooding. 
Encouragingly, 81% said that they would be making preparations for flooding as a 
result of the visit, indicating the value of this direct community contact. 
 
2.39 A recent scoping study assessing the benefits of flood warning schemes 
reviewed SEPA’s existing cost benefit assessment procedures and urged a shift in 
focus away from “the movement of possessions, to a holistic approach incorporating 
the benefits from operational and resilience activities” (SNIFFER, 2006, p. ii).  Whilst 
noting the importance of intangible losses from flooding (life, injury, health and well-
being), clear guidance on quantifying such losses in terms of flood warning benefits 
awaits further research.  However, the study concluded that an economic valuation of 
the tangible benefits of flood warning in Scotland could be undertaken based on the 
Multi-Coloured Manual (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2005) whilst noting that high levels 
of uncertainty in existing flood damage data sets could make it challenging to 





2.40 Insurance provision covering both buildings and contents is the dominant 
means of managing flood risk at the household level in the UK.  There is a stark 
differentiation in the impact of floods on those with and without insurance (Fordham 
and Ketteridge, 1995).  Affordable flood insurance cover for buildings has been 
readily available from the early 1960s to the late 90s, due to the agreement drawn up 
between the British Insurance Industry Association (forerunner to the Association of 
British Insurers - ABI) and the UK Government.  This availability, tied to the 
expansion of owner-occupation, has resulted in the vast majority of Scottish 
homeowners and landlords having building cover for floods, usually as a condition of 
their mortgages, with average household premiums around £250 (Crichton, 2005).  
 
2.41 Over the past 10-15 years the amount paid for flood damage by insurance 
companies has increased rapidly.  Global losses in the 1990s exceeded US$200bn, 
with insured losses from the 2002 European floods at €3.4bn (Munich Re, 2005).  In 
the UK, the 2000 floods generated insured losses of more than £1bn (Environment 
Agency, 2000) causing the industry to consult on a range of strategic options for the 
future (Green and Penning-Rowsell, 2002).  The response has been to develop internal 
risk assessment methods enabling the industry to take on new business thanks to the 
more detailed information gained from these methods on the flood risk of individual 
properties (ABI, 2005).  Coverage is now provided to ‘almost all’ households in 
‘high’ flood risk locations, although the industry makes no claim to provide universal 
coverage (ABI, 2005). 
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2.42 The current ABI pledge on providing household and business insurance dates 
from 11th November 2005.  Where properties are subject to a 1-in-75 year or worse 
risk of flooding, households and businesses should still be able to obtain insurance 
cover where there are plans to improve defences in the next five years.  However, the 
position remains that insurance provided will be subject to premiums that reflect the 
assessed risk to the property and market forces.  
  
2.43 Introducing the new agreement, Stephen Haddrill, the ABI’s Director General, 
said  
 
“The insurance industry is committed to ensuring that flood insurance 
remains available to existing customers where flood defences will be in place 
within five years. This is good news for the millions of homeowners and 
businesses who rely on insurance for financial protection from the cost of 
flooding. The Government’s commitment to effective management of flood 
risk is very welcome, and enables our members to continue flood cover for 
almost all households and businesses at risk of flooding. “However, we 
expect climate change to dramatically increase the flood risk, so continued 
improvements on the ground are vital. For flood insurance to remain widely 
available, the Government must make further progress in reducing the flood 
risk in vulnerable communities throughout the country” (quoted from ABI 
news release Friday, 11 November 2005). 
 
It is noted that no distinction is made between the UK and Scottish governments in 
this statement, although the difference in approach to flood risk management in 
Scotland has had an influence on the policies of some insurance companies, and 
arguably should have had more (Crichton, 2003a and pers. comm.). 
 
2.44 The social impact of the change in the price and availability of insurance has 
been poorly documented both in Scotland and the UK as a whole.  Insurance 
penetration is likely to be lower for those on low incomes, and the policy changes by 
the industry threaten to make the impact ever greater for those groups.  Contents 
insurance is also likely to have been taken up to a lesser degree in this group.  Around 
20-25% of UK households do not have home contents cover (Priest et al., 2005) and 
the attendant risk from flooding is likely to be borne more disproportionately by lower 
income groups (Arnell, 2000). 
 
2.45 A variety of reasons are documented for this lack of insurance cover, ranging 
from incomplete information on risk to inability to afford it (Whyley et al., 1998). 
Among those who are covered for both buildings and contents, there may be a 
reluctance to take other flood protection measures or to act on flood warning – the so-
called ‘moral hazard’ (Handmer, 1989). 
 
2.46 Fordham and Ketteridge (1995) found that lack of insurance and under-
insurance for home contents were common factors in exacerbating the impact of the 
early to mid 1990s floods in Scotland. The causes for underinsurance were said to 
have been unrelated to the flood risk, but reflected the ‘red-lining’ of areas of public 
housing by insurance companies due to risks of vandalism and theft.  Data are scarce 
on the take-up of contents insurance in flood risk zones in Scotland and whether 
similar insurance company concerns still prevail in such zones.  On a UK level, it has 
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been found that 80% of all households are covered by contents insurance, but only 
around 50% of tenants, including local authority tenants, have contents insurance.  As 
noted by Hood et al. (2005), this is significant as having contents insurance makes it 
far less likely that the occupier will seek emergency assistance and temporary housing 
at local authority expense.  Initiatives have been taken to encourage the uptake of ‘pay 
with rent’ schemes for public sector tenants (Demos and Toynbee Hall, 2005). 
Following the discovery that 42% of public sector tenants had no contents insurance, 
the Scottish Executive allocated £500,000 in 2003 to aid the promotion of existing 
schemes.  Currently, 80% of Scottish councils operate such schemes, although take-up 
by tenants still appears to be low (Crichton, pers comm.).  
 
2.47 Removable flood defences may provide a solution to lack of insurance for 
some householders.  Crichton (2003b) observed that over 150 types of removable 
protection were then available on the open market, although due to uncertainties about 
their effectiveness or deployment, their use would be unlikely to change the eligibility 
of the property for insurance coverage.  However, at present there is little research 
into the extent of their uptake or into social attitudes to these systems, although some 
evidence exists that local authorities have promoted their uptake in flood risk areas. 
The uptake of flood resistance measures following flooding of buildings (‘resilient 
reinstatement’), which could reduce the value of future claims for properties that have 
been flooded in the past (ABI, 2003) has also yet to be assessed. 
 
 
The ‘sustainable approach’ to flood risk management 
 
2.48 DEFRA’s Flood risks to people project reflects a general move towards 
viewing flood preparedness as a suite of non-structural measures which include 
planning and building control, insurance and effective forecasting and flood warning 
(DEFRA, 2006). All these measures will be required on a national basis across the 
UK as and when the proposed EU Floods Directive becomes law.  In Scotland, there 
are already legal implications of such measures with the provision of sustainable flood 
management now a statutory duty on responsible authorities as the Water 
Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003 comes into operation. 
 
2.49 For the purposes of Scottish legislation sustainable flood management has 
been defined as providing: 
 
“..the maximum possible social and economic resilience against flooding, 
by protecting and working with the environment, in a way which is fair 
and affordable both now and in the future”. 
 
This definition was recommended by the National Technical Advisory Group 
(Scottish Executive, 2005) for implementation of the Water Environment and Water 
Services (Scotland) Act 2003, and includes ‘enhancement of community benefit with 
fair outcomes for everyone’ as one of its objectives. ‘Resilience’ encompasses the 
four ‘A’s’: Awareness of flood risk, Alleviation of the effects of the flood, 
Avoidance of the risk where possible, and Assistance in the event of difficulties.  
 
2.50 As part of the non-structural and planning aspects of ‘alleviation’ and 
‘avoidance’ approaches, catchment wide management and ‘soft’ defences should be 
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implemented generating environmental gain by the restoration of riparian wetlands 
restoration and the creation of detention ponds (Davis, 2004; Scrase and Sheate, 
2005).  Making space for water (DEFRA, 2004) which strongly advocated this 
approach has met with a generally favourable response from consultee stakeholders in 
England.  It advocates a mix of policies to prevent creation of new risk, manage 
existing risk and increase resistance and resilience.  It also stresses the need to 
understand and accept the respective roles of the state, central and local government, 
NGOs and individuals, in flood risk management.  This ‘integrated portfolio’ of 
responses will, it is hoped, contribute to the sustainable development objectives of 
reducing the threat to people and property and delivering the greatest environmental, 
social and economic benefit.  However, the flood alleviation capabilities must be 
capable of withstanding extreme events, and research in this respect reports mixed 
results (Scottish Executive, 2005). 
 
2.51 Use of riverbank realignment and land restoration is occurring in Scotland by 
some local authorities using powers available to them under the Flood Prevention and 
Land Drainage (Scotland) Act 1997. The various measures incorporated include 
alleviation work in river channels, biodiversity improvements, farming practice 
improvements, using local knowledge and public participation as well as technical 
studies of the catchments concerned.  Although reported to having beneficial effects 
(Smith, 2005), there is a lack of information on social attitudes in Scotland for such 
rural flood management measures. 
 
2.52 There are also international examples of good practice to draw on.  One 
approach is the plan in London, Ontario, Canada, where land use planning and 
wetland re-establishment have been combined with existing hard dams and defences 
to create a catchment with a high degree of resilience to flooding (Brick and Goldt, 
2001). The land use planning regime is strict: no new development is permitted on the 
floodplain and existing residents can only sell to the municipal authority when they 
move, who then demolish the property.  The Napa River Flood protection project in 
the USA also indicates the value of community participation in implementing a 
sustainable river management scheme for a river that had been artificially 
straightened, again with a strong emphasis on ecological restoration (Bechtol and 
Laurien, 2005). 
 
2.53 Sustainable urban drainage systems (SUDS) in urban areas, if properly 
designed and maintained, also have potential to contribute to the sustainable flood 
management approach.  The SNIFFER project on Social impacts of stormwater 
management techniques (SNIFFER, 2005) investigated social attitudes in zones where 
sustainable flood management systems have been implemented in urban areas across 
the UK.  It found that the public held strong views on what they favoured in such 
systems, with an emphasis on aesthetics, amenity and recreation value.  There is a 
need both to take the public’s views into account and for better publicity about 
proposed schemes prior to implementation, to ensure social acceptability, particularly 









2.54 This chapter has reviewed the impacts of flooding (flood-related deaths, 
health-related intangible losses, and community and housing impacts) and has 
included a small number of earlier studies relating to Scotland.  Living with flood risk 
(social drivers of vulnerability, distribution of risk and vulnerability, warnings and 
emergency preparedness, and insurance) provided a second area in the review.  
Recent more sustainable approaches to flood risk management in Scotland, the rest of 
the UK and abroad have also been examined. 
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CHAPTER THREE  METHODS 
 
3.1 Capturing the complexities of human responses to flooding and assessing 
‘what works’ in terms of flood prevention and warning schemes requires a flexible 
and wide-ranging methodology which embraces both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches.  The methodology adopted in the project comprises four distinct but 
complementary strands: 
 
1) Socio-demographic profiling of flood risk areas in Scotland and selection of 
study areas 
2) Questionnaire survey of households in flooded/flood risk areas 
3) Focus group discussions with residents in flooded areas 
4) Semi-structured interviews with institutional stakeholders 
 
 
Socio-demographic profiling of flood risk areas and selection of study areas 
 
3.2 In order to establish what type of communities are most exposed to flood risk, 
and to ensure that the selection of study areas is representative of this, the socio-
demographic characteristics of the populations living in flood-risk areas across 
Scotland have been identified from the 2001 Census of Population.  This information 
has been used for two purposes: 
 
• To assess whether potentially vulnerable groups are over or under represented 
in flood-risk areas. 
• To assess how representative the returns in the household survey are of flood-
risk areas across Scotland as a whole. 
 
3.3 Socio-demographic profiling is necessary because certain types of individuals  
and households may be more vulnerable to the impacts of flooding than others, for 
example the elderly, lone parents, children and people whose activities are limited by 
ill-health or disability (DEFRA, 2006).  In addition, housing tenure may influence the 
nature and severity of the impacts of a flood, for example local authority landlords 
often have limited capacity to rehouse flood victims whereas owner occupiers may be 
able to access accommodation paid for through their buildings insurance. 
 
3.4 It is also important to establish whether potentially vulnerable groups are over  
or under represented in flood-risk areas across Scotland (cf Fielding and Burningham, 
2005).  On the one hand, it could be postulated that local authority housing and lower 
income households in the private sectors are more likely to be located in flood-risk 
areas because the land and housing may be cheaper.  On the other hand, some 





3.5 The key challenge in profiling the socio-demographics of small areas such as 
flood-risk zones is matching the spatial units used to report Census results to outlines 
of flood risk.  The smallest geographical units for which Census data in Scotland are 
available are Output Areas.  There are 42,604 Output Areas across Scotland with, on 
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average, around 50 households and a population of 120.  Because Output Areas are 
designed to have approximately equal populations, they are of substantially greater 
geographic extent in rural areas reflecting the lower population density found there. 
 
3.6 Analysis using a Geographical Information System (GIS) indicates that there 
are 287 Census Output Areas that are completely contained within flood-risk areas (as 
defined by the IH 130 indicative flood risk maps and, where available, more recent 
maps held by the relevant local authority).  Although this approach excludes 
significant areas of flood-risk, most of these are relatively sparsely populated and it 
has the advantage of not spuriously introducing any Census data from outside flood-
risk areas.  The 287 selected Output Areas are composed mainly of clusters in Angus, 
the Scottish Borders, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Moray and Perth & Kinross. 
 
3.7 The main disadvantage with this approach is that the 287 Output Areas largely 
represent towns and cities at the expense of remoter areas.  For this reason, the socio-
demographics of the 287 ‘flood-risk’ Output Areas should not be compared against 
Scotland as a whole, as this would simply reflect the substantial socio-demographic 
differences between urban and rural areas.  For example, 27.5% of households in the 
287 flood-risk Output Areas rent their home from the local authority compared to 
only 21.6% in Scotland as a whole.  At first sight, this could suggest that local 
authority housing is more likely to be built in flood-risk areas, but when large Output 
Areas in remoter parts of Scotland are excluded the figure for comparison rises to 
27.0%, indicating virtually no difference between flood-risk and non-flood-risk areas. 
 
3.8 Consequently, the analysis presented here compares flood-risk areas in built-
up areas with urban areas not at risk of flooding.  The possibility that the results 
would be different in remoter areas cannot be discounted. 
 
 
Socio-demographics of flood-risk areas 
 
3.9 In urban areas, the socio-demographic profile of flood-risk areas is generally 
very similar to that of areas not at risk of flooding.  For example, 27.5% of 
households in flood-risk areas rent from a local authority compared to 27.0% overall 
(Table 3.1).  The corresponding figures for employed persons in ‘elementary’ (i.e. 
unskilled) occupations are 14.5% and 14.1% respectively.  Lone parents with 
dependent children and households containing a person with a limiting long-term 
illness both form slightly lower proportions of households in flood-risk areas (7.5% 
and 37.6% respectively) than elsewhere (8.3% and 38.4% respectively).  Another 
minor difference between flood-risk and non-flood-risk areas is that older people are 
slightly more likely to live in the former (17.3% of people in flood-risk areas are aged 
65+ versus 15.6% elsewhere). 
 
 
The representativeness of the household survey returns 
 
3.10 Previous experience indicates that retired people and those of higher socio-
economic status are more likely to participate in household surveys.  While older 
people (aged 70+) are inevitably over-represented in our returns (22.2% of survey 
returns versus 11.2% of the Scottish population), lower socio-economic groups are 
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relatively well represented.  For example, 9.9% of our survey returns fall into the 
‘elementary’ (i.e. unskilled) occupational category versus 12.7% in Scotland as a 
whole, a difference of only 1.8%.  The under-representation of local authority tenants 
is slightly greater (15.8% versus 21.6% nationally) but again is not as substantial as is 
sometimes the case with this type of survey. 
 
Table 3.1  Socio-demographics of flood-risk areas 
 
Socio-demographic group % of persons or households in socio-
demographic group 
 Flood-risk areas in 
urban Scotland* 
Urban Scotland** 
Persons aged 65+ 17.3 15.6 
Single pensioner households 16.7 15.8 
Lone parents with dependent children 7.5 8.3 
Rented from Local Authority 27.5 27.0 
Rented from Housing Association 6.7 6.9 
Elementary occupations 14.5 14.1 
Households with person(s) with a 
limiting long-term illness 
37.6 38.4 
*For flood-risk areas,’urban Scotland’ is defined by the Census Output areas that are completely 
contained within flood-risk zones (n=287; mean=1.90ha; median=1.59ha; total pop=30,089). 
** For areas not at flood-risk, ‘urban Scotland’  is defined as Census Output areas less than 3ha on 
the basis that this gives a size distribution of Output Areas comparable to that of those in flood-risk 
areas (n=25,311; mean=1.64ha; median=1.63ha; total pop=2,770,719). 
 
 
Selection of flood risk areas 
 
3.11 Having listed Scotland’s major floods over the period 1993-2005 and coded 
them as fluvial (over-topping of river banks), pluvial (surcharging sewers combined 
with overland flow) and coastal, a representative sample of flood risk areas was 
compiled.   Floods of differing origins were sampled from small urban areas 
(Brechin, Elgin, Forres, and Hawick), large urban areas (Glasgow, Edinburgh and 
Perth) and scattered inland and coastal rural locations.  The number of households 
sampled in each of these locations is given in Appendix B; Table 1.  The number of 
households located in large urban, small urban and rural areas is given in Appendix B; 
Table 8.  The number of households recording each type of flood (fluvial, pluvial and 
coastal) is given in Appendix B; Table 9. 
 
 
Questionnaire survey of households in flooded/ flood risk areas 
 
3.12 In order to generate information relating to flood impacts (objective 1) and 
attitudes to floods, knowledge and awareness of floods and behaviour during floods 
(objective 2), a survey was undertaken on households which had been flooded and 
households located within flood risk areas but not flooded (as defined on the first 
generation IH 130 indicative flood risk maps and, where available, more recent maps 
held by the relevant local authority). 
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3.13 The survey was undertaken via a questionnaire designed to be completed by 
respondents with minimal or no assistance from a member of the project team.  In 
urban areas the questionnaire was delivered by hand to each household and usually 
collected the next day, with the team member occasionally assisting in its completion.  
Collection was focused on evenings and weekends to maximise the number of returns; 
two return visits being made where necessary.  FREEPOST envelopes were provided 
when follow up visits still failed to generate a response. 
 
3.14 Address lists of households which had been flooded and households, not 
flooded, but located in flood risk areas were generated in advance of visiting each 
survey site.  For smaller urban areas (Brechin, Elgin, Forres and Hawick) 
questionnaires were delivered to all households within the historic flood envelope.  
For larger urban areas (Edinburgh and Perth) a sample was drawn of properties 
closest to the river with a variable upper limit in any one survey site of c. 250-550 
properties.  Scottish Water provided addresses of properties in the east end of 
Glasgow which experienced pluvial flooding in 2002 from which a representative 
sample of 262 properties was drawn.  Across all survey sites a maximum of 10% of 
upper floor properties was included in the total sample.  The number of households 
visited in each survey site is listed in Appendix B; Table 1. 
 
3.15 For scattered rural inland and coastal locations, the questionnaire was 
delivered by post, respondents being provided with an envelope for return by 
FREEPOST.  A sample of addresses of flooded households in Orkney, Shetland, 
Culloden, Menstrie, Eyemouth, Dunoon, Newcastleton and Corpach was generated 
from information in local authority 2003 and 2005 Biennial Reports and telephone 
contact with council staff and SEPA representatives.  Reconstructed outlines of flood 
extent were often available, which allowed accurate selection of properties. 
 
3.16 The questionnaire (which will be provided with a statistical annex due to be 
published on the SE website in summer 2007) was divided into five sections: 
 
• Your experience of flooding (information on the actual experience of being 
flooded). 
• Impacts of the flood (immediate and lasting impacts of the flood). 
• Living with floods (awareness of flood risk and measures to reduce the impacts 
of flooding). 
• Your thoughts and opinions (views on flood protection measures and where 
responsibility for providing protection lies). 
• About you and your household (information on composition of household, 
housing tenure, occupation, educational qualifications and household income). 
 
Households which had been flooded were invited to complete all five sections. 
Households which had not been flooded, but which were located within the flood risk 
area, were invited to complete the last three sections.   
 
3.17 A draft questionnaire was piloted in Brechin in order to: 
 
• assess what sampling strategy would generate an appropriate proportion of 
flooded versus ‘not flooded but at flood risk’ households; 
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• assess response rates from different risk groups, in particular households that 
lived within an historic flood envelope versus those outside the envelope; and 
• test the suitability of the questionnaire, for example in terms of topics covered, 
question design, routing and overall length. 
 
3.18 Having delivered questionnaires to 67 properties in Brechin which yielded 46 
returns (68.7% response) it was concluded that sampling within the historic flood 
envelope would generate a representative sample of households living in a flood risk 
area.  Many properties which had been flooded, but had subsequently changed 
occupancy, yielded a robust sample of households ‘at risk but not flooded’ alongside 
other properties within the historic flood envelope which were ‘at risk and had been 
flooded’ but with no change in occupancy.  The questionnaire was revised in light of 
the Brechin returns following discussions within the project team plus contributions 
from the Project Steering Group. 
 
 
Focus group discussions 
 
3.19 Focus groups provide a means to elucidate detailed and nuanced information 
on people’s attitudes and motivations in much more depth than is possible via a 
questionnaire survey.   
 
3.20 Focus group participants were recruited from the household questionnaire 
survey.  Respondents to the survey who had been flooded were asked if they would be 
willing to participate in a focus group to explore some of the issues in greater depth.  
Expenses of £15 was paid to each respondent who attended a group.  Focus groups 
were held in Elgin, Forres, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Perth with 10-12 respondents 
being invited to each venue to explore their views on: 
 
General attitudes towards flooding and flood risk: 
• the balance of responsibility for mitigating flood losses – individuals versus 
public authorities 
• the range of options for reducing losses available to individuals living in flood 
risk areas 
• the types of flood proofing and/or action individuals would be willing to take 
to mitigate flood losses 
• individual’s attitudes to flood insurance 
 
Experiences and perceptions of flood prevention schemes and flood warning schemes: 
• awareness of flood alleviation schemes either in place or being planned 
• changes in behaviour due to campaigns designed to raise awareness of these 
schemes 
• perceived effectiveness or potential effectiveness of these schemes and how 
far they instil confidence or anxiety 
• the accuracy and reliability of warnings 
• the effectiveness of the warnings which resulted in their evacuation 
 
3.21 Each focus group, held in a hotel, lasted around 90 minutes with 5-10 of the 
invitees attending alongside two or three members of the project team.  Each session 
was recorded onto audio tape and then transcribed to provide a verbatim record.   
 
Table 3.2  Key institutional stakeholders’ interviews and dates 
 








Strategic methods used by NU and others to mitigate 
flood loss 
Ideas for further future mitigation of loss 
30.1.06 
interview 
Head of Flood Warning 
Development 
SEPA 
SEPA policy on flood warning provision 
Experience of flood warning development 




Head of Flood Warning 
SEPA Highland and 
Grampian region 














Building and Land 
Services 




Interaction with Emergency Services 
Post-flood recovery 












Edinburgh City Council 
 








Interaction with Emergency Services 
Post-flood recovery 
Flood alleviation scheme promotion 
2.5.06 
interview 
Renfrewshire Council Network regeneration and flood prevention 
Flood alleviation scheme promotion 
7.7.06 
telephone 
Aberdeen City and 
Aberdeenshire Councils 
Emergency planning  
Watercourse management  
Flood Liaison and Advice Groups 
7.06 
telephone and  
email exchange 
 





plus written responses  
Scottish Water Measures to prevent urban flooding 
Flood warning and emergency procedures 
Network maintenance and renewal 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews with institutional stakeholders 
 
3.22 The purpose of the interviews with institutional stakeholders was to examine 
‘what works’ in terms of flood prevention and flood warning (particularly in relation 
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to the social aspects of such campaigns) and engagement with the community and 
other stakeholders in flood risk areas.   These issues were discussed with practitioners 
at both national (Scottish Executive, SEPA) and local levels (local authorities).  
Interviewees and dates are shown in Table 3.2 and the issues covered in Appendix D.  





3.23    The returns from the Household Survey were coded and then analysed using 
SPSS (a statistical package with routines specifically designed for analysing social 
science data).  Summary tables, often involving cross-tabulation of responses against 
socio-economic status, provided concise and efficient outputs of the main findings.  
For some responses it was possible to determine statistically significant differences 
between sub-groups (eg ‘flooded’ and ‘not-flooded’) using a Chi-Squared test.   The 
transcripts of the Focus Group discussions were examined following the same 
sequence of issues as for the Household Survey (impacts of flooding, living with 
floods and managing flood risk).  Verbatim quotations from participants’ 
contributions were extracted from the transcripts to provide illustrations to each of 
these themes.  In a similar manner the tape-recorded semi-structured interviews with 
institutional stakeholders were examined to collate answers across a range of 





3.24 This chapter describes the methods adopted in this study.  Households in 
locations variously flooded between 1993 and 2005 by rivers, coastal storms or failed 
urban drainage comprised the target population.  A self-complete questionnaire-based 
survey was designed to elicit responses on flood impacts and the experience of living 
with floods from households which, during the study period, had either been flooded 
or were at risk of being flooded.  The draft questionnaire was piloted on households in 
Brechin within an area flooded in 2002.  In a revised form, it was subsequently 
delivered by hand to a sample of households in small urban areas (Elgin, Forres and 
Hawick), large urban areas (Glasgow, Edinburgh and Perth) and, by post, to scattered 
inland and coastal rural communities.  Focus groups were organised at five locations 
with participants recruited from respondents to the household survey who had been 
flooded.  The group’s experiences and attitudes were recorded onto audio tape and 
then transcribed to produce a verbatim record.  Semi-structured interviews (also 
recorded) with a range of institutional stakeholders were designed to elicit views on 
‘what works’ in terms of flood prevention, flood warning and engagement with those 
who live in flood risk areas.  Socio-demographic profiling of the flood risk areas 
yielded a slight over-representation of single pensioner households and a slight under-
representation of lone parents with children, but in other categories lower socio-







CHAPTER FOUR HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
 
4.1 The questionnaire survey was delivered to 2,321 households in 
Brechin, Edinburgh, Elgin, Forres, Glasgow-Shettleston, Hawick and Perth (Table 4.1 
and Figure 4.1).  Households were randomly selected within historic flood envelopes 
provided by the relevant local authority.  This meant that all surveyed households 
were at risk, but due to local topographic effects or changed occupancy since the 
flood, not all households had been flooded.  The locations of the major urban 
communities sampled in the household survey can be inspected in Ordnance Survey 
1:50,000 map extracts of Brechin, Edinburgh, Elgin, Forres, Glasgow-Shettleston, 
Hawick and Perth in Appendix A.  The flood outlines on these maps are those from 
the Indicative River & Coastal Flood Map (Scotland) published by SEPA in 
November 2006.  This was not available at the time of the household survey (March - 
June 2006) but it does provides a general indication of the sampled communities 
within the flood-risk areas. 
 
4.2 Responses from 1,223 households were obtained giving an overall response 
rate of 52.7%.  The bulk of the sampling was undertaken by a door-to-door survey, 
questionnaires being delivered one day and generally collected the next.  The 
scattered nature of the target population for rural and coastal areas (236 households in 
Inverness, Mentrie, Eyemouth, Dunoon, Copach, Highland region, Orkney and 
Shetland, Figure 4.1) made a door-to-door survey too costly and a postal survey was 
adopted instead.  The response rate of 29.2%, whilst lower than for the door-to-door 
survey, is still acceptable for surveys of this kind. 
 
Table 4.1  Response rates by survey location 
 






Brechin 67 46 68.7 
Edinburgh 539 316 58.6 
Elgin 412 237 57.5 
Forres 444 261 58.8 
Glasgow-Shettleston 262 113 43.1 
Hawick  115 55 47.8 
Perth 246 126 51.2 
Scattered rural & 
coastal (by post) 
236 69 29.2 
    
TOTAL 2,321 1,223 52.7 
 
 
Socio-demographic and residential characteristics of the sample 
 
4.3 The sample yielded 633 flooded properties and 590 non-flooded properties 
(Appendix B; Table 2) generating a close to even split between respondents who had 




Age and occupation 
 
4.4 The age profile within households (Appendix B; Table 3) broadly reflects 
national patterns; 22.2% of households include at least one adult more than 70 years 
old.  The occupational groups of the highest earner are also broadly in keeping with 
the national profile (Table 4.2).  For both ‘age’ and ‘occupation’ the sub-samples are 
sufficiently large to enable differential responses to flooding and flood risk to be 
examined at a later stage. 
 
                  
 
            Figure 4.1  Sample sites used in the household survey 
 
                  Pilot survey       Main survey      Scattered rural and coastal 
 
1 Brechin  9    Inverness   
2 Glasgow  10  Mentrie 
3 Edinburgh  11  Eyemouth 
4 Perth   12  Dunoon 
5 Forres   13  Corpach 
6 Elgin   14  Highland (scattered) 
7 Hawick  15  Orkney 
8 Newcastleton  16  Shetland 
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Table 4.2  Occupational group of highest earner in household 
 
Occupational group Number of 
households 
Per cent of 
households 
Managers and senior officials 74 8.8 
Professional 144 17.2 
Associate professional and technical 153 18.3 
Administrative and secretarial 91 10.9 
Skilled trades 135 16.1 
Personal services 44 5.3 
Sales and customer services 30 3.6 
Process, plant and machine operatives 83 9.9 
Elementary occupations 83 9.9 
   
TOTAL 837 100.0 
 
 
Housing tenure and property type 
 
4.5 In terms of housing tenure (Table 4.3), the majority of the properties are 
privately owned (75.6%) with rented accommodation provided by local authorities 
(15.8%), housing associations (4.9%) and private landlords (3.1%).  This profile also 
broadly conforms to the national pattern. 
 
Table 4.3  Housing tenure 
 
Housing tenure Number of 
households 
Per cent of 
households 
Owned with mortgage 467 40.7 
Owned outright 400 34.9 
Rented from council 181 15.8 
Rented from a housing association 36 3.1 
Rented from a private landlord or employer 56 4.9 
Other 7 0.6 
   
TOTAL 1,147 100.0 
 
4.6 The two dominant types of housing stock (Appendix B; Table 6) comprise 
terraces and tenements (63.1%), followed by detached and semi-detached properties 
(35.3%).   Groundfloor only bungalows and flats made up 43.1% of the properties 
sampled and houses with both ground and upper floors 49.2% (Appendix B; Table 7).  
The remaining 7.7% of properties comprised upper floor flats which had been 





4.7 The majority of properties (49.2%) were located in small urban areas 
(Brechin, Elgin, Forres and Hawick) with a further 45.4% drawn from large urban 
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areas (Glasgow, Edinburgh and Perth).  The balance of 5.6% was drawn from 
scattered inland and coastal rural locations (Appendix B; Tables 1 and 8).   
 
 
Characteristics of the floods 
 
4.8 Inundation by rivers overtopping their banks (fluvial flooding) was the single 
most important source of flooding (85.4%), followed by urban flooding (pluvial) 
caused by surcharging sewers combined with overland flow (9.9%).  Coastal flooding 
was only recorded in 57 properties (4.7%), but this does represent a significant 
proportion of properties recently subject to coastal floods.  The categorisation of 
flooding type was made by project staff, reflecting information provided by SEPA 
staff and local authorities in their Biennial Reports for specific events in the sampled 
locations (Table 4.4).   
 
Table 4.4  Types of flood 
 
Type of flood Number of 
households 
Per cent of 
households 
   Fluvial 1,045 85.4 
   Pluvial 121 9.9 
   Coastal 57 4.7 
   
TOTAL 1,223 100.0 
 
It is recognised that a clear distinction between fluvial and pluvial floods is not always 
possible.  In this study pluvial flooding relates primarily to the Shettleston event in the 
east end of Glasgow in 2002.  The occurrence, severity and spatial extent of different 
types of flood over the last decade has constrained our ability to include more 
properties subject to pluvial and coastal flooding. 
 
4.9 In properties which had been flooded, 60% reported water over one foot deep 
(30 cm) and only 6.3% less than one inch deep (2.5cm), implying that most floods 
generate significant depths at ground floor level (Appendix B; Table 10).  In 48.5% of 
properties sampled, the ground floor was inundated and in 16.4% of properties 
inundation only extended to the gardens and outhouses or garages (Appendix B; Table 
2).  
 
4.10 In 81.4% of events the flood waters contained mud, silt or gravel (Appendix 
B; Table 11) and in 59.4 % sewage (Appendix B; Table 12).  All types of floods 
(fluvial, pluvial and coastal) contained significant amounts of sediment but, as one 
might expect, sewage was more prevalent in pluvial (73.3%) than in fluvial floods 
(57%). 
 
4.11 Of those who had been flooded, 74% had experienced flooding in their homes 
or communal stair and 26% only in their gardens and/or outhouses (Appendix B; 
Table 2).  Of the 629 respondents who had been flooded 71.7% had experienced one 




The experience of being flooded  
 
4.12 Of those who were flooded, 88% of respondents were at home when the flood 
occurred.  In addition to noting rising water, in 42% of properties a flood warning was 
received mainly via neighbours (31.8%) or an official (27.5%).  For 273 respondents 
(43% of the sample) Floodline accounted for only 8.1% of warnings. (Appendix B; 
Table 14).  Overall, 33.4% of households received a warning at least three hours 
before their property became inundated (Appendix B; Table 15).   
 
4.13 Priority actions prior to the flood (Appendix B; Table 16) comprised removing 
possessions from the ground floor (39.3%), deploying sandbags or flood guards 
(37.4%), followed by moving the car (33.9%) and vacating the house (21.3%).  Of the 
86.8% of respondents who undertook mitigation measures in response to a warning 
(Table 4.5), 49.2% removed possessions from the ground floor, 45.9% deployed 
sandbags or flood guards, 39.7% moved a vehicle to higher ground and 28.9% 
evacuated members of the household.  Only 62.5% of those not warned undertook the 
same mitigation measures, but at much lower levels of activity.  In general, the flood 
warning generated a higher level of activity in each of these priority actions.   
 
4.14 When priority actions are cross-tabulated against the length of the warning 
lead time (Appendix B; Table 18), actions within the house were scaled down after 
three hours, possibly reflecting physical exhaustion and/or evacuation of the property.   
 
Table 4.5  Actions taken prior to the flood, by whether received flood warning 
(per cent of respondents) 
 





Deployed sandbags, flood guards or other defence 45.9 31.2 
Removed possessions from ground floor 49.2 32.4 
Household members vacated the house 28.9 15.9 
Moved car to higher ground 39.7 30.0 
Other 2.9 3.0 
   
No action taken 13.2 37.5 
   
 
4.15 By far the largest source of assistance (Appendix B; Table 19) was from 
neighbours (55.8%) and family (53.3%), followed by friends outside the locality 
(27.9%), the local authority (21%) and the Fire Service (19.7%).  Of those 
respondents who had been home when flooded, 58% assisted their neighbours.  A 
further 44% of those at home, but not flooded, also provided assistance.   
 
4.16 The majority of those forced to leave their home (Appendix B; Table 20) 
stayed with friends/relatives (44.2%) and/or rented alternative accommodation 
(52.4%).  Very few (4.8%) reported using an Evacuation Centre, but this may reflect 
in part the subsequent use of alternative longer-term accommodation.  Many moved 
from one type of accommodation to another during the period in which they were 
displaced from their homes. 
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Impacts of flooding 
 
4.17   Once flooded, 78% of those affected (Appendix B; Table 21) vacated their 
homes and, of these, 45.4% were out their homes for six months or more, the 
remaining 54.6% returning within six months. 
 
4.18 Direct economic losses sustained by individual households (Appendix B; 
Tables 22 and 23) comprised damage to buildings and contents (mean values of 
£31,980 and £13,552 respectively, though in many cases these losses would be offset 
by insurance) and unpaid leave averaging 10.4 days.  An average of 6.3 days annual 
leave was also taken in the wake of flooding.  The average length of compassionate 
leave taken from work (with the cost being met by employers) was 9.8 days. 
 
4.19 In order to gauge the impacts of flooding on households, respondents were 
invited to score 20 potential impacts on a scale: ‘not applicable’, ‘no impact’, ‘mild’, 
‘serious’ and ‘extreme impact’2.  The overall results in terms of respondents reporting 
a serious or extreme impact are shown in rank order in Figure 4.2 and listed in Table 
4.6.   
 
Figure 4.2  Categories of flood impacts ranked according to severity 
 
4.20 Each category can also be assessed in terms of its average score (0-3).  Time 
and effort to return to normal (2.21) and discomfort/inconvenience (2.20) are clearly 
identified as the most severe impacts, closely followed by worry about future flooding 
(2.14), stress of the flood itself (2.03) and having to leave home (1.91).  Impacts 
directly related to being out of one’s home are then registered including dealing with 
                                                 
2 Responses were then coded 0 – not applicable or no impact, 1 – mild, 2 – serious and 3 – extreme 
impact.  From this an average score for each impact was then generated on a scale 0-3.  
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time and effort required to get house back to normal
Discomfort or inconvenience while getting house back to normal
Worry about future flooding
Having to leave home and posessions
Stress of the flood event itself
Having to live in temporary accommodation
Dealing with insurers and loss adjusters
Dealing with builders, decorators, etc
Being stranded in or out of home
Loss of irreplaceable or sentimental items
Financial losses
Loss of house value
Disruption to electricity supply
Strains between family members
Loss of community spirit
Deterioration in mental health
Damage to car or van
Deterioration in physical health
Loss of or distress to pets
Used holiday entitlement






insurers (1.67) and builders (1.62), living in temporary accommodation (1.62) and 
being stranded in/out of home (1.62).   Financial loss (1.53) together with loss of 
house value (1.36) and damage to car (0.76) occupy the second half of the bar chart 
alongside losses of irreplaceable/sentimental items (1.53), deterioration in physical 
(0.82) and mental health (0.94), strains between family members (1.02) and loss of 
holiday entitlement (0.65).  Other impacts that score relatively modestly include 
disruption to electricity (1.33), loss of community spirit (0.97) and loss or distress to 
pets (0.71); although the last of these may be depressed by responses from households 
without pets. 
 
4.21 In an attempt to probe deeper in terms of flood impacts, each of the 20 
categories has been assigned to one of three groups: tangible (relating to material 
losses) and intangible (relating to non-material and/or emotional losses).  The latter 
group is further sub-divided into immediate impacts and lasting impacts (Table 4.6). 
Tangible impacts are losses that can readily be expressed in material terms (for 
example, loss in house value, damage to buildings contents and vehicles resulting in a 
measurable financial loss).  By contrast, intangible impacts typically involve 
affective responses.  They are less readily convertible into costs although monetised 
values can be attributed to them by economists (for example, see JBA (2005) and 
RPA (2005)).  Intangible impacts can be further divided into those whose impact is 
felt during and immediately after the flood (for example, being forced to evacuate, 
the stress of being flooded, dealing with insurers and builders) and impacts that are 
delayed but lasting and only surface several months later (for example, worry about 
future flooding, loss of irreplaceable family pictures and memorabilia, deterioration in 
physical and mental health).  It is recognised that this typology is not absolute and 
there are gradations between impacts that are tangible or intangible and immediate or 
lasting.  Nevertheless, we have found this typology helpful in categorising the range 
of impacts experienced by households that have been flooded. 
 
4.22 Average scores across all households for each of the new classes of impacts 
have been derived in Table 4.6 for the whole population sampled (‘no response’ 
included in the calculation) and for only those who reported an impact (‘no response’ 
excluded from the calculation).  The former is valid when generalising impacts across 
the whole population which experienced flooding: the latter is valid if only those who 
reported an impact (zero, mild, serious or extreme) are included.  For example, across 
the whole sampled population ‘loss or distress to pets’ scores very low (0.71) whereas 
amongst pet-owners this impact increases nearly two-fold (1.45).   For the sampled 
population the scores are tangible impacts 1.12, intangible immediate impacts 1.81 
and intangible lasting impacts 1.29.  Two points immediately stand out: intangible 
impacts register markedly higher values than tangible impacts and the 
immediate impacts are, on average, strikingly higher than the lasting impacts.  
These findings undergo some adjustment when only households which reported an 
impact are included.  The rank order across categories remains the same, but the 
scores change differentially.  Tangible impacts are now 1.52 (up 0.4), intangible 
immediate impacts 2.07 (up 0.26) and intangible lasting impacts 1.57 (up 0.28).  For 
households that register a flood impact, average tangible impacts approach intangible 
lasting impacts, but intangible immediate impacts are markedly higher than either.   
This finding is also apparent in Figure 4.2 with individual serious or extreme tangible 
impacts recorded by 19-50% of households whereas for intangible immediate impacts 
the range is 51-82% of households. 
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Table 4.6  Flood impacts 
 





impact on those 
affected** Impact 
 
 Mean N Mean N 
Tangible:       
Financial loss 1.53 563 1.69 508 
Loss of house value 1.36 557 1.70 443 
Disruption to electricity supply 1.33 550 1.63 449 
Damage to car or van 0.76 534 1.40 292 
Used holiday entitlement 0.65 530 1.19 288 
     
AVERAGE SCORE 1.12  1.52  
      
Intangible – immediate:     
Discomfort/inconvenience 2.20 586 2.31 556 
Stress of flood itself 2.03 601 2.09 582 
Having to leave home 1.91 575 2.33 471 
Dealing with insurers 1.67 590 1.88 524 
Living in temporary accommodation 1.62 585 2.03 467 
Dealing with builders 1.62 578 1.97 474 
Being stranded in/out of home 1.62 556 1.88 478 
     
AVERAGE SCORE 1.81  2.07  
      
Intangible – lasting:     
Time and effort to return to normal 2.21 591 2.33 560 
Worry about future flooding 2.14 601 2.21 581 
Irreplaceable/sentimental items 1.53 585 1.85 484 
Strains between family 1.02 570 1.29 449 
Loss of community spirit 0.97 552 1.17 457 
Deterioration to mental health 0.94 560 1.21 438 
Deterioration to physical health 0.82 579 1.06 450 
Loss or distress to pets 0.71 564 1.45 278 
     
AVERAGE SCORE 1.29  1.57  
     
* ‘N/A’ or ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 
 ** ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 
 
4.23 The composition of intangible immediate impacts across the sampled 
population (column 2 in Table 4.6) all relate to the stress of the flood itself (2.03), the 
anxiety caused by being out of one’s home (1.91), the discomfort of living in 
temporary accommodation (2.20) and time and effort spent dealing with insurers 
(1.67) and builders (1.62) in order to return home.  Although labelled ‘immediate’ this 
group of impacts often extends over many months (45.4% of households were out of 
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their home for six months or more, Appendix B; Table 21).  Given the primacy of the 
goal of returning home, it comes as no surprise that this group of impacts scores so 
high.   However, once the household has returned to its home, many of these impacts 
will diminish in significance – hence the use of the term ‘immediate’.   When only 
households which registered an impact are included in the sample, the absolute values 
of impacts increase but, apart from having to leave home (markedly up) and having to 
deal with insurers (markedly down), their rank order is unchanged (Table 4.6, column 
4). 
 
4.24 By contrast, the individual elements that collectively comprise intangible 
lasting impacts register effects that have a sustained and longer term impact within 
households across the sampled population.  The high score attributed to the time and 
effort required to return to normal (2.20) points to the flood as a highly disruptive 
element within the life of the household.   Part of that return to ‘normal life’ is 
hindered by worry of future flooding (2.14), the loss of sentimental/irreplaceable 
items (1.53) and strains within the family (1.02).  Concerns over physical and mental 
health do not score so highly (0.82 and 0.94 respectively), but this may possibly 
reflect the stigma attached to scoring mild or serious impacts within such categories.  
When viewed alongside strains within the family and worry about future flooding, the 
mental health impacts of flooding could be more severe than is implied by the self 
coding of the questionnaire (see para 5.18).  When only households which reported an 
impact are included the absolute value always increases, but the rank order is little 
changed with only loss or distress to pets and deterioration in mental registering 
higher ranks than before (Table 4.6, column 4). 
 
4.25 Tangible impacts for the sampled population recorded the lowest group 
average score (1.12).  None of the individual impacts scored especially high with 
financial loss (1.53) and loss of house value (1.36) and loss of electricity (1.33) 
registering the highest values.  All values increase when only households reporting 
these impacts are included, but the rank order remains unchanged (Table 4.6). It is 
striking that this group of impacts, which reports material losses most easily measured 
in economic terms, scores the lowest aggregate score.  This may reflect the relatively 
high take up of insurance, with 94.7% having contents insurance (Appendix B; Table 
43).   
 
4.26 We now explore flood impacts on households, sub-dividing the responses 
according to their experience of the flood (warning received, insurance status, age 
profile, occupational status, household income, number of times flooded, type of 





4.27 Receiving a flood warning is associated with a lower average score in terms of 
time and effort to return to normal (2.18 compared with 2.24 for households with no 
warning), reducing worry about future flooding (2.10 compared with 2.17) and the 
loss of irreplaceable items (1.48 compared with 1.57) and lower overall financial 
losses (1.48 compared with 1.57).  All of these differences are modest, and it is 
interesting that the largest differences in this group (loss of irreplaceable items and 
overall financial losses) are those for which residents can take action to reduce flood 
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impact.  Overall average intangible-immediate impacts are slightly reduced (1.79 with 
a warning and 1.83 without a warning) but are unchanged for overall average 
intangible lasting impacts (Appendix B; Table 25).  Tangible impacts also report a 





4.28 The effect of having contents insurance on reported flood impacts is complex.  
The questionnaire was designed primarily to check on contents insurance, it being 
recognised that many living in rented accommodation would be unsure as to their 
buildings cover (in Appendix B; Table 22 only 184 reported the actual value of 
buildings losses).  However in practice, properties being bought via a mortgage, or 
properties rented from a local authority, will be covered by buildings insurance – as 
will the majority of privately owned non-mortgaged properties.  Thus the term 
“contents insurance” can broadly be interpreted as including both buildings and 
contents.  As expected, dealing with insurers (1.95 with insurance, 1.88 without) and 
builders (1.73 with insurance and 1.00 without) register higher impacts when contents 
insurance is held, as does living in temporary accommodation (1.68 with insurance, 
1.50 without).  Discomfort/ inconvenience (2.27 with insurance and 1.97 without) and 
time and effort to return to normal (2.28 with insurance and 2.05 without) also register 
more severe impacts despite having contents insurance.  This may reflect higher 
levels of affluence in households with contents insurance with higher claims 
generating additional and extended post flood adjustment.  This is partly confirmed by 
higher tangible impacts and higher intangible-immediate impacts being reported by 
those with contents insurance (Appendix B; Table 26). 
 
 
Elderly household members 
 
4.29 The presence of at least one member of the householder more than 70 years 
old has little effect on average individual impacts.  In only two categories does the 
presence of a septuagenarian strongly increase the average score: having to leave 
home (1.98 compared with 1.89) and being stranded in/out of home (1.73 compared 
with 1.58).  However, it is striking that all three groups of impacts score lower 
averages when a septuagenarian is a member of the household (Appendix B; Table 
27).  A possible explanation is that the handling many post flood impacts are 





4.30 Some of the largest differences in response emerge when the sample is sub-
divided into households with annual incomes above and below £20,000.  For those 
below this income threshold, the stress of the flood (2.02 compared with 1.83), having 
to leave home (1.95 compared with 1.70) and the fear of being stranded in/out of 
one’s home (1.61 compared to 1.26) generate higher levels of anxiety.  To this should 
be added the higher impact of losing irreplaceable items (1.56 compared to 1.23) plus 
increased strains within the family (1.02 compared with 0.88), more severe mental 
(1.07 compared with 0.64) and physical health effects (0.92 compared with 0.47) and 
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a view that community spirit has been weakened since the flood (0.86 compared with 
0.74).  This profile of responses points to vulnerable households where modest 
incomes may inhibit post flood recovery.   It is also striking that in the aggregate 
scores (Appendix B; Table 28) tangible impacts are not income sensitive, but both 






4.31 When households are grouped according to the occupational status of the 
highest earner (Appendix B; Table 29) there is a general pattern of average tangible 
impacts being more severe in skilled or semi-skilled households (1.19) when 
compared with professional or managerial households (1.10).  A similar pattern 
obtains for intangible lasting impacts (1.37 compared with 1.16).  For immediate 
intangible impacts, occupational status is a poor discriminator. 
 
 
Frequency of flooding 
 
4.32 We can also explore whether repetition intensifies or lessens individual flood 
impacts, by comparing responses from individuals flooded once, twice or three or 
more times.   In fifteen out of seventeen instances the impact of being flooded a 
second time was more severe with individual scores increasing by as much as 0.54 
(worry about future flooding and loss in house value).  The impacts following a third 
flood fall back somewhat, possibly reflecting a fatalistic reaction, but these results are 
based on much smaller samples with associated reductions in confidence.  The 
contrast in average scores is marked and noteworthy (Appendix B; Table 30) with 
tangible impacts up from 1.05 to 1.34, intangible immediate impacts up from 1.74 to 
2.06 and intangible lasting impacts up from 1.20 to 1.55 on being flooded a second 






4.33 Differential impacts in terms of flood type and depth of flood waters can also 
be examined, although the small number of returns from those affected by coastal 
floods precludes their separate analysis.  Pluvial flooding generated strikingly more 
severe impacts in terms of financial loss (1.97 compared with 1.47 for fluvial floods), 
more significant losses of irreplaceable items (1.80 compared with 1.50), the stress 
generated by the flood (2.29 compared with 2.01), worry about future flooding (2.37 
compared with 2.12), strikingly increased strains within the family (1.33 compared to 
0.98), and greater deterioration in mental health (1.32 compared with 0.90) and 
physical health (1.14 compared with 0.79).  In general, pluvial floods are 
characterised by less warning and higher levels of sewage contamination than fluvial 
floods – both of which are likely to generate higher tangible impacts and strikingly 
higher lasting intangible impacts (Appendix B; Table 31).  However, care must be 
taken in generalising from these findings as the sample size for responses for pluvial 
floods was relatively small (56) and mainly related to the Glasgow-Shettleston flood 
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in 2002.  The socio-demographic profile of the flooded population in Shettleston may 





4.34 As expected, the impact of a flood is strongly correlated with the depth of the 
flood water (Table 4.7).  Whereas average group scores for a depth of 1 inch (2.5 cm) 
for tangible and intangible immediate impacts are 0.88 and 1.38 respectively, these 
increase to 1.31 and 2.05 when the flood water depth exceeds 12 inches (30 cm) - the 
level experienced by 60% of respondents.  Within individual impacts, loss of 
irreplaceable items (up from 0.61 to 1.93), having to leave home (up from 1.35 to 
2.20), the stress of the flood itself (up from 1.68 to 2.24) and living in temporary 
accommodation (up from 0.97 to 1.89) register substantially more severe impacts 
once flood waters exceed 12 inches. 
 
Table 4.7  Flood impacts, by depth of flood (mean score*) 
 








    
Tangible:    
Average score 0.88 0.90 1.31 
     
Intangible – immediate:    
Average score 1.38 1.58 2.05 
     
Intangible – lasting:    
Average score 0.93 1.06 1.50 
    





4.35 Housing tenure also has a significant effect on flood impacts (Table 4.8).  
Council house tenants typically register lower tangible impacts, but much higher 
lasting intangible impacts than owner occupiers.  Especially severe impacts for 
council tenants include the stress of the flood itself, having to leave home, living in 
temporary accommodation, the fear of being stranded in/out of one’s home, overall 
financial losses (and in particular the loss of irreplaceable items) and deterioration in 
both physical and mental health.  For owner occupiers flood impacts were typically 
less severe except for dealing with insurers and builders, and concerns over loss of 
house value.  The overall impact of a flood on council tenants appears to be more 
onerous and longer lasting when compared with owner occupiers, raising questions as 






4.36 Location also moderates the severity of flood impacts, in part reflecting the 
character of the most severe flood experienced by each household (Appendix B; Table 
34).  In terms of tangible impacts, the floods in Elgin (1.32), Perth (1.27) and 
Glasgow-Shettleston (1.25) were the most severe and those in Hawick (0.81) and 
Brechin (0.74) the least severe.  The same rank order obtains for immediate intangible 
impacts (Elgin 2.14, Perth 1.98 and Glasgow-Shettleston 1.92).  But Glasgow-
Shettleston (1.60) records the second highest value for lasting intangible impacts, very 
similar to that for Elgin (1.67).   Overall, the experience of flooding in Elgin generates 
the highest average scores, closely followed by Glasgow-Shettleston.   
 
Table 4.8  Flood impacts, by housing tenure (mean score*) 
 



























      
Tangible:      
Average score 1.23 1.11 0.96 0.76 0.77 
       
Intangible – 
immediate:   
   
Average score 1.91 1.70 1.92 1.54 1.49 
       
Intangible – 
lasting:   
   
Average score 1.32 1.17 1.61 1.26 0.96 
      
*‘N/A’ or ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 
 
4.37   The overall impact of flooding on community cohesion is unclear with 17.1% 
of respondents reporting an improved sense of community and 15.6% reporting a 
deterioration (Appendix B; Table 35).  Further analysis may be needed to clarify any 
perceived lessening in community cohesion, especially if non-flood related drivers are 
involved. 
 
4.38 When questioned on reasons for moving or considering moving (Table 36), 
44.1% of respondents now saw their property as a poor investment, 83.2% feared 
another flood and many attached negative qualities to their house (i.e. the house will 
never be the same and the house brought back negative feelings about the flood).   
 
 





4.39 Given that all respondents live within or close to an area that has recently been 
flooded, it is striking that 63.6% of those who have been flooded view future flooding 
as “very likely” or “likely” whereas this reduces to 41.2% for those who have not 
been flooded (Table 4.9).   The experience of being flooded significantly increases the 
perceived likelihood of future flooding.  The perception of flood risk also 
significantly varies with location (Appendix B; Table 38) with 88% of the sampled 
residents in Elgin viewing future flooding as “very likely” or “likely” (perhaps partly 
as a function of repeat flooding), this reducing to 44.4% in Brechin and 22.9% in 
Perth (now protected by a flood alleviation scheme). 
 
Table 4.9  Perception of flood risk, by whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 
 
Perceived likelihood of being flooded 










Very likely 30.0 11.5 21.0 
Likely 33.6 29.7 31.7 
Unlikely 23.9 36.3 30.0 
Very unlikely 10.7 16.2 13.3 
Zero or negligible likelihood 1.8 6.3 4.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 86.532; df=4; p<0.001 
 
4.40 The experience of being flooded does not result in reported improved 
knowledge of flood risk (Appendix B; Table 39) with 67.8% of those flooded 
claiming to be either “not very well” or “not at all informed”, a value very similar to 
those who have not been flooded.  Information on flood risk is mainly acquired 
informally from relatives and friends or more formally from the local authority 
(Appendix B; Table 40).  National and local media are also significant sources, and 
Floodline is an important source (33.2%) but only for those who have been flooded.  
It comes as no surprise that respondents who have been flooded worry significantly 
more often than respondents who have not been flooded (Appendix B; Table 41).  The 
most important triggers for such worry are “heavy rainfall” or “seeing the river rise or 
in spate” (especially for those who have been flooded), followed by “forecasts of 
heavy rainfall” and “reports on flooding in the media” (Appendix B; Table 42). 
 
 
 Managing flood risk 
 
4.41 Contents insurance is held by 90.8% of respondents, this increasing to 94.7% 
for those who have been flooded, a significant difference between respondents 
(Appendix B; Table 43).  However, when asked whether the cover specifically 
included flooding (Appendix B; Table 44), these values (still significantly different) 
reduced to 72.2% (all respondents) and 84.0% (flooded respondents).  A significantly 
higher excess for contents insurance was reported by households that had been 
flooded: higher excesses being required for 27.4% of all respondents and 36.8% of 
those who had been flooded (Appendix B; Table 45). 
 
4.42 We also explored whether the take up of contents insurance differed according 
to housing tenure both at the time of the flood and afterwards at the time of the 
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survey.  At the time of the flood social tenants were much less likely to have contents 
insurance than those who either owned their property or were buying it via a mortgage 
(Table 4.10).  By the time of the survey (1 to 13 years later depending on location) the 
take up had increased by 6.2% (council tenants) and 22.6% (housing association 
tenants) but had declined by 20.9% (private renting) possibly reflecting a high 
proportion of short-term tenancies.  The increase for housing association tenants 
points to a marked change in behaviour, albeit by a very small sub-set of the whole 
population surveyed.   
 
Table 4.10  Contents insurance at time of flood and at time of survey, by housing 
tenure 
 
Housing tenure Per cent with 
contents insurance 
at time of flood 
Per cent with 
contents insurance 
at time of survey 

























4.43 ‘Pay-with-rent’ contents insurance is known about by 36.9% of council 
tenants, this value being slightly higher (39.1%), but not significantly so, for those 
who have been flooded (Appendix B; Table 47).  However, 73.9% of social tenants 
have contents insurance with 7 out of 87 council tenants having elected the ‘pay-with 
rent’ route (Table 4.11).  Overall this means that around 75% of social tenants have 
contents insurance with around 10% using ‘pay-with-rent’ schemes, and around 25% 
with no insurance.  When asked why contents insurance had not been taken out, 
46.9% of social tenants cited cost and 21.9% the non-availability of cover (Appendix 
B; Table 49).  Whether or not the c.25% of social tenants without cover can be 
persuaded to join ‘pay with rent’ schemes will depend, in part, on insurance 
companies making cover available and the affordability of the premiums. 
 
4.44 Householders’ take up of flood alleviation measures is strikingly higher for 
those who have been flooded (60.7%) compared with those not flooded (31.1%).  The 
most favoured responses are not having sentimental or irreplaceable items downstairs, 
the purchase of removable flood guards or sandbags and keeping the drains and 
ditches around the property cleaned out (Table 4.12).  Receiving demountable flood 
guards or sand bags from the local authority is also a popular option, alongside 







Table 4.11  Uptake of ‘Pay-with-Rent’ schemes among council tenants, by 
whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 
 









Yes 13.7 11.1 12.6 
No 78.4 75.0 77.0 
Don’t know or N/A 7.9 13.9 10.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 0.925; df=2; p>0.01 
 
Table 4.12  Flood alleviation measures taken, by whether flooded 
(per cent of respondents) 
 









Installed non-return valves on drains 2.0 0.8 1.4 
Keep ditches and drains around the property clean 18.0 9.0 13.6 
Built walls around the property 12.0 3.6 7.9 
Purchased water pumps 3.2 0.2 1.7 
Purchased removable flood guards or sandbags 19.3 6.6 13.1 
Received removable flood guards or sandbags from 
the council 
12.9 8.1 10.5 
Avoid keeping sentimental or irreplaceable items 
downstairs 
22.5 6.2 14.5 
Avoid having expensive furniture or floor coverings 
downstairs 
8.4 2.8 5.7 
Replaced plasterboard with plaster 1.8 0.2 1.0 
Installed concrete floors 7.0 1.3 4.2 
Replaced carpets with rugs 5.5 2.6 4.1 
Moved power sockets 9.3 0.9 5.2 
Moved electrical appliances 4.3 0.9 2.7 
Other 10.0 6.2 8.1 
    
Not taken any flood alleviation measures 39.3 68.9 53.7 
    
 
4.45 Respondents who have not been flooded register similar priorities, but the 
percentage take up is often very small.  Reasons given for not undertaking individual 
flood alleviation measures were mainly reliance on others to build flood defences or 
improve drainage (by implication this was a local authority duty), followed by an 
expectation that insurance would cover losses and the perceived low likelihood of a 
flood of similar severity (Appendix B; Table 51). 
 
4.46 Finally, we explore flood risk management based around warning systems.  
Floodline was known about by 74.2% of those flooded but by only 59.4% of those not 
flooded (a significant difference – see Table 4.13).  Usage of Floodline is also 
significantly higher amongst those who have been flooded (35.5%) compared with 
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those not flooded (13.1%, Table 4.14).  High levels of customer satisfaction with 
Floodline are reported across flooded and non-flooded households – 77.7% and 
79.3% respectively finding the service “helpful or very helpful” (Appendix B; Table 
54). 
   
4.47 Of respondents who had been flooded, 51% received a formal flood warning 
(official phoning or knocking on the door, loud hailer, automatic telephone 
messaging), this significantly falling to 34.4% for those not flooded (Appendix B; 
Table 55).  Just over half of the respondents (52.7%) received one flood warning, this 
falling to 27.8% for two warnings and 19.5% for three warnings (Appendix B; Table 
56), these values being similar for flooded and non-flooded respondents.    
 
Table 4.13  Awareness of Floodline, by whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 
 









Yes 74.2 59.4 67.1 
No 25.8 40.6 32.9 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 28.369; df=1; p<0.001 
 
Table 4.14  Use of Floodline, by whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 
 









Yes 37.5 13.1 26.7 
No 62.5 86.9 73.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 67.483; df=1; p<0.001 
 
4.48 In terms of future warnings (Table 4.15), it is striking that only 46.2% of 
households that had been flooded and warned were “confident or very confident” of a 
sufficient warning in the future, this falling to 21.2% for those not warned and 
flooded.  By contrast, those who had not been flooded took a significantly more 
positive view with 60.7% of those warned and 40.2% of those not warned being 
“confident or very confident” in future warnings.  Prior experience of being warned 
raises confidence but, paradoxically, to lower levels amongst those flooded than those 
not flooded.  On the other hand, those who have been flooded but not warned are 
nearly half as confident as those who have been neither flooded nor warned.  Thus 
having received a warning in the past increases confidence in getting sufficient 
warning next time, but this is lessened by the actual experience of being flooded, 
possible reflecting what can be done with “sufficient” time.  Surprisingly, those who 
have been warned but not flooded, have by far the highest confidence in future 
warnings; but this may not be sustained through repeated false alarms. 
 
4.49 However, prior experience of being flooded did result in significantly higher 
levels of confidence in knowing what to do in a future flood (65.3% “confident or 
very confident” – Table 4.16) when compared with those who had not been flooded 
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(52.7% “confident or very confident”).   The most preferred means of being warned 
were an official knocking at the door, individual action (checking the river) and a 
loudhailer in the street, television or a phone call (Appendix B; Table 59), with a mix 
of these actions being favoured by a large number of respondents. 
 
Table 4.15  Confidence of sufficient warning of a future flood, by whether ever 
received a warning and whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 
 

















Very confident 9.9 2.9 9.6 6.6 
Confident 36.3 18.2 51.1 33.6 
Not very confident 38.4 45.0 34.6 40.2 
Not at all confident 15.4 33.9 4.8 19.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Chi-squared = 49.637; df=3; p<0.001 
**Chi-squared = 30.262; df=3; p<0.001 
 
Table 4.16  Confidence of knowing what to do in a future flood, by whether 
flooded (per cent of respondents) 
 









Very confident 18.3 10.5 14.5 
Confident 47.0 42.2 44.7 
Not very confident 25.1 37.1 30.9 
Not at all confident 9.6 10.2 9.9 
Chi-squared = 26.401; df=3; p<0.001 
 
4.50   We now explore whether receipt of a flood warning varies with socio-
economic status.  Neither age, nor income group, nor occupational class nor housing 
tenure register any significant difference in terms of flood warning (Appendix B; 
Tables 60-63).  This implies that the agencies responsible for dissemination do so in 
an even-handed manner to the 42% of sampled households which received a warning. 
 
4.51 Finally we examine the acceptability and responsibility of a range of flood 
management policies.  The most acceptable forms of flood management (considering 
effectiveness, cost and fairness) are structural flood defences (favoured by 91.1% of 
all respondents), closely followed by fitting valves to sewers and storm drains 
(89.0%), a flood warning service (88.5%) and using upstream storage in reservoirs 
(86.0%).  Neither demolition of the most threatened properties with compensation or 
relocation of residents (39.2%) nor payment to rural land owners to increase storage 
of water in the soil (72.1%) approach the levels of support accorded structural flood 
defences (Table 4.17). But respondents who have been flooded are more supportive of 
demolishing threatened properties than those who have not been flooded (45.1% 
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compared with 33.3%).  Overall, structural measures are still seen as providing the 
first line in flood defence.    
 
Table 4.17  Acceptability of flood management policies, by whether flooded 
(per cent of respondents indicating policy is acceptable) 
 







Structural flood defences 
 
92.6 89.4 91.1 
Valves fitted to sewers and/or storm 
drains 
89.5 88.4 89.0 
Upstream reservoirs 
 
88.2 83.6 86.0 
Sustainable urban drainage systems 
 
80.2 77.1 78.7 
Flood warning service 
 
90.3 86.6 88.5 
Demolition of the most threatened 
properties and relocation of the occupants
45.1 33.3 39.2 
Pay farmers and land managers upstream 
to undertake practices that increase the 
water-holding capacity of the ground 
76.0 67.9 72.1 
 
4.52 When respondents were asked where they thought the main responsibility for 
protecting property from flooding should lie, responsibility was unequivocally 
assigned to local authorities by 58.4% of respondents, and to a lesser extent to the 
Scottish Executive (31.9%), with fewer than 20% of respondents identifying SEPA 
and Scottish Water (Table 4.18).  When these answers are sub-divided according to 
socio-economic characteristics, households with septuagenarians preferentially 
allocate responsibility to the Scottish Executive and away from local authorities 
(Appendix B; Table 66), whereas households with an annual income of less than 
£20,000 reverse this allocation with local authorities overwhelmingly favoured 
(Appendix B; Table 67).  When the same question is asked across occupational 
classes, the local authority continues to be most favoured responsible body, but by a 
lower percentage of those in professional and managerial grades (Appendix B; Table 
68).  Unsurprisingly, council and housing association tenants overwhelming see flood 
protection as a local authority duty.  However, this declines sharply in favour of the 
Scottish Executive amongst home-owners and households with private landlords 
(Appendix B; Table 69).  When asked where responsibility for flood protection 
actually lies, 22.9% of respondents accepted individual responsibility (up from 8.3% 
in terms of where responsibility should lie), with local authorities, the Scottish 
Executive, SEPA and Scottish Water identified as responsible authorities as before, 







Table 4.18  Views of where main responsibility for flood protection SHOULD lie 
 
Where main responsibility for flood 
protection SHOULD lie 
Number of 
responses 
Per cent of 
responses 
Per cent of 
respondents 
Yourself 93 5.9 8.3 
Landlord 51 3.2 4.6 
Local council 654 41.4 58.4 
Scottish Executive 357 22.6 31.9 
SEPA 211 13.4 18.9 
Scottish Water 184 11.6 16.4 
Other 30 1.9 2.7 
    
TOTAL - responses 1,580 100.0  
TOTAL - respondents 1,119  141.2 
 
Table 4.19  Views of where main responsibility for flood protection DOES lie 
 
Where main responsibility for flood 
protection DOES lie 
Number of 
responses 
Per cent of 
responses 
Per cent of 
respondents 
Yourself 257 18.6 22.9 
Landlord 29 2.1 2.6 
Local council 508 36.7 45.4 
Scottish Executive 188 13.6 16.8 
SEPA 119 8.6 10.6 
Scottish Water 114 8.2 10.2 
Other 14 1.0 1.3 
Don’t know 154 11.1 13.8 
    
TOTAL - responses 1,383 100.0  
TOTAL - respondents 1,120  123.6 
 
Table 4.20  Willingness to pay extra Council Tax per annum for flood protection, 
by whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 
 






Not willing to pay any extra 58.4 51.5 55.1 
Under £20 12.2 17.4 14.7 
£20-£49 13.4 17.4 15.3 
£50-£99 5.7 7.2 6.4 
£100+ 10.2 6.6 8.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
4.53 Finally respondents were invited to specify their willingness to pay additional 
council tax which would be hypothecated for flood protection measures (Table 4.20).  
More than half of respondents were unwilling to make any additional payment.   Of 
the remainder 8.5% were prepared to pay £100 or more, 6.4% £50-99 and 15.3% up 
to £49.   Those who have been flooded are more willing to make a higher contribution 
– 10.2% of those flooded would pay more than £100 compared with 6.6% of those not 
 47 
flooded.  Income is also a statistically significant discriminator of willingness to pay 
(Appendix A; Table 72) with 15.9 % of higher income households (>£20,000 per 
year) offering to pay £100 or more, compared with only 7.0% for lower income 
households (<£20,000 per year).  When analysed by housing tenure, those owning 
their home with a mortgage express the greatest willingness to pay (albeit with nearly 
half not willing to pay any extra), while social tenants express the least willingness 
with almost two-thirds not willing to pay any extra council tax for flood protection 





4.54 This chapter has reported the findings from a questionnaire survey of 
households in eight locations flooded within the period 1993-2005.  Overall, roughly 
equal numbers of flooded households and households at risk, but not flooded, were 
surveyed.  The single most important finding is that intangible impacts are more 
severe than tangible ones.  Also immediate impacts are more severe than lasting 
impacts, but the latter (which include long-term health effects) can individually be 
very onerous, especially for vulnerable households where modest incomes may inhibit 
post flood recovery.  Flood warnings and insurance can help mitigate flood impacts.  
But only 33% of those who have been flooded use Floodline, and contents insurance 
take up is significantly lower for social tenants than owner-occupiers.  Only 13% of 






CHAPTER FIVE  FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
 
5.1 This chapter summarises the main findings from the five focus groups.  The 
chapter is structured to parallel that of Chapter Four.  The impacts of flooding 
(objective 1) are summarised under the headings ‘tangible impacts’, ‘intangible 
immediate impacts’ and ‘intangible lasting impacts’.  The findings in terms of living 
with floods (objective 2) are reported in terms of ‘risk perception’ and ‘managing 
flood risk’.  This chapter puts the human face on being flooded and living with the 
risk of being flooded.  The quotations from focus group respondents amplify and 
deepen the findings in Chapter Four. 
 
 




5.2 Changes in property values  Most focus group participants reported a 
downturn in the volume and value of house sales immediately after the flood.  This 
contrasted with more recent sales being close to the market values for non-flooded 
properties.  Nevertheless, anxieties remain on whether a particular property will sell, 
for example due to a history of repeat flooding and that visible flood measures serve 
to devalue property: 
 
 “If I get flooded again, I won’t claim on the insurance because I’ve then 
got a house that’s been flooded twice and I’ll never sell it.  You asked why 
not use flood defences like your neighbour.  The fact when I sell my house 
the first thing you see is boards fitted, special blinds, there’s obviously a 
problem”.  [Forres] 
 
By contrast, one focus group participant in Glasgow reported a house in their street 
with flood guards fitted being sold to someone who did not even ask what they were, 
or enquire about flooding in the area. 
 
5.3 Lost earnings  Focus group discussions rarely included lost earnings, implying 
that not many people are affected by this.  However, one Glasgow participant who 
was a taxi driver reported not being able to work for six weeks because his car was 
written off by the flood. 
 
5.4 Other financial losses  General out of pocket expenses incurred as a direct 
result of a flood was the most often reported other financial loss: 
 
“I don’t think there’s anybody here could say that they didn’t end up out 
of pocket because of the flood.  Just the mere fact you go into a hotel.  Yes, 
you go into a hotel but the insurance company don’t pay for your food, so 
you have to go out and buy your food either in the hotel or a restaurant”.  
[Forres] 
 
5.5    Role of insurance in mitigating tangible losses  As noted below, a major 
immediate impact reported by participants was the disruption associated with having 
to leave one’s home and the resulting discomfort and inconvenience.  However, these 
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impacts were mitigated by the relatively good experiences most focus group 
participants had with their insurance companies in the aftermath of the floods: 
 
“I couldn’t believe how much it cost.  And the second time, like we just 
had got a brand new heating system in.  ‘No’ [don’t keep it].  Replace it 
again.  In fact, my kitchen [about] which I actually said to them, ‘I don’t 
even really know [how much it cost].  We’ll maybe just keep the kitchen.  
It’s just brand new.’  ‘No’.  All it went out and all back in again.  I have to 
admit, the insurance companies were good - there was no quibble”.  
[Glasgow] 
 
“He was like that, ‘No, everything out’.  And I said to him, ‘There’s no 
any [checks to be done]? You know, you hear people, you know, insurance 
companies’ … and he said, ‘No.  You’re talking about a whole house.  You 
don’t start nitpicking with people.’  He said, ‘They’ve lost everything.  
They’re upset’.” [Glasgow] 
 
5.6 Although insurance companies’ response in the aftermath of a flood was 
generally viewed favourably, some participants reported negative experiences: 
  
“I know a chap and his wife went to stay with his mother and because they 
were staying with a relative, the insurance company halved the fee they 
were paying.  So that old lady was subsidising the insurance company.  
And where I was staying, I put in bed and breakfast, they wrote back and 
said, ‘We see you are getting breakfast, so we deduct £2 something.’  
[Perth] 
 
“I thought they were a bit penny pinching because in correspondence to 
them when I was complaining about the builder, I explained the trouble 
we’d went to lift the carpet, to get the furniture up the stair.  I would never 
do it again.  No way.  I mean, they tell you to do it.  The flood comes, then 
if it comes, it can come and it can destroy the lot because I’m trying to 
save them money and they’re giving me a hard time, you know”.  
[Edinburgh] 
 
5.7 An important difference between the experience of those repairing their home 
through their own private buildings insurance and council tenants relying on the local 
authority housing department may explain some of the greater impact of flooding 
reported by council tenants in the household survey: 
 
“I found that my insurance was quick and everything.  I mean, I know 
ones in my street that are council houses.  They were waiting for months 
and months and months.  Our insurance company got them in right away 




Intangible impacts - immediate 
 
5.8 Trauma  Many participants appeared to experience the flood itself and its 
immediate aftermath as quite traumatic.  Words frequently used to describe the time 
of the flood include ‘shock’, ‘horrendous’, ‘fear’ and ‘panic’: 
 
“My son came running in and he said, ‘There’s nothing can be saved 
here’.  I was actually … took out in a rowing boat wearing a pair of 
pyjamas, a pair of slippers and my wee bag I lifted every day.  I was just 
in shock because it was just after my boy died.  I just stood and I tried to 
save this and that… hopeless”. [Glasgow] 
 
“It was really stressful.  I mean, I seen people maybe … the first day or so, 
they were alright and then all of a sudden you see them sitting there 
crying.  They just crack up”. [Glasgow] 
 
“Panic.  It’s all panic… you think, ‘I’m going out the house, what do I 
need if I’m going out?  I need medicines, so I get my medicines’ - my 
wife’s diabetic – ‘I need toiletries, I need towel, I need a change of 
underwear, I need clothing’.  So you’ve got to pack a bag and packing a 
bag in 10 minutes to go out, you don’t know how long you’re gonna be out 
for, is impossible.  You don’t think, ‘Oh my photos’ because you’re just 
full of… fear.  Fear sets in.  Medication – that’s the kind of things you 
think of.”  [Elgin] 
 
“I had hens.  I also had bees.  The flood wiped out the bees.  I had to swim 
in four and a half feet of water to get out the hens, which was sewerage 
and, you know, the whole thing was just absolutely horrendous”.  [Forres] 
 
5.9 Anxiety and stress  After the trauma of the flood itself, many participants 
reported a period of ongoing anxiety and stress associated with being out of their 
home and making the necessary arrangements for repairs: 
 
“I think you’ve a fear factor initially of adrenaline that helps to carry you 
through it … I think in a lot of cases, panic sets in and actually gets you 
through whatever it may be and then after that’s finished, then it sets in.  
Then it’s the desperation to get alternative accommodation or whatever 
and then after that it’s getting the loss adjuster to come and look.  You 
walk back through your house again and it’s covered in sewage.  That’s a 
devastating moment”.  [Elgin] 
 
Uncertainty appears to contribute to feelings of anxiety, particularly for council 
tenants who often do not have as much control over where they will be re-housed 
compared to someone with private insurance paying for alternative accommodation: 
 
“It’s the fact of … where are you going?  You know, you’re going out your 
house and there’s nothing organised where you’re gonna go, what’s 
gonna happen to you or anything like that”.  [Elgin] 
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5.10 The anxiety and stress of having to organise many things simultaneously 
reportedly can have an impact on family relationships: 
 
“It puts a strain on your relationship as well because of the stress and 
everything of trying to find somewhere else to stay and sort everything out 
… you’re just … you’re falling out with one another and everything”.  
[Elgin] 
 
“My wife and I usually get on quite well but there was something about 
work needing done in the house and a couple of times she said, ‘You’ll 
need to go and see this, you’ll need to go and see that’ and she just said it 
once too often and I flipped, ‘You go and see about it’, and we had a 
massive row, you know.  It’s just… it was totally out of character, you 
know”.  [Edinburgh] 
 
5.11 A commonly reported problem was security, which seemed particularly acute 
in Glasgow: 
 
“We were broken into about 10, 12 times… oh, we gave up.  And we had 
left not very much up the stairs but we’d left a few things that they just 
kept scattering everything and then breaking windows, breaking in down 
the stairs to get in and what the insurance company wouldn’t do was class 
that as the same claim and they were saying that to get the window fixed 
down the stairs, they wouldn’t incorporate it in with the claim just fixing 
all the rest of the house.  And we were saying, ‘That’s just ridiculous.  It’s 
because we’re out the house with the flood that we’re getting broken into’ 
and they were saying, ‘No, you would need to do a separate claim then.  
It’s £100 excess plus …’ and we were like that … we got that sorted in the 
end but I mean…” [Glasgow] 
 
5.12 Disruption and inconvenience in leaving one’s home  Simply being out of 
one’s home reportedly takes its toll on people because of the frustration and 
uncertainty of not knowing how long it will be until it is possible to return, for 
example: 
 
 “It’s the time that you’re out [that impacts on you the most].  I mean, we 
were out for a year or almost a year, it was 11 months we were out and 
you just think, ‘Am I never getting back to my own house?’, you know.  It 
seems to drag on and on and on”.  [Elgin] 
 
5.13 Participants reported a greater impact on vulnerable individuals of being 
displaced from home, in particular the elderly and those without friends and 
family close by who could help out: 
 
“That’s where the problem arises.  It’s the aftermath.  It’s the elderly.  It 
hits them the hardest.  The lady stripped everything.  She took all her 
bedding from the house, all her curtains, all her towels, all her clothes and 
they were all covered in muck with flooding and she brought them up to 
Bishopmill House in black carrier bags, black plastic bags, 29 of them and 
proceeded to wash them through the machines.  None of the laundries and 
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none of the drycleaners in the town would touch anything out of the flood 
area.  Whenever you gave your address, no thanks, you’re not coming 
through here with it.  So you were stuck”.  [Elgin] 
 
5.14 Many participants reported that living in hotel accommodation presented 
difficulties in maintaining normal family life, particularly for those with young 
children: 
 
“Two kids traipsing around town, trying to find something that they want 
to eat and there is nothing … you know, you think it would be the best 
thing in this world to just have your tea made for you every night but it 
really becomes a bind”.  [Forres] 
 
As well as discomfort and inconvenience resulting directly from displacement, 
participants reported a wider range of impacts resulting from disruption to families, 
for example impaired performance by children at school: 
 
“We stayed with a chap that used to stay with us but my son couldn’t.  
There wasn’t enough room for him, so he stayed with his gran and that 
was one of the problems because we didn’t have our eye on him.  I just 
bounce back but my son’s exams suffered that year.” [Glasgow] 
 
5.15 As well as displacement from home, putting a new home together brings a lot 
of disruption and stress.  Some participants reported difficulties in finding what they 
needed, for example accessories to match existing décor, and having to return 
damaged, faulty or incorrect goods that had been delivered or installed. 
 
5.16 Dealing with builders  Many focus group members found dealing with 
builders stressful especially in terms of the quality of their workmanship. 
 
“A lot of cowboys came out the woodwork when it’s insurance jobs, you 
know”. [Glasgow] 
 
“The only people that were dealing with it were the people that were 
contracted to deal with the whole house and when we came in after it had 
been put in… there was like tears on the linoleum and a scratch on the 
wallpaper and we said, ‘What about this?’  ‘Well, we didn’t put it in’ … 
‘Well, you’re the only people that were in the house and we certainly 
didn’t put it in’.  But we couldn’t prove it, we just had to leave it.  There 
was nothing we could do”.  [Perth] 
  
“We were out for a year and our insurance company employed these 
cowboys… we ended up trying to get them off the site and then we had to 
find our own contractor after that, which was a nightmare.  We fought 
with the insurance company right up until April, the house was in such a 
mess.  I mean, there wasn’t an even wall or anything.  That round your 
door there, you could put your hand in at the top and at the bottom it was 
tight.  That was how far off our walls were.  Now, I wanted it back the way 
[it was]… and he said, ‘Oh, wait till it’s finished, wait till it’s finished’.  
There was no way [we were going to do that].  My husband and I were up 
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2, 3 in the morning having cups of coffee and cigarettes, we were so 
stressed out and I was saying to him, ‘You should say this to them’ and we 
were just falling out with one another because of it”.  [Elgin] 
 
5.17 Participants reported anxiety resulting from lack of control over the work 
when contractors are being paid by insurance companies and are overwhelmed with 
work.  For example, there was much frustration expressed at the length of time repairs 
took to properties.  In some cases this was compounded by householders visiting their 
property to assess progress to find that often no-one was working on their property 
because contractors apparently found it more time-efficient to work on a whole street 
in one go: 
 
“What some of them were doing… because they had so many properties … 
they would do a bit on yours, go round to another property and do a bit on 
that and then go round and do a bit on another one and then they’d come 
back to you the next day and do another wee bit”.  [Perth] 
 
“I contacted the insurance company.  It was two days before anybody 
appeared to see me.  So they started to arrange work to be done and then 
on the Saturday night I think it was, I got this wee naffer fellow, ‘I’m 
gonna be your builder, so I said, ‘Aye, aye’.  Turned out to be a complete 
cowboy”.  [Edinburgh] 
 
Many focus group participants had difficulties finding trades people due to high 
demand after the flood.  This seemed to be especially the case in Edinburgh, with 
particular shortages of plasterers and electricians. 
 
 
Intangible impacts - lasting 
 
5.18 Health impacts  As well as the anxiety and stress of dealing with getting back 
into one’s home, many focus group participants talked about longer-term ongoing 
mental health issues, with elderly people reportedly being affected the most: 
 
“You need somebody … how do you explain it?  You need a psychiatrist or 
a psychologist.  The Council workers got that.  They got counselling.  
That’s what I’m saying.  We need, not necessarily me or whatever, but the 
elderly, somebody who’s 70, 80 year old and they are completely stressed 
out … they did become compulsive.  They’ve got compulsive habits every 
day.  They didn’t have them before, they now have.  They’ve now got this 
stress syndrome.  You need somebody to come up and got to talk to them, 
to understand them…  It’s not the younger ones.  The younger ones can 
hack that, no problem.  We’re still stressed but we’ll get round it sooner or 
later”.  [Elgin] 
 
“Well, I live alone, and I was eight months [staying] with my daughter 
and I’m still not right… well, I don’t think any of us will ever be right 
because I mean, we’re no just young teenagers”. [Glasgow] 
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“I was in the house for about 3 weeks to a month after it before they 
moved [me] and I’ve got a lot of health problems.  I was ill and it was all 
that sewage and they put a dehumidifier in but they had to take it out 
because I’ve got asthma and it was bringing on asthma attacks”.  
[Glasgow] 
 
5.19 As well as the widespread reporting of stress and anxiety, a number of focus 
group participants highlighted a range of impacts on physical health, from exhaustion 
due to not sleeping and physical exertion (usually sand-bagging) to a slipped-disk 
from moving furniture.  Other narratives included: 
 
“I had a daughter who was quite ill at the time with a virus and that [the 
flood] had a real impact on her recovery.  In fact, I think it was really 6 
months … 6 months without a voice.  And how much of that was because 
of this … you know, she had the illness to start with but how much it was 
prolonged was because of the stress”.  [Forres] 
 
“I wasn’t aware of it, you know but I heard my son talking to somebody, 
‘God, my dad’s aged 10  years’.”  [Edinburgh] 
 
5.20 Several people reported elderly neighbours never really recovering from being 
flooded.  A couple of focus group participants (plus several respondents on the 
doorstep during the household survey) attributed fatalities to the flood – albeit people 
who were frail prior to being flooded: 
 
 “My next door neighbour, she’s elderly, she elected to stay overnight and 
I think … I don’t know whether family were coming the next day to get her 
… but she had a subsequent fall.  It was within weeks and she died.  So 
whether it was all the stress plus the fall just, I don’t know”.  [Perth] 
 
“The first flood, we had my mother in law, elderly lady.  Totally confused, 
in new accommodation.  It threw her, never really recovered.  She’s 
passed away since between the floods.  I’m no saying the flood was the 
cause of her passing away but she was totally confused in the new house.  
It affects folk… she was elderly, it affected her, so the elderly people really 
suffer a lot more than others” [Elgin] 
 
5.21 Loss of irreplaceable items  The loss of material possessions apparently can 
create a sense of emotional loss, particularly for retired people who often see their 
home and its contents as representing their lifetime’s work.  The loss of sentimental 
items, especially photographs, appears to be particularly upsetting: 
 
“My mother died of cancer, I lost all her photos, all the photos of the kids, 
all the like baby stuff, you know, memories, you know when they’re first 
born, the memory box”.  [Elgin] 
 
 “Weddings and photos, my husband and I through the years, my only son, 
he was there the year before [son deceased].  An awful lot of sentimental 
stuff.  My father was a seaman.  He brought me a lot of stuff I couldn’t 
replace.  In fact, my daughter … we were actually in tears because I had 
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this ottoman and it was hand carved and actually I was offered a lot of 
money for this a few years before that.  I said, ‘I wouldn’t part with this’.  
I said, ‘Even if you gave me thousands’, I said, ‘because this belonged to 
my father’.”  [Glasgow] 
 
“You can’t renew them and there’d been like a lot of things like people 
had bought us like my 21st birthday books, a lot of them went, that my 
granny had given me.  My gran’s not with me.  Things like that are sad.  
You’re looking at your stuff and you’re thinking, ‘That has to go’ or 
‘That’s gone’.  As you say, you look for something but we lost that in the 
flood.  Things like that.  That’s when it’s quite hard”. [Glasgow] 
 
“My life was in two skips, things which you cannot replace, wedding 
photographs, birth certificates.  I was in the RAF during the war and my 
flying log was all ruined.  I had a couple of wings off my uniform, gone.  
These are things that you cannot replace … not by an insurance company 
or anybody else”.  [Perth] 
 
5.22 Community impacts and responses  On the whole local communities seem to 
have responded quite well to the demands of the initial displacement of residents: 
 
“I mean, I suppose where I stay in Greenfield anyway it was like a 
building site.  In the morning, all the workers started arriving and you 
could come down and just make sure everything was getting done you 
know.  But everybody was out all blethering.  You were talking to people 
you never spoke to before, you know what I mean, because all of us having 
experienced the same kind of a thing and they were all out blethering, 
bringing you out a cup of tea and chatting away and things like that”. 
[Glasgow] 
 
“This sounds silly but it brought Kingsmill and South West Murdie closer 
together.  When I first moved in there, it was like them and us, Kingsmill 
and Murdie.  Because everybody was thrown together in the same 
situation, right, left and centre, you had to pull together.  If someone was 
having a problem, you’re there to help… everybody has good days and 
bad days and you had to look out for folk, like the young lad who’s blind 
up from us”.  [Elgin] 
 
5.23 However, some participants were sceptical about just how genuine the 
desire to help was among non-flooded residents: 
  
“I would say it was more curiosity than help but then I don’t know how 
much of that’s our own pride in not asking for help cos I would never have 
thought to ask my neighbours, you know.  I took my washing to friends and 
to the laundry rather than asking neighbours who had no washing.” 
[Glasgow] 
 
Two of the five focus groups (Glasgow and Perth) mentioned difficulties in 
distributing funds from emergency appeals, with most people not receiving anything 
and not knowing what happened to the money.  For example: 
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“I ended up having a meeting with them, with the councillors and with the 
Lord Provost, it basically ended up they accused me of calling them liars 
and that.  I mean, it did become a bone of contention and from this day … 
from that day onwards, I would never contribute a penny to any appeal.  
Appeals cause an awful lot of ill feeling and an awful lot of problems”.  
[Perth] 
 
5.24 In addition to the immediate disruption to people’s lives while out of their 
home, (see 5.12-5.15) some participants reported permanent restrictions on their 
activities, mainly resulting from not wanting to leave their property unattended: 
 
“We can’t go on holiday, we take separate holidays now because someone 
needs to be there if there is a flood… unless we can get someone to come 
and stay in the house that we trust, you know, that we don’t mind staying, 
we’re stuck”.  [Edinburgh] 
 
 




5.25 Causes of floods  A range of views were expressed about the perceived causes 
of floods, often at variance with the actual causes.  Many focus group members 
appeared to look for someone to hold responsible for a particular flood, typically a 
landowner or the local authority, for example: 
 
“It’s not an Act of God, it’s an act of incompetence whoever built the wall 
not strong enough”.  [Edinburgh] 
 
More generally local authorities were often blamed by participants for not dredging 
rivers, not cleaning drains, allowing building on floodplains and not constructing 
flood defences. 
 
5.26 In the period following a flood, rumours often start about the cause of the 
flood.  For example, in Edinburgh the perception that gates at Leith docks should have 
been opened in 2000 to allow the river to flow to sea faster than normal was expressed 
by a number of participants.  In Perth participants talked of a rumour still circulating, 
a decade-and-a-half after the flood, that the army blasted the river bank to save 
commercial properties in the town centre at the expense of local authority housing in 
North Muirton.  The existence of this rumour was captured (and rebuffed) by one of 
the participants: 
 
“I was chair person of the flood committee and we were kept fully up to 
date with everything that was happening and everything was fully 
explained to us and there was rumour and there was counter rumour, even 
North Muirton being sacrificed to save the town, obviously it wasn’t.  But 
there were all these rumours and counter rumours.  There was even 
supposed to be a film of the TA blasting.   There’s all sorts of things but it 
was all rubbish… and it’s up to people to listen … you know, it was 
explained to us and even after it being explained, people didn’t always 
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believe it so at the end of the day it was down to what you want to 
believe”.  [Perth] 
 
Also in Perth, participants reported that a rumour persists that the flood was caused by 
a poorly constructed dam breaking.  This may reflect negative local attitudes toward 
rural landowners. 
 
5.27 Most prevalent is a widespread view (reported in all five areas where focus 
groups were held) that drains and culverts should be cleaned out more often and that 
this is a significant cause of the apparent rise in the number of floods in Scotland over 
the last fifteen years or so. 
 
5.28 Perceived levels of risk  Perception of the risk of future flooding varied greatly 
from person to person, depending in large measure on where they live.  Those close to 
a river and those who have been flooded more than once generally appear to view 
further flooding as more likely. 
 
5.29 Most flood victims in the Elgin focus group were almost certain there will be 
another flood, reflecting the fact that there have been two large floods within five 
years.  Indeed, one focus group participant reported that a council official has 
admitted to them that it is likely there will be another flood.  However, another Elgin 
respondent to the household survey wrote that they felt relatively confident that 
lightening would not strike three times in the same place. 
 
5.30 There is reportedly a degree of faith in the flood gates that have been installed 
in Perth, but tempered by recognition that the gates had not been tested by particularly 
high levels on the Tay at the time of the focus group.  Adding to Perth residents’ 
relative peace of mind is the view that the river is highly unlikely to rise to the same 
extent as it did in 1993, as this was caused by unusually deep snow across Tayside 
followed by a very rapid melt. 
 
5.31 In Glasgow, local papers apparently have reported that the east of Glasgow 
will flood again due to under-capacity in the urban drainage system.  However, other 
participants at the Glasgow focus group took the view that Scottish Water has done 
enough to prevent another flood in Glasgow, whilst recognising that improvements to 
the urban drainage system are being implemented gradually, local area at a time. 
 
5.32 While many people may suffer from anxiety about flooding, at the same time 
they are often able to rationalise the level of risk they face.  For example, one focus 
group participant argued that people who have been flooded – including himself – 
overreact to the risk of a future flood, simply because their minds have been focussed 
on flooding: 
 
“You’re talking about risks and assessing the risks.  All it [having been 
flooded] does is focus your attention on flooding ...  Statistically, there’s 
more chances of you being flooded from your tank in the attic bursting 
and flooding your house that way.  There’s also more chance you’ll have a 
household fire through electrical fault than normal sort of flooding.  
There’s a risk that you might get struck by lightning.  There’s probably as 
much risk of that as, you know, getting flooded.  It’s just focusing your 
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attention at a particular time on a particular risk.  If you asked the non-
affected section of the population if flooding was a constant concern, then 
of course they’ll say no.  So we are a special group, we’re contaminated 
by the experience”.  [Forres] 
 
5.33 When needing to get information on the imminent level of flood risk, most 
people indicated that they rely on observing the river: 
 
“We’re round at the river every time it rains.  My husband was round last 
night looking at it.” [Elgin] 
 
“As soon as we get a couple of days rain… I mean, I get up every morning 
and it’s force of habit … I look out to see how the water is, you know and, 
you know, after a night’s rain, you think, ‘Oh it’s come up about 2 or 3 
feet’, you know”.  [Edinburgh] 
 
5.34 Local knowledge of historic flood patterns, while sometimes an asset, can also 
blind people to the fact that different spatial and temporal patterns of rainfall will 
affect different rivers in contrasting ways, producing different floods: 
 
“I think the problem we had with the warning side of things was that we 
were never considered at risk.  The areas that were flooded were never 
really considered at risk because I happened to be at work the same day 
that you said the Fire Brigade were pumping out the river.  One of my 
friends actually lives down on the Findhorn, down at Mondoll and he got 
a phone call to say that there was a high flood risk of the Findhorn and 
would he care to go home and, you know, check out his property and make 
preparations for flooding. And he left work that afternoon and told me that 
‘I’m off to do a check cos there’s this flood warning out for the Findhorn’.  
And I said ‘Bye, good luck to you mate’, you know, ‘Cheerio, all the best’, 
unbeknown to me that it wasn’t him that was under threat.  It was us under 
threat from the Mossat, not the Findhorn.  So I think the historical 
perceptions were that the Findhorn was always the threat and with the 
volume of rain that was falling, it was the Findhorn that was liable to 
flood, not the Mossat.” [Forres] 
 
5.35 During the household survey, a number of people at the edge of flood 
envelopes indicated on the doorstep that they were not at flood risk because the flood 
did not reach their property.  This view appears to be based on a perception that every 
flood will be identical. 
 
5.36 In terms of assessing the longer term risk faced, some focus group participants 
appeared quite well informed about climate change and the possible impact on 
flooding, for example: 
 





Managing flood risk 
 
5.37 Flood proofing  Most focus group participants were not keen on the idea of 
using flood guards from a practical point of view: 
 
Participant 1: “The problem [with flood guards] is if you put them on and 
you go back in your house, they’re not easy to get over.  Or you cannot get 
back into your house.  They’re easy enough taken off but if you’re flooded 
and you put your barrier up, how do you get back into your house?  You 
can’t get over that.  I’ve tried it”. 
Participant 2: “I’ve tried it and I’m fairly fit and I struggled trying to get 
over it. I had to get a chair from inside the house to climb over onto 
another chair and pull that chair in, then go in, then close my front door.  
It’s not that easy and if you’ve got an elderly person, they are going to 
struggle if they had their own barriers and that’s why we don’t have the 
barriers”.  [Elgin] 
 
Some council tenants reported flood guards being stored centrally by the local 
authority, labelled with people’s addresses.  There was scepticism as to the feasibility 
of deploying flood guards from this central store in sufficient time to avoid flooding. 
 
5.38 Other participants were of the view that trying to prevent flood waters from 
entering their home can be futile.  Therefore they simply ensure they can quickly 
retrieve key items: 
 
“You tend to get your life in a little bit more order is one of the things that 
we’ve done now.   Whereas before it happened, you maybe weren’t good 
at file keeping or receipt keeping, invoices and that sort of stuff and maybe 
didn’t keep all your legal documents and all that in a special place that 
you can just grab, you know, maybe you had some a bureau, some in a 
bottom drawer here, some over there, you know.  Now I think since it 
happened to us, everything’s got its place and if there’s a threat of flood, 
we’ve got a couple of boxes of legal documents, photographs, anything 
that you think is important, within minutes you can have that sorted and 
then you put your feet up, go to bed and wait”  [Forres]. 
 
5.39 Flood warnings and emergency planning  Although many focus group 
participants were quick to complain at either not receiving a warning or not getting 
sufficient warning of a flood, the limitations of what participants say they can do to 
prepare for a flood make them lukewarm or even sceptical about the benefits of flood 
warnings: 
 
“Well, we would still have a chance to save a few things but, I mean, what 
happens then, OK, you’re gonna be flooded.  Where are you gonna go?  
I’ve no got the money for hotels or anything.  Whether I’m on benefit or 
not, there’s folk working that still can’t afford it.  Where do you go?  They 
say, you’re gonna be flooded.  I’ve no family to go to”.  [Elgin] 
 
Some questioned the value of the information contained in a flood warning per se, for 
example: 
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“They have a much flaunted flood warning system.  Who needs a warning 
of a flood?  If your eyes are open, you can see it’s going to flood”.  
[Forres] 
 
“I think the whole argument about warnings is academic.  I honestly do, 
because what can you do?  We live in bungalows, we get a warning you’re 
gonna get flooded, move all your stuff upstairs.  Sorry, can’t do that”.  
[Forres] 
 
On the other hand, some saw value in flood warnings, albeit limited: 
 
“You can take a couple of precautions, move your car out, you know, I 
lost my car.  If I’d had a warning, I could have maybe taken it out”.  
[Forres] 
 
5.40 Other participants reported feeling let down by not having been given 
sufficient warning and information on what to do to prepare for the flood.  An 
example of this came from Perth, perhaps triggering improvements in flood warnings 
and emergency planning since the flood in 1993: 
 
“we pulled the car out of Lincoln Court and went right and there was a 
lorry full of sandbags.  Right?  We’re like, what’s going on here, cos we 
hadn’t heard a thing.  So my husband went over and they said that they 
think there might be flooding but they don’t know. They’d have to wait 
until the 4 o’clock high tide and then they would know.  So, OK.  So we 
went away …  and it wasn’t until I put the kids to bed and I went upstairs 
and I saw the neighbours flooding out their houses and it was pouring 
down and I could see the road outside - it was just water. … So they had 
sandbags.  We took some sandbags and the rest … they brought sand and 
they just dumped it in the middle of the road and they gave us the 
sandbags to fill as the water’s coming up – but we didn’t know what we 
were doing or where to put the sandbags - and then it covered the sand 
and washed the sand away [laughs]”.  [Perth] 
 
There was also more general frustration reported at local authorities’ responses to the 
floods: 
 
Participant 1:  “I was very disappointed that the Council didn’t ask the 
Army to step in.  The Army’s there, it’s got men, the manpower, it’s got the 
lorries, it’s got the equipment”. 
Participant 2:  “It felt amateurish, didn’t it?” 
[Several participants concur]  [Edinburgh] 
 
5.41 Insurance Many participants reported losing their no-claims bonus and some 
reported increases in excesses for flooding when making their insurance claim.  Many 
people found this vexing as they were not at fault: 
 
“The only impact on the insurance was the aftermath because of the box 
asking who was responsible for the damage.  I lost no claims insurance 
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cos I had a no claims bonus on my household insurance and my contents 
insurance”. [Glasgow] 
 
“the one thing that I really got angry was I mean, my taxi was underwater, 
right over the steering wheel and nobody would take the blame for it.  It 
had my mobile phone in it, my fire extinguisher.  My computer which cost 
£1000 and the company wanted £250 excess off me but nobody would take 
… so I just had to claim off my own insurance and my premium then went 
sky high because the Water Board, everybody just wouldn’t take 
responsibility for it”. [Glasgow] 
 
Large flooding excesses and lack of access to alternative insurers because of living in 
an area that has been flooded were commonly reported problems.  For example, one 
focus group participant whose insurance provider introduced a £10,000 excess for 
flooding after the flood explained his frustration at not being able to do anything 
about this and the anxiety that such a large excess brings: 
 
“We wrote to our MSP who wrote to the insurance company complaining 
and got a letter back saying that they wouldn’t even consider reducing the 
excess until the council has installed flood foundations.  So you can 
imagine, every time it rains, we’re round at the river, looking to see.  I 
mean, £10,000 excess for flooding; it’s just…”  [Elgin] 
 
“The insurance initially stayed the same for about a year and then the 
following year it shot up and we thought, right, we need to try and get a 
better quote and as recently as a year ago when you gave your postcode 
they told you no, you’re in a floodplain”.  [Forres] 
 
 
5.42 Ownership of managing flood risk  Most focus group participants accepted a 
degree of responsibility for protecting their own home from floods and for living with 
the consequences of living in a flood-risk area.  However, many perceived a wider 
culpability for the flood that other organisations are not willing to accept: 
 
“There’s a question at the bottom [of an insurance claim form] and it 
says, “Who do you hold responsible?”  Everybody that I’ve spoken to has 
put Edinburgh Council.”  [Edinburgh] 
 
 “I have been in touch with Scottish Water beforehand and after the flood 
because of the ongoing problems that we had.  When we started getting 
flooded, I phoned him and he automatically authorised a group of men to 
drain the water away to stop it getting to us.  So they were working on it, 
you know.  I can’t stand and let them take blame for doing nothing but at 
the end of the day, it was their fault, they should have done something 
quicker and we wouldn’t have got the experience we did”.  [Glasgow] 
 
5.43 Many participants were of the view that local authorities were contributing to 




“I don’t think that the District Council are helping either.  They’re trying 
to build on every flood plain that’s going.  The flood area where I had four 
and a half feet of water and had to take my hens out of. … Actually, you 
know, anyone can put in planning permission.  They’ve actually got 
planning permission in for my ground, which I’m not selling, but they have 
and I mean, I think that’s ridiculous”.  [Forres] 
 
5.44 In some local settings there was a strong perception of alleged injustice in the 
priorities given to different types of property owner.  For example, that the army were 
brought in to pump out Murrayfield stadium in Edinburgh in preparation for a rugby 
match while people’s homes were still under water vexed one participant: 
 
“Murrayfield was out of action for 3 or 4 days, we were out of action for 3 
or 4 months.  Basically that’s what it boils down to”.  [Edinburgh] 
 
5.45 In Edinburgh, there is reportedly strong negative feeling towards the Scottish 
Rugby Union for objecting to the proposed flood alleviation scheme, and 
consequently delaying its implementation.  In this case the residents’ perception 
reported in the focus group is that commercial interests are overriding the interests of 
householders.  One participant expressed concern at who is and is not willing to make 
sacrifices for the proposed flood alleviation scheme: 
 
“with the current proposed plan, we’re gonna lose so much of our garden 
and we’ve not complained and our neighbour’s a chiropractor and she’s 
got a little gravelled area … and she has objected”.  [Edinburgh] 
 
5.46 On the question of ‘managed retreat’ from areas that have been flooded, some 
participants indicated that they would have been relatively happy to have been 
permanently re-housed at the time of the flood, including owner occupiers.  Indeed, 
most participants knew former neighbours who had opted to ‘cut their losses’ and 
move out.  However, a substantial proportion of focus group participants were 
strongly opposed to this idea, with their notion of ‘home’ being closely bound to a 
specific property, particularly if they have lived there for a long time.  For example: 
 
Interviewer: “How would you feel about permanently moving if you were 
fully compensated?” 
Participant 1:  “No.  I mean, I was sitting out there yesterday, beautiful 
sunshine, lovely piece of grass in front of me, nice … I mean, the wall is 
very artistic, it’s an old fashioned rubble wall, the birds are singing and 
there’s wood pigeons… and it’s brilliant, you know.  I don’t want to move 
from there.  I’m quite happy to, you know…” 
Participant 2:  “That’s why you bought the house”. 
Participant 1:  “That was why I bought it, aye”. 
Participant 2:  “You probably worked all your life in order to…” 
Participant 1:  “That’s right.  I mean, I’ve gradually moved up and, you 
know, this is what I’ve come to and I’m quite happy there”.  [Edinburgh] 
 
In the Elgin focus group, it was argued that it would not be feasible to permanently 
re-house everybody who was flooded because so many properties were affected in 
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relation to the size of the town.  In addition, there was a view expressed that the state 
did not have the right to prevent people from taking risks with their own homes: 
 
 “you are happy living where you are cos you like that house and I think 
you’re right – so the State shouldn’t tell you otherwise”.  [Forres] 
 
5.47 Many participants expressed frustration with the slow-pace and perceived lack 
of willingness to listen seriously to the suggestions of local people in planning flood 
defence schemes.  This appeared to be particularly acute in Elgin: 
 
“We went to one of the meetings that they had and I remember suggesting 
that until they do something, could they not dredge the river.  And they 
looked at me as though I was daft and said, ‘What is the point of dredging 
the river?  It’ll only silt up again’.  I said, ‘Well, dredge it again until such 
times as you get things decided’.  But oh no, oh no, they knew best”.  
[Elgin] 
 
“they’ve formed yet another sub committee to report back to the Council 
about the flood progress or the contractors, etc and we’re all still in limbo 
and wondering what is happening.  Now, there is another meeting 
promised round about September this year but when you get to that, it’s 
not the Council it’s a contractor and you get plans brought out like this 
thing here [holds up very detailed plan followed by laughter].  Now, this is 
a consultant producing this very expensive plan for the Council and I 
don’t know if half the Council has even looked at it.  It’s total frustration 






5.48 This chapter has summarised the main findings from the five focus groups, 
relating to the impacts of floods, the experience of living with flood risk and attitudes 
towards managing flooding and flood risk.  Using verbatim quotations extracted from 
transcripts of the focus group discussions it has amplified and deepened the results of 
the household survey reported in Chapter Four.  By eliciting individual narratives and 





 CHAPTER SIX INTERVIEWS WITH KEY INSTITUTIONAL 
  STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Aims and scope 
 
6.1 To examine the monitoring, warning and emergency response aspects of flood 
preparedness we interviewed senior decision-makers in SEPA, local authorities and 
central government (see Appendix C for the interview pro-formas).  We also explored 
local authorities’ experiences of handling floods to establish what they found worked, 
or otherwise, in terms of warning dissemination, general emergency planning and 
management.  
 
6.2 We also examined the measures that local authorities and SEPA feel work best 
for promoting flood awareness outwith flood events.  Under this heading come 
awareness campaigns (including those of SEPA), flood newsletters, and publicity for 
community ‘self-help’ initiatives.  We explored the social aspects of planning for 
more permanent flood alleviation, the promotion of flood alleviation schemes and the 
often complementary approaches that emphasise planning, development control, and 
maintenance of watercourses using statutory powers.  The information gained allowed 
us to assess how the selected local authorities involved communities in alleviation 
schemes and/or awareness campaigns.  
 
6.3 We sought the views of Scottish Water on the social issues of emergency 
planning, maintenance and network renewal.  We also contacted a representative from 
the insurance industry to establish how flood mitigation measures impact on insurance 
companies’ decisions on policy provision and charges.  We invited comment from 
SEERAD on the social aspects of flood risk as viewed by the body that sets national 
funding policy for flood alleviation schemes and warning programmes.  
 
6.4 In the second part of the discussion in Chapter Seven we summarise the 
findings on ‘what works’ in terms of flood alleviation planning, via responses to a 
series of questions related to the social aspects of flooding and flood risk. 
 
 
Flood warning to local authorities and key emergency responders 
 
Extent of National Coverage by SEPA flood warnings  
 
6.5 The majority of communities at risk of fluvial flooding are covered by flood 
warning schemes and included as part of the Floodline system.  Significant population 
centres without coverage and at risk of being flooded include the Forth estuary from 
Grangemouth to Stirling, and parts of West Lothian including Livingston.  In 
Aberdeenshire, the Dee, Don and Deveron catchments also lack flood warning 
schemes.  Although problematic in terms of establishing adequate warning lead times, 
SEPA staff report that these catchments are now under review for new schemes as 
resources permit. 
 
6.6 SEPA is dependant on local authority or Scottish Executive funding for new 
flood warning schemes; new funding often being triggered following damaging floods 
SEPA’s cost-benefit appraisal method (policy no 34) is then implemented, with 
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expectations in terms of the reach of the system and the information that can be 
provided and managed as well as technology and resources permit.  The local 
authority also needs to show clearly how it plans to use the information in its flood 
emergency plan.  
 
6.7 SEPA acknowledges that the re-active nature of this policy has constrained 
expansion of warning provision to date; the majority of the areas covered by warning 
having suffered at least one flood in the past.  In future, the development of a national 
flood warning strategy has the potential to maximise social benefit by covering many 
more areas at risk (as established by the 2006 flood risk maps) if certain pre-defined 
criteria, such as adequate lead times, are met.  SEPA endorses this strategy as it would 
help focus on those locations with most pressing needs.  The requirements of the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004 place a mandatory duty on emergency planning groups (see 
para 6.13) to assimilate a community risk register.  This duty may provide a useful 
database for assessing those at flood risk.  In turn, by stimulating production of flood 
emergency plans and alleviation strategies in authorities that have yet to produce 
them, it may help target flood warning provision more effectively.  This duty also has 
obvious relevance for warning dissemination, as it may identify areas that would 
benefit from warning systems. 
 
6.8 Some SEPA staff claim, with some concern, that expansion of their warning 
duty has stretched their existing commitments.  This has adversely affected their basic 
recording of hydrometric data on which the accuracy of flood warning systems 
ultimately depends. 
 
6.9 In terms of public awareness, SEPA runs campaigns to increase public 
knowledge of Floodline and has links with some local authorities to promote 
awareness after flood events. The Floodline awareness campaign findings are 
summarised above in para 4.46. 
 
 
Coastal flood warning 
 
6.10 At present the Clyde estuary is the only coastal zone in Scotland covered by a 
flood warning scheme.  Extending this to other sections of Scotland’s coastline is 
problematic in terms of lead times.  For example, the lead time for the January 2005 
storm, which caused severe flooding and wave damage in the Western Isles and north 
eastern coasts, was only a few hours.   Noting the difficulties in providing clear flood 
warning to such areas, SEPA is developing an extension of the Flood Watch service 
to selected coastal communities based on more intensive use of the Met Office’s 
predictions of sea surges. 
 
6.11 The coastal flood warning system for the Clyde covers three authorities 
downstream from Glasgow City Centre (see Kaya et al., 2005).  Both Glasgow City 
and Renfrewshire Councils commented that this provides excellent warning times 
(typically 36 hours).  The authorities along the river have pre-designated trigger levels 
at which they receive a faxed warning predicting when the specified level is expected 
to be exceeded, and for how long. 
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6.12 In some restricted areas, there may be potential for specific warning of more 
localised coastal flooding. An example is provided by Scottish Borders Council in 
Eyemouth, where a link has been made with the local harbour master to give a visual 
alert, combined with a removable flood defence to protect properties along a stretch of 
road near the harbour where the risk is highest.  
 
 




6.13 A regional multi-agency approach to emergency planning has become the 
norm, with eight corporate groups established nationally in former regional 
government areas to oversee strategic aspects of emergency planning.  These groups 
co-ordinate the actions of the emergency services, local authorities, voluntary groups 
and utility companies.  Although such a structure is now required under the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004, the Act’s requirements builds on existing best practice.  
Thus the planning groups investigated in this report (Tayside Region Emergency Co-
ordinating and Planning Group ((RECAP), Strathclyde Emergency Co-ordinating 
Group (SECG) and the Grampian Joint Emergencies Committee) have all benefited 
by sharing infrastructure and manpower.  Interviewed local authority staff also praised 
the voluntary sector, including the Women’s Royal Volunteer Service (WRVS), for 
its contribution to emergency planning.  The national viewpoint is also positive: 
 
“ … a tremendous example of people being pro-active, if there is a significant 
enough event the groups get together for a de-brief meeting…the new 
generation of professionals are getting together and recognising the benefits 
from regional organisation.” (SEERAD interview) 
 
6.14 Within the regional structure, the police and emergency services act as 
intermediaries and as chief co-ordinators, interacting with the local authorities on a 
tactical basis.  In areas where flood warnings are provided, these Category 1 
responders are warned by SEPA directly.  Perth & Kinross Council commented that 
their interplay with the other responders in RECAP “works perfectly” and is refined 
by periodic training exercises (of necessity, desk-based for flooding scenarios) and 
analysis of lessons learned from past events.  Glasgow City Council noted that in the 
Strathclyde group, all parties are familiar with each other from the legacy of regional 
authorities and have come together seamlessly during past incidents.  Interaction with 
SEPA at the training and incident level is also valued.  For example, Scottish Borders 
Council staff report close interaction with SEPA between flood events in refining 
warning dissemination, and training of Duty Sergeants specifically to deal with flood 
emergencies.   
 
 
Local Emergency Plans  
 
6.15 The interviewed local authority staff often anticipated the receipt of a flood 
warning based on a combination of severe weather forecasts and their own river 
monitoring.  Once the hydrometric warning arrives, and informed by past experience, 
they maintain a two-way dialogue with SEPA as the event develops. 
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6.16   In most interviewed authorities, the response is based on speed of rise of the 
main rivers rather than an individual warning on a particular reach.  Generally co-
ordinated by the emergency planning manager in the affected local authority or 
authorities, the response is supported by emergency planning officers in the regional 
Emergencies Committee. 
 
6.17 Within this general structure, authorities adapt to their specific requirements, 
based on accumulated experience about the behaviour of the watercourses.  In 
Glasgow, the emergency plan stipulates rapid distribution of sandbags along known 
vulnerable stretches of the Clyde, Kelvin and White Cart.  Only 4 hours warning can 
be given for the White Cart, so additional protection in winter is provided by laying 
sandbags on certain stretches to the known 1 in 5 year return level.  This strategy 
provides a time buffer to permit better dissemination of warnings and, if necessary, 
evacuation of residents.  However, the seasonal appearance of sandbags is a visible 
reminder of flood risk that, according to Glasgow City Council staff, is unpopular 
with some residents.  
 
6.18 Edinburgh City Council operate a standby rota to ensure Council labour is 
available to respond to severe weather warnings, and that workers are adequately 
rested. 
 
“We tend to be out (checking rivers) before SEPA call us out.  We also 
speak with SEPA and the weather forecasters and get a feel for the event. 
Say we came in on a Friday and there was a forecast that things were 
going to be bad over the weekend, we would …come back in at night to 
relieve those who stayed on duty, and in the meantime we would action a 
flood volunteer rota and find out who is available from the list of co-
ordinators.  These are the ‘public faces’ of the Council.  They will be 
allocated areas and liaise with emergency headquarters, but their main 
job is to keep the public informed”. (Edinburgh City Council) 
 
Volunteer Flood Co-ordinators in Edinburgh have been allocated to known flood risk 
areas. Operating on a rota, they are Council workers alerted by phone to provide the 
crucial on-the-ground link between the Council and the emergency services.  In 
particular they prioritise sandbag distribution as the flood progresses, with large sized 
sandbags available at Council depots for distribution in areas known to be at risk. 
 
6.19 Scottish Borders Council responds to weather warnings by automatic pager 
messages which give all those responsible in the Council an early alert, even before 
SEPA’s flood warnings are received.  Due to the size of the region and the 
interconnectedness of the main rivers, the plan involves active monitoring of all major 
rivers in the region with continuing dialogue with SEPA on hydrological patterns as 
the situation develops.  The Borders emergency co-ordinating group is convened at a 
control room in the Council offices.  It is not usually possible to protect areas as part 
of a seasonal routine, so resources and labour are distributed according to the 
developing event. 
 
6.20  Aberdeenshire Council at present has no flood warning provision beyond a 
general Flood Watch on its major rivers (para 6.5), and so relies on weather 
monitoring and dialogue with SEPA hydrologists to give early warnings. 
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6.21 Perth & Kinross is unique among the authorities interviewed in having an 
alleviation scheme for the main population centre (Perth city).  However, the authority 
still relies on early warning in order to close floodgates in a timely manner.  Staff 
report that fully closing the 84 gates when risk levels are low was found to be too 
disruptive to local traffic flows, so the authority has a prioritisation scheme, with 
groups of gates closed only when the river is expected to reach a certain height.  Close 
monitoring of conditions upstream and tidal predictions give up to 24 hours warning 
time of a flood on the Tay, with the police then managing the remaining local 
disruption from floodgate closures. 
 
 
Flood warning dissemination 
 
6.22 Authorities have various means in place to disseminate warnings.  Procedures 
are stipulated in the regional emergency planning framework, and the extent to which 
the police and other emergency services are involved varies between authorities.  
These services are a vital part of the dissemination to households within urban 
Glasgow and Edinburgh, in the latter interacting with the Voluntary Flood Co-
ordinators.   According to SEPA, the police still disseminate warnings door to door in 
the Highland Council area, but not in the former Grampian region.  They have 
withdrawn from issuing direct warnings within the Tayside RECAP group, although 
still play a role in Perth & Kinross, since it has been found that they are the optimal 
means to ensure that the warning is reliably passed on.  Beyond Perth city, cascade 
systems operate.  SEPA issues the warning to the police, who then disseminate to the 
person at the head of those flood warning groups that might be affected by the flood.  
The warning then cascades through those who are registered with the group, but the 
Council has noted difficulties with this system.  There are inherent delays and no 
audit trail, so it is difficult to know how effective the system is when operated.  Also 
it has been observed that farmers may not talk to each other and there have been 
incidents where failures to spread the warning have caused livestock deaths.  In Perth 
city, a cascade operates for businesses in the central area but has not been introduced 
for householders, since the police are still actively involved in dissemination.  More 
generally, Scottish Borders Council staff stressed the advantages provided by local 
contact and knowledge gained from experience with their flood warning groups. 
 
6.23 In the Borders and parts of Moray, Automatic Voice Messaging (AVM) is 
used to disseminate warnings to designated flood warning groups.  Scottish Borders 
Council presently offers coverage for all properties ‘at risk’ (defined by presence in 
one of the 24 flood warning groups).  SEPA aims to achieve a 3 hour minimum lead 
time for flood warning to allow time for the Council to disseminate the warning and 
for householders to respond.  The system now has around 600 properties registered 
out of total number of more than 4500 currently at risk.  It is capable of delivering 
SMS text messages.  If an occupier approaches the Council and requests that their 
property be added to the system, it is checked against the risk database.  The property 
occupier then has to provide a small set of details including the phone/SMS numbers 
on which they wish to be warned. 
 
6.24 The decision to issue warnings via the AVM will be taken by the Council in 
close liaison with SEPA.  Dissemination appears highly effective, with Scottish 
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Borders Council claiming that they can obtain a 90% contact rate.  The AVM system 
is checked and evaluated after each use by ‘Bordercare’, a 24/7 facility that both 
issues warnings and acts as a help facility for the public.  Being web-based, the AVM 
software can be accessed easily by anyone in the Council who needs to modify its 
operation, and has double failover systems built in.  
 
6.25 Moray Council’s AVM system operates in areas that have been flooded in the 
past, principally Forres, Elgin and Rothes.  The Council invites all of its tenants in 
these areas to complete a form to register them on the scheme.  The system alerts the 
tenants in most cases to fit the flood guards that the Council has installed on their 
properties.  Others in these areas, including private householders and business, can 
also register for the scheme if they wish.  Three hundred contacts are registered on the 
system at present. 
 
6.26 Both Councils make pro-active efforts to publicise their systems.  The Scottish 
Borders Council leaflets households and works jointly with SEPA in their flood 
awareness campaigns.  Moray Council placed articles in the local press when their 
system was launched in 2005 plus leaflets in local libraries and on the Council 
website. 
 
6.27 Costs of running the AVM in these areas comprise fixed costs of £3,000 to 
£5,000 per annum, plus ‘per contact’ charges when the system is activated. 
 
6.28 Two issues surrounding the wider application of AVM have emerged: 
 
Inclusion  Scottish Borders Council noted that people who should be in the AVM 
scheme are not always registered because they fear their details would become more 
widely known.   In fact, the Council assures householders as to confidentiality.  The 
insurance industry viewpoint (para 6.63) appears to be that they would liaise with a 
householder after a flood and even suggest inclusion in an AVM system if one were 
available.  
 
Warning content  The systems at present merely refer the client to Floodline, which 
may not be in keeping with public expectations.  SEPA promote guide materials and a 
CD-ROM that tell people how to prepare and flood responsibilities, entitled 
‘Preparing for Flooding’.  These have been distributed during their awareness 
campaigns and community meetings.  Combined efforts by councils and SEPA 
working together are said to be helpful in managing expectations. 
 
6.29 A recent unpublished report commissioned by the Scottish Executive has 
examined how the efficiency and speed with which a flood warning is issued can be 
improved.  The Executive is currently pursuing the implementation of such enhanced 
flood warning systems jointly with SEPA, local authorities and the Police.   Were a 
nation-wide service to be developed, local authority experience in deploying AVM 
systems would be of value. 
 
6.30 In terms of dissemination it is clear from interviews with local authority staff 
that there are several areas nationally where the police have withdrawn from issuing 
flood warnings directly to the public and which do not have direct coverage to those 
at risk by a direct method such as AVM.  In such regions, reliance may be placed on a 
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cascade system, or on reference to Floodline by householders, alongside 
dissemination by radio and television authorised by the police. 
 
 
Warning and emergency response for pluvial flooding and drain surcharge 
 
6.31 Urban flooding from surcharging sewers, blocked culverts and/or surface 
runoff has occurred in several areas in the past decade, most notably in the Shettleston 
area of Glasgow in July 2002.  By its very nature, warning for pluvial flooding is 
problematic, and at present no adequate system is available, although there is the 
potential to develop one that interacts with burn or culvert monitoring in areas where 
risk is a particular concern.  
 
6.32 As a result, local authorities have acted in a variety of ways to reduce the risk 
from culverts and watercourses within their respective areas.  Edinburgh City Council 
notes that smaller flood incidents can often occur from drain backup without a flood 
warning, so there is a need to monitor watercourses and weather pro-actively.  
Glasgow City Council has a rolling maintenance programme for culvert screens 
operated by dedicated staff, which helps to ensure that backups will not occur. In the 
longer term, the Strategic Drainage Plan (SDP) for the city is being developed in 
conjunction with Scottish Water to reduce the direct flow of water into culverts. 
However, since the SDP is still at the planning stage, interim measures have been 
taken by Scottish Water in high risk areas, including fitting of non-return valves, 
sealing of manhole covers and provision of flood guards and vent covers to protect 
properties from drain backup outside the property.  
 
6.33 Scottish Water maintains verifiable records for properties that have flooded 
due to overloaded sewers, for which it has a legal obligation.  The aim of these 
records, which are held in an Overloaded Sewer Flooding Register, is to provide an 
auditable method for identifying specific properties affected by flooding or at risk of 
experiencing flooding.  The Flooding Register is Scotland-wide and is made up of a 
series of flooding clusters within sewerage catchments.  Scottish Water is also 
developing an emergency response plan.  Its Strategy and Planning unit works with a 
Flood Management Group that examines all aspects of emergency planning with 
regard to flooding. 
 
6.34 Scottish Borders Council has telemetered alarms on culverts in Jedburgh and 
Galashiels known to be high risk.  These send signals direct to the Council offices 
when the culvert depth becomes high as a result of blockage, allowing maintenance 
teams to respond.  Perth & Kinross Council alerts businesses in high water table zones 
in the city centre to the possibility of basement flooding.  The process is conducted by 
a business warning cascade system, initiated by a warning from SEPA.  
 
 
Social aspects of flood emergency management 
 
Local initiatives for flood awareness and emergency planning 
 
6.35 Many authorities have taken local initiatives to try and encourage participation 
in both flood warning dissemination and flood emergency management. The use of 
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cascade systems in Perth & Kinross, noted above, are examples primarily focussed on 
dissemination, but there are further initiatives that specify positive action by those 
receiving the warning. Comments have pointed to both benefits and drawbacks. On 
the one hand, the strategy can encourage independence and free up local authority 
resources for other areas of the emergency plan, while also giving the community a 
tangible sense that ‘something is being done’ with regard to flood prevention.  On the 
other hand, participation can also raise unrealistic expectations which may lead to 
disillusionment after a flood event if not carefully managed.  These expectations may, 
in turn, be based on lack of knowledge about responsibilities for flood defence on the 
part of householders.  A further potential difficulty is that the personnel involved may 
not be trained to the level of the local authority workforce and Category 1 responders, 
even though they may be required to work independently in an emergency.  
 
6.36 As part of the Scottish Borders Council’s initiatives to encourage community 
engagement, the authority has distributed Environment Agency ‘floodpack’ toolkits to 
six Community Councils, and encouraged them to develop a local plan that could be 
put into operation in response to a direct flood warning.  However, the Council has 
encountered some difficulty in establishing and maintaining contact with the 
Community Councils, noting that a flood event is often required to provide the 
stimulus for contact.  
 
6.37 Local authorities and SEPA have also noted a general lack of knowledge 
among the public as to which public bodies are responsible for providing flood 
protection (both temporary and permanent) and flood warning.  Information on this 
has come from various sources: questionnaire returns from awareness campaigns, 
feedback after flood events and promotional campaigns for flood alleviation schemes.  
The general finding is that awareness goes up markedly after a flood event, but 
rapidly tails off thereafter. 
 
6.38 In light of this finding, local authority efforts have been focussed on 
improving awareness via information campaigns and newsletters.  Examples exist of 
comprehensive flood information leaflets, for example those in Scottish Borders and 
Edinburgh, that are delivered to properties in flood risk areas.  This information 
sometimes refers directly to flood incident and maintenance data from the local 
authority Biennial Flood Reports.  Renfrewshire produces a ‘digest’ of its Biennial 
Report for distribution to the public, and finds this helpful in spreading information 




Sand bags and removable flood defences 
  
6.39 Local authorities vary in their management and deployment of sand bags.  
Possible approaches, sometimes used in combination, are:  
 
• distribute sand bags to properties during a flood event, with or without priority 
according to whether the property is local authority owned; 
• provide filled sandbags or filling facilities for private use at the site of the 
emergency;  
• provide facilities at depots for individuals to fill bags and take them away.  
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The last option has generally found the least favour, as it is difficult to control how 
many bags are taken.  The balance between the three approaches may differ from 
event to event and even within a local authority. 
 
6.40 Scottish Borders Council distributes information leaflets outlining 
responsibilities for flood protection and location of sandbag stores, many of which are 
located in defunct fire station yards.  They have established initiatives with 
community groups to both increase sandbag depot availability and encourage access 
through publicity campaigns.  Interviewed staff reported that a pilot area run in 
Selkirk by the local rugby club has been successful.  However, the Council is also 
trying to wean the public off reliance on sandbags, and has been encouraging uptake 
of temporary removable flood defences.  It notes a tendency among the public to 
assume that the Council will supply and fund all these measures.  Furthermore, the 
Council has reported that as it takes the initiative, the Community Councils and other 
groups tend to take a step back and assume that the proposed measure (for example, 
local management of sandbag stores and funding temporary flood defences) is the 
local authority’s responsibility.  
 
6.41 In Aberdeenshire, a pilot scheme at Inverurie is encouraging similar local 
control over sandbag distribution, although, as with the some of the initiatives in the 
Borders, this is not yet fully operational. 
 
6.42 Glasgow City Council makes sandbags available in depots for public use. 
Elsewhere in the urban areas studied, sandbag provision is kept under local authority 
control.  Thus in Edinburgh, the plan restricts public access to depots, since it has 
been found that the emergency response works best when the distribution is controlled 
by those in the incident room who are interacting with the voluntary co-ordinators and 
others at the site of the emergency.  
 
“… the person in the incident room will know where the (the sandbags) 
need to go, since he has the big picture of everyone phoning into him.” 
(Edinburgh City Council) 
 
6.43 Many local authorities are also now using large temporary barriers such as 
removable dams in the street in areas known to be at flood risk.  But ensuring they are 
installed in time, especially in the absence of Council staff, makes their use difficult.   
It may be necessary to come to an arrangement with a local contact point, possibly 




6.44 Evacuation is typically a slow and difficult operation, and hazardous both for 
rescuers and evacuees.  There is often a lack of willingness to evacuate resulting in 
increased risk to members of the emergency services. 
 
6.45 All the local authorities contacted have evacuation plans that integrate 
emergency planning, emergency services and social work departments.  These co-
ordinate closely with the regional body, and involve the voluntary services 
(particularly the WRVS) in opening and staffing designated rest centres.  Some 
authorities mentioned the potential for problems and negative feedback when 
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complications have arisen with evacuations and particularly those which occurred 
during the night.   In Edinburgh, the evacuation of nursing homes during the April 
2000 flood led to the use of hospitals as emergency refuge centres.  On this occasion 
few householders attended rest centres during the incident, a fact that was attributed to 
the time of day and the large amount of self-evacuation that occurred. 
 
6.46 Perth & Kinross Council has developed a one-stop registration system for 
temporary evacuees based on computer software developed within the Council, a 
system that has also now been adopted by some other authorities.  This system avoids 
the need to process multiple registrations, e.g. for housing, social work, with often-
traumatised householders, and is also easy to use for the voluntary staff who are 
called in to help. 
 
6.47 Longer term re-housing of evacuees has created difficulties for some 
authorities where large numbers of social tenants have had to move.  In particular, 
Glasgow City Council noted that there were delays in dealing with housing 
associations.  Organising new accommodation has to be negotiated with a multiplicity 
of such associations, causing delays and adding to the social costs. 
 
 
Post-flooding - mitigating costs to the community and businesses 
 
6.48 All local authorities see a recovery plan for businesses and communities as 
helpful.  Scottish Borders Council is in the process of developing one, incorporating 
lessons learned from the flooding incidents of January and October 2005, when many 
businesses, particularly in Hawick, were badly affected.   
 
 
Flood alleviation and avoidance 
  
Social aspects of flood alleviation scheme promotion 
 
6.49 Councils were asked about their experience of promoting flood alleviation 
schemes or other flood prevention programmes.  Of those investigated, White Cart 
(Glasgow) and the Braid Burn (Edinburgh) are flood alleviation schemes now at an 
advanced planning and build stage respectively, while the Water of Leith scheme 
(Edinburgh) has had extensive consultation and a local public inquiry.  Also 
investigated were the option appraisal and planning procedures followed in 
Renfrewshire. 
 
6.50 In all cases, extensive public consultation was recognised as essential from the 
outset. 
 
“What we did right from the start was to say ‘this is not just an 
engineering scheme’ – it is a combination of approaches and the difficulty 
is not with the hydrological aspects but in making sure everyone buys into 




6.51 Glasgow and Edinburgh Councils ran exhibitions to publicise their schemes 
and solicited feedback by questionnaires.  These are considered to have been 
an effective way to ensure social input to the planning process, making the 
community ‘feel involved’.  In Edinburgh, at the Braid Burn exhibition, pro-
active publicity also helped to remove many objections that were largely on 
cosmetic or minor technical grounds.  
 
“[X] was the best attended exhibition, there was a high density of people 
there, and at the end of the day there was not one objection from that 
area, a couple of complaints and a few constructive criticisms…” 
(Edinburgh City Council) 
 
In Glasgow:  
 
“We sent a caravan around, we got 700 visitors and they were all asked 
to fill in a questionnaire, for which we got 190 responses. The 
questionnaires looked into areas like ‘do you support the concept of 
floodplain storage’ and we also asked them which specific option of the 
several available they supported. The vast majority, even in the upper 
catchment, were positive”.  (Glasgow City Council) 
 
Nevertheless, dealing with objections still creates inevitable delays, estimated by 
Edinburgh City Council as around eighteen months for the Braid Burn scheme, 
and presently still outstanding for the Water of Leith scheme. 
 
6.52 In Renfrewshire, informal contact throughout the formal consultation process 
was regarded as helpful, with the public kept involved from an early stage. 
 
“We find it is much better to make things as informal as possible rather 
than blind people with science about the statutory process, … will follow 
the informal consultation up with adverts in the local paper and get 
together Community Councils, community groups and elected members. 
We take along our plans and draft ideas of what we are planning, what 
[the scheme] is going to look like, what it is designed to do and what it 
won’t do”. (Renfrewshire Council) 
 
 
Social factors in flood alleviation scheme cost-benefit appraisal 
 
6.53 In calculating the cost against the environmental benefits of flood prevention 
schemes, some local authorities have included social benefits from avoided damage 
and social impact, and the benefits of extra amenity.  However, in Edinburgh, the 
cost-benefit ratio came out strongly in favour of construction for both the Braid Burn 
and Water of Leith schemes, with little adjustment of the economic analysis to allow 
for social impacts.   For the Water of Leith: 
 
“We used the insurance (claim) costs and the costs of transport 
disruption… the analysis came out strongly in favour.  In most of our 
areas that will be protected by the flood defence there is quite a high 
proportion of insured high value housing”.  (Edinburgh City Council) 
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6.54 In Glasgow, riverside amenity provides a benefit that the Council assessed in a 
non-quantitative way by means of the visitor survey, but no attempt was made to 
value the environmental benefits by any economic methodology.  
 
“The visitors were shown plans and were asked if they thought we should 
make environmental improvements.  That aspect of it was very strongly 
supported.” (Glasgow City Council) 
 
A need to factor in social impacts is potentially vital for schemes with relatively low 
total asset value in the protected area.  Thus Renfrewshire Council needed to allocate 
priorities among three planned flood prevention schemes covering areas affected by 
the 1994 floods.  The fact that all three areas were impacted in 1994 helped in a 
comparative prioritisation procedure.  This was needed as resources were not 
available to develop all three schemes simultaneously: 
 
“We used the 1994 event as a test.  We knew as a result of that event how 
much property and risk to life there was in all three areas, so we 
commissioned a consultant to do a draft feasibility/cost analysis of the 
flood alleviation schemes.” (Renfrewshire Council) 
 
6.55 In deciding the priority order for the schemes, the Council calculated cost-
benefit ratios using the economic analysis specified in the Flood Hazard Research 
Centre’s ‘Multi-coloured Handbook’ (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2003) rather than the 
methodology factoring in social cost and intangible costs.  The latter method has the 
potential to increase the social benefit calculation for schemes in the future.  
However, the Council noted that re-housing many social housing tenants from these 
areas after the 1994 floods presented a problem in obtaining data for this purpose.  
 
6.56 From a national point of view all approved schemes recently brought forward 
by local authorities have been funded by grant aid from the Scottish Executive at 
either 50% or, since 2004, 80% of the scheme cost.  Owing to the number and 
increased costs of schemes now being brought forward, the Scottish Executive is 
currently considering prioritisation as part of future scheme appraisal alongside an 
enhanced role for social factors. 
 
 
Alternative local authority action: watercourse management and development 
control 
 
6.57 Management of watercourses within local authority powers under the Flood 
Prevention and Land Drainage Act 1997 provides a complementary route to flood 
alleviation that is being used, sometimes in innovative ways, by some of the 
authorities we consulted.  Thus in Renfrewshire, the Network Regeneration 
Department provides a link between planning/development control and watercourse 
maintenance.  This link both helps to ensure that new development does not 
materially add to flood risk (through an increase in water drainage) as well as co-
ordinating maintenance on watercourses for which the local authority has a duty under 
the 1997 Act. 
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6.58 The work also involves often delicate liaison with landowners, including 
riparian owners. 
 
“…we approach the landowner or riparian owner and explain to them 
what their duties are, so we explain that to them, and then where 
reasonable, we can go in and do what we can [under the statutory 
powers]” (Renfrewshire Council). 
 
However, such powers can, if used effectively, allow some degree of flood risk 
management without resorting to a large formal flood prevention scheme.  In some 
cases this can be used to advance sustainable catchment planning through interaction 
with other stakeholders such as NGOs. 
 
“We would do as much in the short term as we could, in terms of both 
works and maintenance to try and improve the flow where we could, 
‘tweaking’ the system here and there as much as possible…We come into 
this as people who have a track record for building things in concrete, so 
we recognise that there is a need to let them build confidence in what we 
are about and what we are trying to achieve.”  (Aberdeenshire Council) 
 
It is acknowledged that these works and maintenance programmes cannot always 
provide a risk reduction below the 1 in 75 year return period that is critical for 
insurance provision (see section 6.59 below).  In these cases Aberdeenshire, and some 
other authorities, provide assistance for homeowners to purchase removable flood 
defences. 
  
6.59 Such improvements are most effective when coupled to land use control, 
under the widely praised Scottish Planning Policy SPP7: Planning and Flooding 
(Scottish Executive, 2004).  The Flood Liaison and Advice Groups (FLAGs) use 
SPP7 to advise local authorities on development control, strategic planning and 
prioritisation of watercourse maintenance, as well as the emergency planning issues of 
flooding.  In Aberdeenshire, the FLAG is conceived as a ‘broad church’ that 
facilitates stakeholder dialogue, with social involvement where possible: 
 
“There is a two-tier level of attendance.  At the first tier there are people 
who are fairly closely involved in flooding: SEPA, Development Control, 
Scottish Water, insurers, planners and engineers from [Aberdeen] City 
and Aberdeenshire Councils.  There is a second tier of people who come 
occasionally and who are ‘on call’ e.g. if there is a specific item, the 
Forestry Commission, Fishery Boards, Universities…”  (Aberdeenshire 
Council) 
. 
The involvement of the insurance industry and Scottish Water was seen by 
Aberdeenshire to be a beneficial aspect of FLAGs, although it was also noted that 
more mandatory information exchange with both industries would help the operation 
still further, potentially delivering greater social benefits.  Scottish Water has an 
Overloaded Sewer Flooding Register of properties affected by internal flooding and 
this register used to inform its Capital Investment Programme.  It also run specific 




Insurance coverage in flood risk areas 
 
6.60 A representative from Norwich Union, part of Aviva plc and one of Scotland’s 
largest insurers, provided insight into insurance industry policy in dealing with 
properties in flood risk areas.  Some of the comments noted below are also part of 
general insurance industry policy, as expressed by the Association of British Insurers 
(ABI). 
 
6.61 Norwich Union developed its own flood-risk maps after many properties in 
England were flooded in 1998 outside areas identified on the Environment Agency’s 
flood-risk maps.   Norwich Union’s maps are based on a model of the river system 
plus a digital elevation model and incorporate the locations of known flood defences. 
In addition, the industry has funded research into the links between flood 
characteristics and damage.  Such ‘flows research’ plots flow rate and height against 
the amount of damage caused in a property.  The findings have led to more effective 
risk assessment in economic terms and have improved the advice that can be given to 
households on steps they can take to mitigate flood damage. 
 
6.62 The general policy of the insurance industry, re-iterated in a national statement 
in November 2005, is continue to provide coverage to properties at less than a 1 in 75 
year risk of being flooded.   For a risk of more than 1 in 75 years, cover is available 
where improved flood defence is planned within 5 years (ABI, 2005).  If a property 
has been flooded in the past, insurance will not be provided as a matter of course.   In 
this instance, new applicants may be turned away, while existing policyholders would 
have their premiums increased and their excess raised to £5,000 (or higher in the case 
of a large property).  Even those properties that are covered are subject to open market 
influences on premiums and excesses which are now rising in areas known to be at 
high flood risk. 
 
6.63 For both ‘flooded’ and ‘at risk’ households, it is not general practice within the 
industry to add conditions to a policy that might insist the owner take measures such 
as temporary flood protection or signing up to an AVM system.  This is because such 
conditions would be extremely difficult to enforce and police.  However, the 
insurance company would typically talk to an owner about such measures if they had 
been flooded.  This finding raises questions about the extent to which incentives can 
be provided for the uptake of temporary defences and direct warning systems. 
 
6.64 The representative from Norwich Union noted a general trend in recent years 
toward an increase in the total value of settled claims.  Given the measures that are 
being taken by the industry to reduce the risk exposure of their flood insurance 
portfolio, it takes seriously the possibility that climate change may already be exerting 
an influence on flood occurrences. 
 
6.65 Norwich Union would like to see Flood Searches become a mandatory part of 
Home Buyers Reports.   A flood search provides information on whether a property 
has been flooded in the past and whether a property is in a flood risk area.  In 







6.66 This chapter has examined the policy context within which the earlier findings 
from the household survey and the focus groups can be evaluated.  Key flood risk 
management objectives for local authorities and regional emergency planning groups 
have been identified; existing and planned expansion of SEPA’s flood warning 
service outlined; challenges in raising flood awareness clearly posed and the role of 
insurance industry noted.  The chapter has also helped identify ‘what works’ in terms 





CHAPTER SEVEN  DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
   
7.1 This chapter draws together the findings from the household survey (Chapter 
Four), the focus group discussions (Chapter Five) and the interviews with key 
institutional stakeholders (Chapter Six).  In this chapter we discuss earlier findings on 
flood impacts (objective 1), examine “what works” in terms of living with floods 
(objective 2) and make recommendations for improved delivery of flood risk 
management.  In each of the section on “what works” we pose and answer questions 
relating to (i) warnings and dissemination, (ii) emergency planning and temporary 
flood alleviation, and (iii) ownership of managing flood risk. 
 
 
Impacts of flooding 
 
7.2 The most important single finding in terms of flood impacts is that intangible 
impacts register markedly higher values than tangible impacts, and immediate 
intangible impacts are generally higher than lasting intangible impacts (para 4.22 and 
Appendix B; Table 24).  This is a striking result with far-ranging policy implications, 
especially for the method by which project appraisal is undertaken for proposed flood 
alleviation schemes in Scotland (see recommendation 15, para 7.39).  The rank order 
of the individual impacts which make up tangible and intangible impacts are broadly 
similar to those reported by RPA (2005) although our typology is more detailed.  
 
7.3 Time to return to normal, and discomfort/inconvenience were the two most 
severe individual impacts (para 4.20) and this was mirrored in the focus groups where 
disruption to normal life (often over more than six months) was clearly seen as a 
major impact (paras 5.12-5.15).  The stress of the flood itself and future worry about 
flooding were other intangible impacts, far more severely felt by low income 
households (para 4.30).  Social tenants also have higher impact scores than owner 
occupiers and may have a lower resilience in coping with floods.  As in the RPA 
(2005) study, health impacts did not score highly in the household survey (Appendix 
B; Table 24), but they did register strongly in the focus groups, especially for the 
elderly and those already ill (paras 5.18-5.20).  These results are broadly in agreement 
with more detailed studies on health impacts undertaken by Tapsell et al. (2001) 
following the 2000 floods in England. 
 
7.4 The loss of irreplaceable and sentimental items does not score so highly as 
other impacts in the household survey (Appendix B; Table 35 reflecting the findings 
of RPA, 2005), nevertheless, comments in the focus groups revealed intense personal 
losses in the form of valued photographs, treasured heirlooms and irreplaceable 
memorabilia (para 5.21).  These narratives are amongst the most poignant of those 
reported from the focus groups.  Some losses are absolute, impossible to value in 
monetary terms and leave a deep and lasting impact. 
 
7.5 As in previous studies it is difficult to specify the longer-term impacts on 
communities.   Some anecdotal evidence exists of enhanced cohesion in the focus 
group discussions (para 5.22) but this is countered by scepticism over the longer term 
and claims that emergency assistance was not allocated equitably (para 5.23).  
Fordham and Ketteridge (1995) reported similar findings from communities in Perth 
and Strathclyde flooded in 1993 and 1994.  Trends in property prices are likewise 
 80 
ambiguous (cf Yeo 2003) with reduced values reported immediately after the flood 
not necessarily sustained in the longer-term (para 5.2). 
 
 
Living with flood risk 
 
7.6 The above findings endorse the Foresight project’s conclusion that social costs 
are likely to be the key driver in flood risk management in the 21st century (Evans et 
al., 2004).   Enhancing social resilience is already included as one of the objectives of 
sustainable flood management in Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2004; Werritty, 2006) 
and the conceptual framework for delivering this objective has already been sketched 
out by many in terms of vulnerability, coping capacity and adaptation (eg Wisner et 
al., 2004).  But operationalising these concepts for Scotland and promoting social 
resilience remains a major challenge requiring much more detailed research on the 
location and needs of communities at risk of being flooded.   
 
7.7 In promoting social resilience, the IFRC (2002) recommended emergency 
planning actions provide a useful checklist: 
 
• risk and vulnerability mapping 
• disaster awareness and education 
• early warning and evacuation 
• stockpiling of relief materials 
• training in response skills 
• planning at all levels to ensure co-ordination of the disaster response. 
 
SEPA’s Indicative River & Coastal Flood Map (Scotland) published in 2006 provides 
a map of flood risk, but vulnerability mapping (likely to be required under the EU 
Flooding Directive) remains to be done.  Research on characterising and mapping 
vulnerable communities is well-advanced in England (DEFRA, 2006, Fielding and 
Burningham, 2005) and these methods should be appraised and customised for use in 
Scotland (see recommendation 13, para 7.39).  SEPA and local authorities already 
provide flood warnings for communities covered by Floodline (para 6.5), have robust 
and well-tested evacuation procedures (paras 6.44-6.47) and well co-ordinated 
planning for disaster response (paras 6.14 and 6.15).  But raising disaster awareness 
and education remains an under-performing area which needs enhanced effort and 
targeting of communities most at risk (recommendation 3, para 7.39). 
 
7.8 Previous studies in the UK have found some evidence that more vulnerable 
groups are exposed to higher levels of flood risk than the population at large.  
However, this is a qualified finding as the results are not consistent across spatial 
scales (Fielding and Burningham, 2005) or types of flood risk (Walker et al., 2006) 
and methods for spatial aggregation are not standardised.  In our study socio-
demographic profiling failed to find any strong evidence of social segregation in 
terms of flood risk at the level of Census Output Areas.  In particular, the proportion 
of social tenants in flood risk areas was the same as that for urban Scotland as a whole 
(para 3.10).  However, further research is needed to check whether this finding masks 
social segregation at other scales. 
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7.9 Flood warning systems in the UK have generally been commended in the 
international literature (eg Handmer, 2002).  But enhanced provision will need more 
community engagement, the effective delivery of appropriate advice on what to do 
following warning and identification of high risk groups to ensure they receive 
appropriate advice.  In reviewing existing practice from around the world Glantz 
(2003) recommends managers to: 
 
• educate and remind, especially between hazard episodes, bearing in mind 
the inherent public tendency to discount the past 
• time warnings correctly 
• involve stakeholders as early as possible in the development and review of 
a warning system 
• identify what it is that makes societies more or less vulnerable and more or 
less resilient. 
 
Some of these actions are already being implemented in Scotland: timing warnings 
and educating and reminding those at risk.  But maintaining a high level of awareness 
between floods remains a challenge (para 7.23) as does identifying contrasting levels 
of social resilience and vulnerability.   
 
7.10 Many studies have reported that warnings are most effective when there is 
strong community engagement in dissemination (eg Key, 1991) but obtaining and 
sustaining such engagement is costly and onerous (para 6.35).  Much depends on the 
level of trust developed between the community group and local authority (Parker, 
2000).   
 
7.11 An unexpected finding from the household survey was that receiving a 
warning increases confidence in getting sufficient warning next time, but this is 
lessened by the actual experience of being flooded (para 4.48).  Since having being 
previously warned also results in greater confidence in what to do next time (para 
4.49), the effectiveness of a warning largely depends on the time it provides to take 
appropriate action.  Campaigns designed to raise flood awareness should thus enhance 
confidence in flood warnings and knowing what effective actions can be taken in the 
time and with the assistance available.   
 
7.12 Another important focus for raising flood awareness is in the relative efficacy 
of contrasting approaches for managing flood risk and the allocation of 
responsibilities for flood protection.  At present public awareness in both these areas 
is singularly ill-informed (paras 4.51 and 4.52).  If non-structural flood defences and 
greater reliance on ‘soft engineering’ are to be major components of sustainable flood 
management (Scottish Executive, 2004), the public needs to be more aware of the 
implications of these changes in managing flood risk (recommendation 12, para 7.39). 
 
7.13 The relatively low score for financial loss as a flood impact points to the role 
of the insurance industry in mediating such losses (Table 4.6).  Given the relatively 
high levels of building and, to a lesser extent, contents insurance, most of the financial 
costs of flooding are under-written by the insurance and re-insurance markets.  
However, this situation looks set to change with rapidly increasing claims and higher 
premiums and excesses placed on existing and new customers (para 6.62).   At present 
around 25% of social tenants are not covered by contents insurance (para 4.43).  More 
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vigorous promotion of ‘pay with rent’ schemes may help reduce this number, but 
affordability and the availability of cover may reduce further take up.  Given the 
likelihood of increased flood risk under climate change (Werritty, 2007) and the 
potential withdrawal of insurance cover for high risk locations (para 6.62), the 
prediction that social impacts will be the key driver in managing future flooding 
(Evans et al., 2004) looks increasingly robust. 
 
 
What works in terms of living with floods? 
 
7.14 Key questions arising from our analysis of the social aspects of warning 
provision, warning dissemination and effective responses are: 
 
1. How could SEPA best extend the utility of its existing flood warning service? 
 
7.15 SEPA’s Floodline was ranked fifth amongst the preferred means of receiving 
flood warnings and only 8.1% of respondents to the household survey had used it to 
receive a warning (Appendix B, Table 14). Overall, approximately a third of those 
who had been flooded and a fifth of those in flood risk areas now use Floodline as an 
information source and report high levels of satisfaction, but this leaves a significant 
majority of those at risk unaware of the service.  Accordingly, raising flood awareness 
via focused campaigns, especially in high risk areas as depicted on the new flood risk 
maps, should remain a top priority for SEPA and be resourced appropriately. 
 
2.  How are warnings most effectively delivered to at-risk householders? 
 
7.16 The most popular delivery of flood warnings is via an official knocking at the 
door (Appendix B Table 14).  Whilst this may not always be logistically possible, 
such direct action is valued as a stimulus to taking preventative action.  Other 
favoured methods of delivery include announcements via radio and television, loud 
hailers and phone calls.  The use of Automatic Voice Messaging (AVM) has proved 
locally effective in Moray and the Scottish Borders and may be a suitable for 
disseminating warnings to other dispersed rural communities.  In large urban areas 
dissemination by local officials and broadcast media are the most favoured means of 
delivery. 
 
3. What are the barriers to effective response in the event of a timely flood   
            warning, and what can be done to address them? 
 
7.17     Given that 88% of flooded respondents were at home when the flood occurred,  
such warnings clearly reach most individuals.  However provision must also be 
explored for those not at home (12% in our survey) and care taken to ensure that the 
most vulnerable individuals receive a warning. AVM might assist in reaching the 
former and an official knocking at the door is desirable for the latter. Once a warning 
has been received, preventative action to reduce losses generally follows.  But such 
action needs to be qualified by a lack of confidence in the receipt of sufficiently 
timely warnings in the future.   
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7.18 Noting that only 42% of those flooded between 1993 and 2005 received any 
kind of warning, the overall utility of a flood warning service can be maximised by 
relevant local authorities: 
 
• expanding awareness via publicity campaigns (in partnership with SEPA and 
where appropriate Scottish Water); 
• increasing awareness of Floodline and how warnings are locally delivered; 
• engaging community resources to assist in disseminating warnings; and 
• making sure those living in flood risk areas are aware of appropriate actions to 
take on receiving a warning. 
 
Pamphlets updated each two years, possibly in conjunction with the local authority 
Biennial Reports to the Scottish Executive, could provide a suitable framework for 
raising awareness. 
 
4. What  problems are associated with AVM dissemination, and how could these   
            be overcome? 
 
7.19 Current impediments in deploying AVM include generating a critical mass of 
registered users within a given community and, when successful, technical constraints 
in disseminating very large numbers of individual warnings within a fixed time 
interval. Registering initial users, and maintaining and updating the database, require 
dedicated personnel, possibly linked to raising flood awareness campaigns.  The 
capacity constraint which inhibits the use of AVM in large urban areas will probably 
be overcome by technical advances. 
 
5.      To what extent is the lack of a national flood warning coverage a problem, and   
         what are potential ways of dealing with this?  
 
7.20 The lack of national flood warning coverage is a problem.  Those parts of 
Scotland which have yet to be covered by Floodline’s recognised Flood Warning 
Schemes are served by Flood Watch.  This service which provides a general early 
alert for possible flooding is not coupled with regional emergency planning 
arrangements.  Areas with significant populations at risk and not currently covered by 
recognised flood warning schemes include the upper Forth Estuary and parts of 
Aberdeenshire.  Emergency plans exist for the communities on the Rivers Dee and 
Don but not for Stirling and Grangemouth.  Given the large number of households at 
risk, all four areas should be prioritised as new flood warning schemes are 
implemented. 
 
7.21 The lower Clyde estuary is the only area currently covered by a coastal flood 
warning scheme which uses predicted storm surge levels provided by the Met Office.  
However, SEPA is developing a new service within Flood Watch for selected coastal 
communities in partnership with the relevant local authorities.  
 
 
Emergency planning and temporary flood alleviation 
 
7.22 Key questions arising from our analysis of the social aspects of emergency 
planning and temporary flood alleviation are: 
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6. What is the role of sandbags in providing temporary flood defence? 
 
7.23 Sandbags are widely used to provide temporary flood defence, but their 
deployment varies across local authorities.  Glasgow City Council makes pro-active 
use of sandbags which are distributed each winter should flooding occur on the White 
Cart.  Other local authorities deploy sandbags reactively once river levels are rising as 
this provides maximum flexibility in targeting material and human resources as 
directed by the emergency co-ordination centre.  Some authorities provide depots and 
materials for the public to fill sandbags, an arrangement which works better if a 
community contact is on hand to assist.  However, in line with SEPA’s guidance to 
households at risk, a more favoured strategy is for sandbags to be strategically 
deployed by council staff, leaving householders to fill and mount their own defences.   
 
7.        What is the role of other temporary flood defences? 
 
7.24 The use of temporary and demountable flood defences is growing.   The Perth 
flood alleviation scheme has 84 gates activated by council staff with advice from 
SEPA’s local flood warning scheme.  Other local authorities use flood dams to 
provide strategic defences for groups of properties. 
 
7.25 However, the household survey and focus groups reported high levels of 
dissatisfaction with local authority provision of temporary defences.  This may reflect 
the inevitable partial view of any given emergency as viewed by individual 
households during the event.  Post-flood contact by council staff explaining the 
deployment of temporary defences can reverse this and enhance satisfaction levels. 
 
8.       How can local residents help in flood protection and emergency management? 
 
7.26 Engaging local residents in disseminating warnings and assisting in deploying 
sandbags offers the possibility of community-based assistance.  But success in 
mobilising these community resources thus far has been limited.  Given the general 
reluctance to accept personal responsibility for flood defence, such a lack of 
community engagement is not unexpected.  Indeed as local authorities reach out to 
propose self-help, the community often takes a step back on the assumption that the 
local authority is accepting responsible for flood alleviation.  Also, the longer the 
interval since the last flood, the greater is the likelihood of such dis-engagement.  
Mobilising community resources to assist in disseminating warnings and rendering 
emergency assistance thus remains a major challenge. 
 
9.       How effective have emergency evacuation plans been when put to the test? 
 
7.27 No adverse comments were reported in the focus groups implying that 
emergency evacuation procedures generally worked well.  Although only 4% of those 
evacuated used the rest centres provided by local authorities, a high proportion is 
likely to have been the eldery or infirm.  The generally high levels of satisfaction with 
the emergency services may, however, mask concerns as to how the most vulnerable 
evacuees were handled.  Sharing best practice in this area across all the regional co-




10.     To what extent do local authorities need to have post-flood plans? 
 
7.28 Staying with family or friends or in private rented accommodation accounted 
for around two thirds of housing needs following a flood.  Nevertheless, because the 
numbers to be re-housed varied markedly from flood to flood, local authorities still 
faced a challenge in rehousing evacuees.  Delays were reported in the focus groups 
pointing to the need for greater co-ordination between local authorities and the diverse 
providers of rented public housing.  Concern was also voiced over the security of 
premises once vacated, with burglary being a major problem.  Securing properties 
after a flood would ease some of the longer lasting intangible impacts. 
 
Ownership of flood risk management 
 
7.29 Questions arising from our analysis of the ownership of flood risk 
management are: 
 
11. What can be done to reduce the impact of flooding in urban areas some of 
which lie outside SEPA’s 1 in 200 year flood risk areas? 
 
7.30 In the short term Scottish Water have undertaken remedial measures to reduce 
flood risk in those urban areas prone to surcharging sewers.  Local authorities also 
have a duty to maintain urban watercourses free of obstructions.  Routine checking 
and cleaning of screens and culverts by the most pro-active local authorities 
substantially reduces this flood risk.  The Biennial Reports to the Scottish Executive 
provide a public record of local authority actions to reduce urban flood risk and these 
could be combined with pamphlets outlining what can done by householders at risk to 
reduce impacts before and at the onset of a flood. 
 
7.31 In the longer term, major infrastructure renewal (eg the Glasgow Strategic 
Drainage Plan and Refrewshire’s promotion of Sustainable Urban Drainage) will 
significantly reduce the impact of pluvial flooding.  But such schemes have along 
lead-in times, require successful partnerships involving Scottish Water, local 
authorities, SEPA and developers and require significant capital inputs to re-design  
existing drainage systems. 
 
12. How effective have public bodes been in raising awareness on the allocation 
of statutory duties for flood risk management? 
 
7.32 Only 23% of householders in our survey recognised that the main 
responsibility for flood defence lay with themselves as owners or their landlords.  
Many felt that the main responsibility should lie with their local authority or the 
Scottish Executive.  When asked why they had not undertaken any measures to 
protect their property, nearly 40% of householders regarded this as a local or central 
government duty.  Public bodies clearly have a major educational task ahead in 







13. What is the role of public consultation in planning flood alleviation  
           schemes? 
 
7.33 Some local authorities that had involved the public in the early stages of 
planning a flood alleviation scheme reported very positive outcomes.  Informal 
consultation removed many of the objections which can seriously delay progress in 
bringing forward a scheme.  Addressing local concerns early in the process also 
promoted higher levels of community engagement.   However, several focus group 
members reported very negative experiences with the community being alienated 
rather than engaged by engineering consultants acting on behalf of the local authority.  
 
14. Which forms of flood defence are most favoured by the public?  How might 
this influence local authorities’ approach to flood alleviation? 
 
7.34 Traditional forms of flood defence (involving embankments, upstream 
reservoirs and flood warnings) are the most favoured forms of flood alleviation.  
Sustainable urban drainage and paying farmers for upstream storage (increasing water 
storage within the soil or in valley floor wetlands) also scored highly.  Demolition 
with compensation or re-location of residents at risk was favoured by a significant 
minority of responses in the household survey.  The public appears to accept a multi-
faceted approach to flood alleviation, but lacks understanding on how more 
sustainable approaches to flood risk management might work.  This is another area 
where local authorities and SEPA need to raise awareness. 
 
15.  How appropriate are current Scottish Executive procedures in providing  
            grants for local authority flood alleviation schemes? 
 
7.35 At present local authorities and their consultants use standard cost-benefit 
methods based on the Treasury Green Book and the ‘multi-coloured handbook’ 
produced by Middlesex University’s Flood Hazard Research Centre (Penning-
Rowsell, et al., 2003).  These permit the inclusion of some information on social costs 
to pre-set economic values and generally provide a robust framework for deriving 
cost-benefit ratios.  But some local authorities have urged that more weight be given 
to social costs, especially where small numbers of vulnerable households fail to reach 
the required economic value of assets to be protected by the proposed scheme.  This 
report re-enforces this proposal that, in cost benefit ratios, more weight be given to 
intangible impacts disproportionately felt by the most vulnerable members of society. 
 
 16.      How does the insurance industry assist householders manage the risk of  
           being flooded?  
           
7.36 Overall market penetration for contents insurance exceeds 90% but this 
reduces to around 75% for social tenants. ‘Pay with rent’ schemes should be promoted 
with greater vigour by local authorities and the Scottish Executive for the 25% or so 
of uninsured social tenants.  For those with insurance, the way claims are processed 
after a flood is generally viewed positively.  But having been flooded, premiums can 
rise dramatically and be coupled with five figure excesses.   For households on 
modest incomes, this will increase anxiety about future flooding. 
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7.37 Insurance companies are increasingly reluctant to provide cover for 
households in flood risk areas.  Cover tends to be provided for existing customers 
(often with higher premiums and excesses) but this will not extend to new customers 
unless the risk is less than a 1 in 75 year flood or new defences are planned within the 
next five years.   
 
17.      Given the anticipated impacts of climate change, how is the insurance industry  
          assisting in the overall reduction of flood risk? 
 
7.38 In response to market forces, the insurance industry is reducing its exposure to 
projected losses from future climate change and flooding.  Given this re-balancing of 
its portfolio, plus a reluctance to reduce premiums when flood proofing measures are 
introduced within the home, the industry’s contribution to the overall reduction in 
flood risk could lessen in the short-term.  However, in the longer term, working in 
partnership with local authority FLAGs, the industry could help implement SPP7 and 





7.39 Given the above findings and drawing on the discussion, we make the 
following recommendations: 
 
1. We recommend that relevant local authorities, in partnership with SEPA, 
mobilise communities in areas at risk of being flooded to assist in disseminating 
warnings and rendering emergency assistance and, where appropriate, to join 
council staff in installing temporary and/or demountable defences. 
 
2. We commend to relevant local authorities current initiatives to provide 
Automatic Voice Messaging for communities at risk of being flooded, noting the 
rich pool of experience available should Automatic Voice Messaging be extended 
to other areas of Scotland.  
 
3 We commend SEPA’s current flood awareness campaigns and, given the 
recent publication of an Indicative River & Coastal Flood Map for Scotland, 
recommend that SEPA now targets communities with the highest risk of future 
flooding.  
 
4. We commend to relevant local authorities SEPA’s planned expansion of 
Flood Watch to coastal areas at risk of tidal/ storm surge flooding. 
 
5. We recommend that, where practicable, flood warning schemes be 
extended to all communities at risk.  When new schemes are appraised, the 
existing cost benefit appraisal process should be adapted to incorporate the 
intangible social impacts of flooding. 
 
6. We recommend that all regional emergency planning bodies share 
experience to develop and implement best practice in evacuation procedures, 
especially by recognising the location and needs of the most vulnerable groups. 
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7. We recommend that relevant local authorities prioritise the preparation 
of a post-flood plan to provide counselling for traumatised flood victims, prompt 
re-housing of social tenants and the securing of damaged properties from 
criminal activity. 
 
8. We recommend that relevant local authorities be encouraged to consult 
communities on their preferred options for flood alleviation schemes from the 
earliest stage, using informal approaches to individual households at risk and 
‘plain English’ wherever possible. 
 
9. We recommend that the Scottish Executive and relevant local authorities 
implement further measures to increase the take up of ‘pay with rent’ contents 
insurance, especially in high flood risk areas. 
 
10. We commend those insurers who deliver timely, resilient and efficient 
repairs to buildings and household contents damaged by flooding and urge the 
ABI to promote this as best-practice across the industry.  We recommend that 
insurers review the increased premiums and excesses charged to households 
following a flood, giving regard to the industry’s contribution towards reducing 
the social impacts of floods. 
 
11. We recommend that Scottish Water, relevant local authorities, developers 
and other stakeholders prioritise areas for implementing remedial measures to 
reduce the risk of pluvial flooding. 
 
12. We recommend that further research be carried out into public attitudes 
to sustainable flood management, building on existing data and recent Scottish 
Executive consultations on sustainable urban drainage systems and sustainable 
flood management.  
 
13. We recommend that further research be undertaken to identify the 
location of communities especially vulnerable to the impacts of flooding, and to 
recalibrate vulnerability indices developed elsewhere for use in Scotland. 
 
14. We recommend that further research be undertaken on the immediate 
and long-term physical and mental health impacts of flooding in Scotland. 
 
15. We recommend that the intangible social impacts of flooding as well as 
the potential environmental benefits, be incorporated to a greater degree in 
option appraisal guidance for relevant local authorities, alongside the standard 
cost-benefit approach. 
 
16. We commend the use of FLAGs as an effective way of promoting 
sustainable flood management, and recommend they be deployed in all relevant 
local authorities. 
 
17. We recommend a continued role for the Scottish Executive’s Flooding 
Issues Advisory Committee as a means for facilitating on-going exchange 
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APPENDIX A:  LOCATION OF HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLED IN 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
 
The flood outlines on these maps (except Glasgow-Shettleston) are those from the 
Indicative River & Coastal Flood Map (Scotland) published by SEPA in November 
2006.  This was not available at the time of the household survey (March - June 2006) 
but it does provides a general indication of the sampled communities within the flood-
risk areas.  The actual areas surveyed were based on the earlier IH 130 indicative 







Figure B.1 Approximate survey area: Brechin (extracted from Indicative 
River & Coastal Flood Map (Scotland)) 
 
Some features of the flooding map are based on digital spatial data licences from the Centre for Ecology and 
Hydrology ©CEH, ©MO, ©NSRI, ©MLURI, ©OSNI, ©DARD(NI), ©DEFRA and includes material based on 
Ordnance Survey 1:50 000 maps with permission of the controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ©Crown 
Copyright. 
 
Neither the presence or the absence of shading on this map can be taken to indicate 









Figure B.2 Approximate survey area: Edinburgh (Water of Leith) (extracted 
from Indicative River & Coastal Flood Map (Scotland)) 
 
Some features of the flooding map are based on digital spatial data licences from the Centre for Ecology and 
Hydrology ©CEH, ©MO, ©NSRI, ©MLURI, ©OSNI, ©DARD(NI), ©DEFRA and includes material based on 
Ordnance Survey 1:50 000 maps with permission of the controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ©Crown 
Copyright. 
 
Neither the presence or the absence of shading on this map can be taken to indicate 














Figure B.3 Approximate survey area: Elgin (extracted from Indicative River 
& Coastal Flood Map (Scotland))  
 
Some features of the flooding map are based on digital spatial data licences from the Centre for Ecology and 
Hydrology ©CEH, ©MO, ©NSRI, ©MLURI, ©OSNI, ©DARD(NI), ©DEFRA and includes material based on 
Ordnance Survey 1:50 000 maps with permission of the controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ©Crown 
Copyright. 
 
Neither the presence or the absence of shading on this map can be taken to indicate 























Figure B.4 Approximate survey area: Forres (extracted from Indicative River 
& Coastal Flood Map (Scotland)) 
 
Some features of the flooding map are based on digital spatial data licences from the Centre for Ecology and 
Hydrology ©CEH, ©MO, ©NSRI, ©MLURI, ©OSNI, ©DARD(NI), ©DEFRA and includes material based on 
Ordnance Survey 1:50 000 maps with permission of the controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ©Crown 
Copyright. 
 
Neither the presence or the absence of shading on this map can be taken to indicate 


























Figure B.5 Approximate survey area: Hawick (extracted from Indicative 
River & Coastal Flood Map (Scotland)) 
 
Some features of the flooding map are based on digital spatial data licences from the Centre for Ecology and 
Hydrology ©CEH, ©MO, ©NSRI, ©MLURI, ©OSNI, ©DARD(NI), ©DEFRA and includes material based on 
Ordnance Survey 1:50 000 maps with permission of the controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ©Crown 
Copyright. 
 
Neither the presence or the absence of shading on this map can be taken to indicate 





















Figure B.6 Approximate survey area: Perth (extracted from Indicative River 
& Coastal Flood Map (Scotland)) 
 
Some features of the flooding map are based on digital spatial data licences from the Centre for Ecology and 
Hydrology ©CEH, ©MO, ©NSRI, ©MLURI, ©OSNI, ©DARD(NI), ©DEFRA and includes material based on 
Ordnance Survey 1:50 000 maps with permission of the controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ©Crown 
Copyright. 
 
Neither the presence or the absence of shading on this map can be taken to indicate 














Figure B.7 Approximate survey area: Glasgow-Shettleston (sampled 
households located within shaded ellipses) 
 
© Crown Copyright/database right 2006. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied 
service. 
 
Neither the presence or the absence of shading on this map can be taken to indicate 




APPENDIX B:  TABLES (RESULTS FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY) 
 
Tables from Chapter Four listed sequentially.  
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
 
Table 1  Response rates by survey location 






Brechin 67 46 68.7 
Edinburgh 539 316 58.6 
Elgin 412 237 57.5 
Forres 444 261 58.8 
Glasgow-Shettleston 262 113 43.1 
Hawick & 
Newcastleton  
115 55 47.8 
Perth 246 126 51.2 
Scattered rural & 
coastal (by post) 
236 69 29.2 
    
TOTAL 2,321 1,223 52.7 
 
 
Table 2  Extent of flooding within the sample 
Extent of flooding Number of 
Respondents 
Per cent of 
respondents 
   
Flooded properties: 633 51.8 
     Home flooded 593 48.5 
     Communal stair flooded, but not home 24 2.0 
     Home, communal stair, garden, outhouse or 
     garage flooded 
     (Brechin pilot study flooded respondents) 
16 1.3 
   
Properties not flooded: 590 48.2 
     Garden only flooded 110 9.0 
     Outhouse or garage flooded, but not 
     communal stair or home 
91 7.4 
     Not flooded at all 389 31.8 
   




Table 3  Age of household members 
Age group Number of households 
with age group 
represented 
Per cent of households 
with age group 
represented 
Child under 10 years 160 13.1 
Child 10-15 years 129 10.5 
Adult 16-24 years 168 13.7 
Adult 25-69 years 891 72.9 
Adult 70+ years 271 22.2 
 
 
Table 4  Occupational group of highest earner in household 
Occupational group Number of 
households 
Per cent of 
households 
Managers and senior officials 74 8.8 
Professional 144 17.2 
Associate professional and technical 153 18.3 
Administrative and secretarial 91 10.9 
Skilled trades 135 16.1 
Personal services 44 5.3 
Sales and customer services 30 3.6 
Process, plant and machine operatives 83 9.9 
Elementary occupations 83 9.9 
   
TOTAL 837 100.0 
 
 
Table 5  Housing tenure 
Housing tenure Number of 
households 
Per cent of 
households 
Owned with mortgage 467 40.7 
Owned outright 400 34.9 
Rented from council 181 15.8 
Rented from a housing association 36 3.1 
Rented from a private landlord or employer 56 4.9 
Other 7 0.6 
   













Table 6  Type of housing 
Housing type Number of 
households 
Per cent of 
households 
Detached 206 19.0 
Semi-detached 177 16.3 
Terraced/end terrace 427 39.4 
Tenement or other flat 257 23.7 
Caravan 1 0.1 
Other 15 1.4 
   
TOTAL 1,083 100.0 
 
 
Table 7  Ground and upper floors in property 
Floors of property Number of 
households 
Per cent of 
households 
   Ground-floor only (bungalows and flats) 448 43.1 
   Ground and upper floors (houses) 511 49.2 
   Upper-floors only (flats) 80 7.7 
   
TOTAL 1,039 100.0 
 
 
Table 8  Types of area 
Type of area Number of 
households 
Per cent of 
households 
   Urban 555 45.4 
   Small town 599 49.0 
   Rural 69 5.6 
   
TOTAL 1,223 100.0 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FLOODS 
 
Table 9  Types of flood 
Type of flood Number of 
households 
Per cent of 
households 
   Fluvial 1,045 85.4 
   Pluvial 121 9.9 
   Coastal 57 4.7 
   








Table 10  Depth of flood water by type of flood (per cent of respondents) 









Under 2.5cm 6.6 4.4 - 6.3 
2.5-30cm 34.7 27.9 27.3 33.8 
Over 30cm 58.7 67.6 72.7 60.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 3.235; df=4; p>0.01 
 
 
Table 11  Mud, silt or sediment deposits by type of flood (per cent of respondents) 









Yes 80.9 86.3 72.7 81.4 
No 12.0 9.6 27.3 12.0 
Don’t know 7.2 4.1 - 6.6 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 3.121; df=4; p>0.01 
 
 
Table 12  Sewage deposits by type of flood (per cent of respondents) 









Yes 57.0 73.3 81.8 59.4 
No 15.1 17.3 18.2 15.4 
Don’t know 27.9 9.3 - 25.2 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 16.038; df=4; p<0.01 
 
 
Table 13  Number of times flooded by type of flood (per cent of respondents) 









One 70.2 81.6 75.0 71.7 
Two 24.8 9.2 16.7 22.7 
Three+ 5.0 9.2 8.3 5.6 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 










RESPONSES TO THE FLOODS 
 
Table 14  Sources of flood warnings 
Source of warning Number of 
responses 
Per cent of 
responses 
Per cent of 
respondents 
Neighbour 118 31.8 43.2 
Radio announcement 36 9.7 13.2 
Television announcement 16 4.3 5.9 
Automatic telephone message 8 2.2 2.9 
Telephone cascade system 3 0.8 1.1 
Floodline 22 5.9 8.1 
An official knocking at the door 102 27.5 37.4 
Loud hailer in the street 22 5.9 8.1 
Text message 4 1.1 1.5 
Phone call from an official 1 0.3 0.4 
Other 39 10.5 14.3 
    
TOTAL – responses 371 100.0  
TOTAL - respondents 273  135.9 
 
 
Table 15  Time between warning and flood 
Time between warning and flood Number of 
households 
Per cent of 
households 
   Under one hour 86 31.6 
   1-3 hours 95 34.9 
   4-6 hours 48 17.6 
   Over six hours 43 15.8 
   
TOTAL 272 100.0 
 
 
Table 16  Actions taken prior to the flood 
Action Number of 
responses 
Per cent of 
responses 
Per cent of 
respondents 
Deployed sandbags, flood guards or 
other defence 
216 23.0 37.4 
Removed possessions from ground 
floor 
227 24.2 39.3 
Household members vacated the 
house 
123 13.1 21.3 
Moved car to higher ground 196 20.9 33.9 
Other 18 1.9 3.1 
    
No action taken 158 16.8 27.3 
    
TOTAL – responses 938 100.0  
TOTAL - respondents 578  162.3 
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Table 17  Actions taken prior to the flood, by whether received flood warning 
(per cent of respondents) 





Deployed sandbags, flood guards or other defence 45.9 31.2 
Removed possessions from ground floor 49.2 32.4 
Household members vacated the house 28.9 15.9 
Moved car to higher ground 39.7 30.0 
Other 2.9 3.0 
   
No action taken 13.2 37.5 
   
  
 
Table 18  Actions taken prior to the flood, by time between warning and flood 
(per cent of respondents) 









Deployed sandbags, flood guards 
or other defence 
39.0 46.7 50.0 44.2 
Removed possessions from 
ground floor 
37.8 43.3 56.8 67.4 
Household members vacated the 
house 
23.2 25.6 25.0 32.6 
Moved car to higher ground 28.0 41.1 40.9 53.5 
Other 3.7 2.2 - 2.3 
     
No action taken 23.2 12.2 9.1 11.6 
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Table 19  Sources of assistance received 
Source of assistance Number of 
respondents 
receiving 
Per cent of 
respondents 
Friends/neighbours in the locality 334 55.8 
Friends outside the locality 167 27.9 
Family members outside your household 319 53.3 
Community group 26 4.3 
Local church 42 7.0 
Local businesses 30 5.0 
Local council 126 21.0 
Police Service 75 12.5 
Fire Service 118 19.7 
Landlord 17 2.8 
Other 34 5.7 
   
No assistance received 63 10.5 
   
 
 
Table 20  Temporary accommodation 
Temporary accommodation Number of 
responses 
Per cent of 
responses 
Per cent of 
respondents 
Evacuation centre 22 3.6 4.8 
Homeless shelter 6 1.0 1.3 
Hotel or B&B 78 12.9 16.9 
Friends or relatives 204 33.6 44.2 
Rented from council or housing 
association 
59 9.7 12.8 
Rented from private landlord 183 30.1 39.6 
Other 55 9.1 11.9 
    
TOTAL – responses 607 100.0  

















IMPACTS OF FLOODING 
 
Table 21  Length of time unable to stay in home 
Length of time unable to stay in home Number of 
households 
Per cent of 
households 
   1-7 nights 44 9.5 
   8-28 nights 18 3.9 
   1-3 months 47 10.2 
   4-6 months 143 31.0 
   6+ months 207 44.8 
   Still out of home 3 0.6 
   
TOTAL 462 100.0 
 
 
Table 22  Financial damage to building and contents 
 Mean Damage (£) N 
     Buildings 31,980 184 
     Contents 13,552 260 
 
 
Table 23  Work days lost 
Type of leave Mean work days lost 
by those affected 
Mean work days lost 
per household 
Compassionate leave or sick leave 
















Table 24  Flood impacts 








 Mean N Mean N 
Tangible:       
Financial loss 1.53 563 1.69 508 
Loss of house value 1.36 557 1.70 443 
Disruption to electricity supply 1.33 550 1.63 449 
Damage to car or van 0.76 534 1.40 292 
Used holiday entitlement 0.65 530 1.19 288 
     
AVERAGE SCORE 1.12  1.52  
      
Intangible – immediate:     
Discomfort/inconvenience 2.20 586 2.31 556 
Stress of flood itself 2.03 601 2.09 582 
Having to leave home 1.91 575 2.33 471 
Dealing with insurers 1.67 590 1.88 524 
Living in temporary accommodation 1.62 585 2.03 467 
Dealing with builders 1.62 578 1.97 474 
Being stranded in/out of home 1.62 556 1.88 478 
     
AVERAGE SCORE 1.81  2.07  
      
Intangible – lasting:     
Time and effort to return to normal 2.21 591 2.33 560 
Worry about future flooding 2.14 601 2.21 581 
Irreplaceable/sentimental items 1.53 585 1.85 484 
Strains between family 1.02 570 1.29 449 
Loss of community spirit 0.97 552 1.17 457 
Deterioration to mental health 0.94 560 1.21 438 
Deterioration to physical health 0.82 579 1.06 450 
Loss or distress to pets 0.71 564 1.45 278 
     
AVERAGE SCORE 1.29  1.57  
     
* ‘N/A’ or ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 














   
Tangible:   
Average score 1.11 1.13 
    
Intangible - immediate:   
Average score 1.79 1.83 
    
Intangible - lasting:   
Average score 1.29 1.29 
   
* ‘N/A’ or ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 
 
 
Table 26  Flood impacts, by whether has contents insurance (mean score*) 
Impact 
 







   
Tangible:   
Average score 1.15 1.01 
    
Intangible - immediate:   
Average score 1.87 1.55 
    
Intangible - lasting:   
Average score 1.31 1.33 
   
* ‘N/A’ or ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 
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Tangible:   
Average score 0.94 1.17 
    
Intangible - immediate:   
Average score 1.76 1.82 
    
Intangible - lasting:   
Average score 1.23 1.31 
   
* ‘N/A’ or ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 
 
 






Under £20,000 pa 
min n=151 
Over £20,000 pa 
min n=133 
   
Tangible:   
Average score 1.08 1.08 
    
Intangible - immediate:   
Average score 1.77 1.72 
    
Intangible - lasting:   
Average score 1.30 1.12 
   
* ‘N/A’ or ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 
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Table 29  Flood impacts, by occupational group (mean score*) 






















    
Tangible:    
Average score 1.10 1.10 1.19 
     
Intangible - immediate:    
Average score 1.79 1.88 1.82 
     
Intangible - lasting:    
Average score 1.16 1.31 1.37 
    
* ‘N/A’ or ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 
 
 
Table 30  Flood impacts, by number of times flooded (mean score*) 








    
Tangible:    
Average score 1.05 1.34 1.21 
     
Intangible - immediate:    
Average score 1.74 2.06 1.72 
     
Intangible - lasting:    
Average score 1.20 1.55 1.53 
    
* ‘N/A’ or ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 
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Table 31  Flood impacts, by type of flood (mean score*) 








    
Tangible:    
Average score 1.12 1.18 1.01 
     
Intangible - immediate:    
Average score 1.80 1.85 1.70 
     
Intangible - lasting:    
Average score 1.27 1.53 1.06 
    
* ‘N/A’ or ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 
 
 
Table 32  Flood impacts, by depth of flood (mean score*) 








    
Tangible:    
Average score 0.88 0.90 1.31 
     
Intangible - immediate:    
Average score 1.38 1.58 2.05 
     
Intangible - lasting:    
Average score 0.93 1.06 1.50 
    
* ‘N/A’ or ‘No impact’=0; ‘Mild impact’=1; ‘Serious impact’=2; ‘Extreme impact’=3 
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Table 33  Flood impacts, by housing tenure (mean score*) 



























      
Tangible:      
Average score 1.23 1.11 0.96 0.76 0.77 
       
Intangible - 
immediate:   
   
Average score 1.91 1.70 1.92 1.54 1.49 
       
Intangible - 
lasting:   
   
Average score 1.32 1.17 1.61 1.26 0.96 
      






































































































































































































































































































































































Table 35  Impact of flood on sense of community 
Since the flood the sense of community has… Number of 
responses 
Per cent of 
respondents 
Improved 106 17.1 
Remained the same 366 59.0 
Deteriorated 97 15.6 
Don’t know 51 8.2 
   
TOTAL 620 100.0 
 
 
Table 36  Reasons for moving house or considering moving house 
Reason Number of 
respondents 
citing reason 
Per cent of 
respondents 
Reasons unrelated to the flood 34 15.5 
House will/would never be the same again 59 26.8 
Living in the house brings/brought back negative 
feelings about the flood 
64 29.1 
Fear of another flood 183 83.2 
Friends/family have moved out of the area 12 5.5 
Property has become a poor investment 97 44.1 





LIVING WITH FLOODS 
 
Perception of risk 
 
Table 37  Perception of flood risk, by whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 
Perceived likelihood of being flooded 










Very likely 30.0 11.5 21.0 
Likely 33.6 29.7 31.7 
Unlikely 23.9 36.3 30.0 
Very unlikely 10.7 16.2 13.3 
Zero or negligible likelihood 1.8 6.3 4.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 






























































































































































































































































































































































Table 39  Knowledge about flood risk, by whether flooded 
(per cent of respondents) 











Very well informed 6.8 5.7 6.3 
Well informed 25.3 27.4 26.3 
Not very well informed 41.3 40.9 41.1 
Not at all informed 26.5 26.0 26.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 1.058; df=3; p>0.01 
 
 
Table 40  Information sources on flood risk, by whether flooded 
(per cent of respondents) 









Neighbours, friends or relatives 40.0 36.0 38.1 
Local radio 29.7 27.3 28.6 
Local press 20.6 34.3 27.2 
National media coverage 29.9 26.9 28.5 
Floodline 33.2 19.4 26.5 
Local council 35.6 38.0 36.7 
Other 14.8 10.7 12.8 
 
 
Table 41  Frequency of worry about flooding, by whether flooded 
(per cent of respondents) 









Most of the time 22.9 4.1 13.8 
Often 38.1 24.2 31.4 
Rarely 32.9 54.9 43.5 
Never 6.1 16.8 11.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 160.075; df=3; p<0.001 
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Table 42  Triggers of worry about flooding, by whether flooded 










Visiting places that remind me of the flood 6.1 2.5 11.9 
Talking about the flood 15.4 9.6 4.4 
Reports about flooding in the media 37.9 26.4 12.6 
Forecasts of heavy rainfall 62.3 34.1 32.4 
Heavy rainfall 76.8 55.3 48.8 
Seeing the river in spate and/or rising 73.5 58.0 66.5 
Other 6.1 4.3 66.1 
    
Never worries about flooding 6.0 18.5 11.9 
    
 
 
Managing flood risk 
 
Table 43  Contents insurance, by whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 









Yes 94.7 87.1 90.8 
No 4.1 10.5 7.3 
Don’t know 1.2 2.4 1.8 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 17.085; df=2; p<0.001 
 
 
Table 44  Whether flooding covered by contents insurance, by whether flooded 
(per cent of respondents) 











Yes 84.0 59.8 72.2 
No 3.9 8.3 6.1 
Don’t know 12.1 32.0 21.8 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 












Table 45  Higher flooding excess on contents insurance, by whether flooded 
(per cent of respondents) 











Yes 36.8 17.1 27.4 
No 33.8 32.0 32.9 
Don’t know 29.5 50.9 39.6 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 53.588; df=2; p<0.001 
 
 
Table 46  Contents insurance at time of flood and at time of survey, by housing 
tenure 
Housing tenure Per cent with 
contents insurance 
at time of flood 
Per cent with 
contents insurance 
at time of survey 


























Table 47  Knowledge of ‘Pay-with-rent’ schemes among council tenants, by 
whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 









Yes 39.1 34.5 36.9 
No 60.9 65.5 63.1 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 0.274; df=1; p>0.01 
 
 
Table 48  Uptake of ‘Pay-with-rent’ schemes among council tenants, by whether 
flooded (per cent of respondents) 









Yes 13.7 11.1 12.6 
No 78.4 75.0 77.0 
Don’t know or N/A 7.9 13.9 10.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 0.925; df=2; p>0.01 
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Table 49  Reasons for not having contents insurance 
Reason Number of 
responses 
Per cent of 
responses 
Per cent of 
respondents 
Possessions of insufficient value 12 15.8 18.8 
Insufficiently likely to be required 9 11.8 14.1 
Could afford to replace items 4 5.3 6.3 
Could not afford the premium 30 39.5 46.9 
Could not get contents insurance 14 18.4 21.9 
Other 7 9.2 10.9 
    
TOTAL – responses 76 100.0  
TOTAL – respondents 64  118.8 
 
 
Table 50  Flood alleviation measures taken, by whether flooded (per cent of 
respondents) 









Installed non-return valves on drains 2.0 0.8 1.4 
Keep ditches and drains around the property clean 18.0 9.0 13.6 
Built walls around the property 12.0 3.6 7.9 
Purchased water pumps 3.2 0.2 1.7 
Purchased removable flood guards or sandbags 19.3 6.6 13.1 
Received removable flood guards or sandbags from 
the council 
12.9 8.1 10.5 
Avoid keeping sentimental or irreplaceable items 
downstairs 
22.5 6.2 14.5 
Avoid having expensive furniture or floor coverings 
downstairs 
8.4 2.8 5.7 
Replaced plasterboard with plaster 1.8 0.2 1.0 
Installed concrete floors 7.0 1.3 4.2 
Replaced carpets with rugs 5.5 2.6 4.1 
Moved power sockets 9.3 0.9 5.2 
Moved electrical appliances 4.3 0.9 2.7 
Other 10.0 6.2 8.1 
    
Not taken any flood alleviation measures 39.3 68.9 53.7 












Table 51  Reasons for not undertaking any flood alleviation measures 
Reason Number of 
responses 
Per cent of 
responses 
Per cent of 
respondents
Did not know about these measures 123 7.6 14.4 
Could not afford these measures 121 7.5 14.1 
Have not got round to organising these 
measures 
44 2.7 5.1 
Adequate flood defences and/or 
improvements in the local drains have 
been or will be put in place 
230 14.3 26.9 
Planning to move house soon 21 1.3 2.5 
Do not think they would be effective 127 7.9 14.8 
It is the landlord’s responsibility 133 8.2 15.5 
The government or council should 
provide flood alleviation measures 
313 19.4 36.6 
A flood of such magnitude is unlikely to 
occur again 
159 9.9 18.6 
Have been unable to procure the 
necessary equipment 
17 1.1 2.0 
Have been unable to hire the appropriate 
expertise 
8 0.5 0.9 
Have insurance 198 12.3 23.1 
Could not reach agreement with 
neighbours 
5 0.3 0.6 
Other 114 7.1 13.3 
    
TOTAL – responses 1,613 100.0  
TOTAL – respondents 856  188.4 
 
 
Table 52  Awareness of Floodline, by whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 









Yes 74.2 59.4 67.1 
No 25.8 40.6 32.9 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 28.369; df=1; p<0.001 
 
 
Table 53  Use of Floodline, by whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 









Yes 37.5 13.1 26.7 
No 62.5 86.9 73.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 




Table 54  Helpfulness of Floodline, by whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 









Very helpful 25.5 17.0 23.6 
Helpful 52.2 62.3 54.4 
Unhelpful 17.4 13.2 16.5 
Very unhelpful 4.9 7.5 5.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 3.013; df=3; p>0.01 
 
 
Table 55  Receipt of a formal flood warning, by whether flooded 
(per cent of respondents) 









Yes 51.0 34.4 42.9 
No 49.0 65.6 57.1 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 32.400; df=1; p<0.001 
 
 
Table 56  Frequency of receipt of formal flood warning, by whether flooded 
(per cent of respondents) 











One 52.7 51.6 52.3 
Two 27.8 27.1 27.5 
Three + 19.5 21.3 20.2 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 0.188; df=2; p>0.01 
 
 
Table 57  Confidence of sufficient warning of a future flood, by whether ever 
received a warning and whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 

















Very confident 9.9 2.9 9.6 6.6 
Confident 36.3 18.2 51.1 33.6 
Not very confident 38.4 45.0 34.6 40.2 
Not at all confident 15.4 33.9 4.8 19.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Chi-squared = 49.637; df=3; p<0.001 
**Chi-squared = 30.262; df=3; p<0.001 
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Table 58  Confidence of knowing what to do in a future flood, by whether 
flooded (per cent of respondents) 









Very confident 18.3 10.5 14.5 
Confident 47.0 42.2 44.7 
Not very confident 25.1 37.1 30.9 
Not at all confident 9.6 10.2 9.9 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 26.401; df=3; p<0.001 
 
 
Table 59  Preferred means of receiving a flood warning, by whether flooded 
(per cent of respondents) 






Neighbour 23.2 20.5 21.9 
Radio announcement 32.1 35.2 33.6 
Television announcement 36.5 36.0 36.2 
Automatic telephone message 22.0 19.7 20.9 
Telephone ‘cascade’ system 14.7 12.5 13.6 
Floodline 31.4 21.4 26.6 
An official knocking on your door 59.7 57.8 58.8 
Loud hailer in the street 38.0 32.8 35.5 
Text message 13.6 16.3 14.9 
Phone call 35.1 38.1 36.5 
Observe the river yourself 46.9 37.1 42.2 
Other 2.3 2.1 2.2 
 
 
Table 60  Whether received a formal flood warning, by age 
(per cent of respondents) 





Yes 20.6 26.3 
No 79.4 73.7 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 2.714; df=1; p>0.01 
  
Table 61  Whether received a formal flood warning, by income group 
(per cent of respondents) 





Less than £20,000 per annum 58.4 56.5 
More than £20,000 per annum 41.6 43.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 0.113; df=1; p>0.01 
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 Table 62  Whether received a formal flood warning, by occupational class 
(per cent of respondents) 





Professional, managerial and associated 
occupations 
41.0 40.6 
Skilled occupations 34.1 33.9 
Semi-skilled and unskilled occupations 24.9 25.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
 Chi-squared = 0.023; df=2; p>0.01 
 
 
Table 63  Whether received a formal flood warning, by housing tenure 
(per cent of respondents) 





Being bought with a mortgage 35.9 37.9 
Owned outright by household 39.2 43.6 
Rented from council 19.0 13.0 
Rented from a housing association or trust 1.7 2.9 
Rented from a private landlord or employer 3.8 2.0 
Other 0.4 0.6 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
 Chi-squared = 7.988; df=6; p>0.01 
 
 
Table 64  Acceptability of flood management policies, by whether flooded 
(per cent of respondents indicating policy is acceptable) 







Structural flood defences 
 
92.6 89.4 91.1 
Valves fitted to sewers and/or storm 
drains 
89.5 88.4 89.0 
Upstream reservoirs 
 
88.2 83.6 86.0 
Sustainable urban drainage systems 
 
80.2 77.1 78.7 
Flood warning service 
 
90.3 86.6 88.5 
Demolition of the most threatened 
properties and relocation of the occupants
45.1 33.3 39.2 
Pay farmers and land managers upstream 
to undertake practices that increase the 
water-holding capacity of the ground 




Table 65  Views of where responsibility for flood protection SHOULD lie  
Where responsibility for flood 
protection SHOULD lie 
Number of 
responses 
Per cent of 
responses 
Per cent of 
respondents 
Yourself 93 5.9 8.3 
Landlord 51 3.2 4.6 
Local council 654 41.4 58.4 
Scottish Executive 357 22.6 31.9 
SEPA 211 13.4 18.9 
Scottish Water 184 11.6 16.4 
Other 30 1.9 2.7 
    
TOTAL – responses 1,580 100.0  
TOTAL – respondents 1,119  141.2 
 
 
Table 66  Views of where responsibility for flood protection SHOULD lie, by age 
(per cent of respondents) 
Household has member over 70 years? Where responsibility for flood 




Yourself 7.7 8.5 
Landlord 4.8 4.5 
Local council 64.5 56.7 
Scottish Executive 26.2 33.5 
SEPA 19.4 18.7 
Scottish Water 18.5 15.8 
Other 4.0 2.3 
 
 
Table 67  Views of where responsibility for flood protection SHOULD lie, by 
income group (per cent of respondents) 
Income group Where responsibility for flood 




Yourself 8.9 7.9 
Landlord 4.9 1.7 
Local council 63.6 47.9 
Scottish Executive 29.2 38.6 
SEPA 18.9 15.2 
Scottish Water 16.9 8.6 










Table 68  Views of where responsibility for flood protection SHOULD lie, by 
occupational class (per cent of respondents) 
Occupational class Where responsibility for 












Yourself 8.5 11.1 6.7 
Landlord 1.4 4.2 5.7 
Local council 53.6 61.5 61.1 
Scottish Executive 35.0 25.2 33.7 
SEPA 19.9 19.8 14.0 
Scottish Water 12.3 12.2 19.2 
Other 3.6 2.7 2.6 
 
  
Table 69  Views of where responsibility for flood protection SHOULD lie, by 
housing tenure (per cent of respondents) 
























Yourself 8.1 10.7 3.3 9.1 5.9 
Landlord 0.7 0.3 13.7 33.3 19.6 
Local council 53.5 58.7 71.9 60.6 54.9 
Scottish Executive 36.5 33.7 19.0 15.2 25.5 
SEPA 16.8 23.5 14.4 9.1 11.8 
Scottish Water 14.1 18.5 14.4 30.3 9.8 
Other 2.0 4.2 0.7 6.1 2.0 
 
 
Table 70  Views of where responsibility for flood protection DOES lie 
Where responsibility for flood 
protection DOES lie 
Number of 
responses 
Per cent of 
responses 
Per cent of 
respondents 
Yourself 257 18.6 22.9 
Landlord 29 2.1 2.6 
Local council 508 36.7 45.4 
Scottish Executive 188 13.6 16.8 
SEPA 119 8.6 10.6 
Scottish Water 114 8.2 10.2 
Other 14 1.0 1.3 
Don’t know 154 11.1 13.8 
    
TOTAL – responses 1,383 100.0  





Table 71  Willingness to pay extra Council Tax per annum for flood protection, 
by whether flooded (per cent of respondents) 









Not willing to pay any extra 58.4 51.5 55.1 
Under £20 12.2 17.4 14.7 
£20-£49 13.4 17.4 15.3 
£50-£99 5.7 7.2 6.4 
£100+ 10.2 6.6 8.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 15.085; df=4; p<0.01 
 
Table 72  Willingness to pay extra Council Tax per annum for flood protection, 




Extra Council Tax per annum 
 
 
Under £20,000 pa 
n=345 
Over £20,000 pa 
n=290 
Not willing to pay any extra 55.7 37.2 
Under £20 16.5 14.1 
£20-£49 15.1 21.7 
£50-£99 5.8 11.0 
£100+ 7.0 15.9 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Chi-squared = 32.347; df=4; p<0.01 
 
 
Table 73.  Willingness to pay extra Council Tax per annum for flood protection, 
by housing tenure (per cent of respondents) 
Housing tenure 
Extra Council 




























Not willing to pay 







Under £20 14.9 12.8 16.6 19.4 22.0 
£20-£49 17.6 16.2 11.7 9.7 14.0 
£50-£99 7.9 5.0 3.7 6.5 4.0 
£100+ 12.4 8.4 2.5 - 2.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 












Thank you for agreeing to provide your views on aspects of flood emergency management and flood 
preparedness in your council (interviewee is assured as to personal confidentiality). 
 
 
Flood emergency planning and warning dissemination – planning stage 
 
How are the responsibilities divided both between between council and emergency services and within 
council departments in flood preparation (eg roads, emergency planning etc)? 
 
How is emergency planning organised on a supra-council level? 
 
What recent experience has there been of initiating the emergency plan or exercises based on it? 
 
What are the procedures for warning dissemination? 
 
What is your experience with warning dissemination?  
 
Do you have systems in place to warn householders, landowners, businesses, directly? If so, how do 
they work? 
 




Flood emergency planning and warning dissemination – operational and post-flood stage 
 
In what ways do you use sandbags and/or other temporary flood prevention measures? 
 
How are local contacts in the community involved at the operational stage? 
 
What are the procedures for evacuation? 
 
What is your experience with evacuation?  
 
How are social tenants re-housed? What are the arrangements for others?  
 
What are the responsibilities of council and other emergency service after a flood? 
 
 
Flood preparedness – social aspects 
 
What measures do you take to draw householders’ attention to the council’s flood initiatives outwith 
flood events? 
 
How successful do you think these have been? 
 
How are local stakeholders involved in formulating the emergency plans? E.g. Flood groups, 
community councils, landowners? 
 
Have you any permanent flood alleviation schemes planned? What stage are these at? 
 
What are the social aspects of the planning procedures for these schemes? How do you involve 
landowners, those affected directly and other stakeholders? 
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Insurance Industry representative 
 
Assessing a particular property 
 
Could you please recap the company’s method for assessing the level of flood risk facing a particular 
property? 
 
What is the typical level of uncertainty? 
 
If a property is deemed to be at high risk of flooding, is the householder over obliged under your terms 
to put in place flood alleviation measures (e.g. build a wall around the property, keep sandbags, pumps, 
etc)? 
 




Managing flood risk 
 
If increasing or decreasing, what are the reasons for this? 
 
Is, or has, the company engaged in any research, analysis or information gathering in relation to better 
understanding current flood risk?  If so, does it relate to individual properties or overall risk 
management? 
 
Is, or has, the company engaged in any research, analysis or information gathering in relation to better 
understanding future flood risk?  If so, does it relate to individual properties or overall risk 
management? 
 
Does the company have any information on the reduction in risk or damage associated with: 
a) flood defences? 
b) flood warning schemes? 
c) flood alleviation measures around the home? 
d) awareness-raising initiatives (e.g. SEPA Flood Awareness Fortnight, Local Authority Biennial 
Reports)? 
 
Is the company doing anything to raise the awareness of its policy holders living in flood risk areas?  If 
so, what?  Do you know of any competitors doing so? 
 
 
Do you know of any data or reports that could shed light on the social impacts of flooding and flood 
risk?  Is it possible that the research team might be able to get access to these data? 
 



















Flood warning coverage 
 
What is the current state of flood warning coverage nationally? 
 
Is there room for improvement in  
o areal coverage 
o warning accuracy 
o lead times? 
 
In extending warning systems to new areas, what is SEPA’s approach in relation to local authorities 
and the Executive (cost/benefit, funding issues, etc)? 
 
Do the methods differ between catchments/ warning areas, e.g. are there differences in approach to 
warning when lead times are short – say 3-6 hours? 
 
How does the information cascade operate in those catchments were it is used and does this affect the 
amount of warning time that can be given? 
 
What arrangements exist for coastal flood warning? 
 
What information does SEPA give to others during a flood alert– e.g the local authority, the emergency 
services, etc. To what extent is the practical role of advising individuals affected by the emergency then 





What are SEPA’s plans for engaging 
o the community  
o emergency planners 
o the emergency services 
Outwith flood events, to try to maximise the effectiveness of flood warnings and Floodline in a given 
area? 
 
How would SEPA engage with these (and any other) bodies post-flood event? 
 
How aware do SEPA feel the public are of role in flood warning and flood prevention vis-à-vis the role 
of local authorities, emergency services, etc? 
 
Based on experience with the flood awareness campaigns how have SEPA’s plans for improving 




Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department 
 
National policy on flood prevention 
 
What measures are in place to raise public and stakeholder awareness of flooding on a national level? 
 
In what ways is the executive SE directing Local Authorities’ approaches toward flood alleviation? 
 
How will the Executive smooth out interaction between the planning system and other statutory 
procedures for future flood prevention schemes? 
 
What is the current degree of take-up of the budget for flood alleviation schemes?  
 
How will the CAR regulations impact on new schemes? 
 
*Can you anticipate how decisions will be made on flood alleviation schemes in the future as regards 
sustainability? Can you anticipate how far social costs of flood risk might be factored in to such 
decisions? 
 
For pluvial flooding, what is the current strategy on reducing flood risk? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Assistance to those affected by flooding 
 
What assistance is presently offered to those unable to obtain/ afford flood insurance? 
 
What other assistance is available from the Executive to those at risk of flooding? 
 
What is the Executive’s view on the current state of emergency planning, especially in the light of the 




How far does the legislative framework (particularly the 1961 and 1997 Acts) inhibit the newer WEWS 









What are the main issues you are facing currently with regards to emergency management of sewer and 
drain flooding? 
 
Can you outline for us the emergency procedures that SW follows when there is a flooding incident 
causing drain/ sewer backup of households? 
 
How are your registers of households at risk of flooding drawn up? 
 
Do you operate any warning systems and/ or procedures for these households and/or advice and 
information lines?  
If so, can you explain how those operate?  
 
How would your emergency procedures operate when there are a large number of households phoning 
in all needing assistance at the same time? 
 




Maintenance and renewal in urban areas 
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